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discounted purchase price, such an approach avoids the risk inherent in a system that treats legal protections
as mere default rules: that an ignorant minority will be taken advantage of as a result of accidental waiver.
Whether or not the investor was truly ignorant, there can be no injustice if she was adequately compensated
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protections for unsophisticated investors who fail to do so.
Keywords

Minority, Oppression, Close corporation

This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol56/iss2/2

ILLIG.OFFTOPRINTER

12/13/2006 4:37:53 PM

MINORITY INVESTOR PROTECTIONS AS
DEFAULT NORMS: USING PRICE TO
ILLUMINATE THE DEAL IN CLOSE
CORPORATIONS
*

ROBERT C. ILLIG

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.........................................................................................276
I.
A Challenge: Minority Investor Vulnerability .........................283
A. The Nature of the Challenge.............................................286
B. The Nature of the Response ..............................................294
1. The remedy of oppression............................................296
2. The dissenters’ right of appraisal.................................302
C. The Sources for the Response ...........................................305
D. The Defects in the Response .............................................308
1. A false analogy...............................................................309
2. A false resemblance ..................................................... 311
3. A false equivalency ........................................................315
4. An ambiguous silence ...................................................318
E. Investor Protections as Default Norms..............................324
II.
A Solution: Using Price as a Diagnostic Tool..........................328
A. Price as a Proxy for Risk .....................................................330
B. The Valuation of Private Firms ..........................................334
1. Firm-specific risk ...........................................................337
2. The discount for lack of control ..................................338
3. The discount for lack of marketability.........................340
C. The Private Allocation of Risk ...........................................343
*

Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. B.A. 1991, Williams College;
J.D. 1996, Vanderbilt University. E-mail: rillig@uoregon.edu. This research was made
possible by the University of Oregon’s Dean’s Advisory Council Endowment Fund. I am
indebted to my many wonderful colleagues at Oregon for their helpful comments
and suggestions. I am also grateful for the able research assistance provided from
time to time by Suzanne Ahlport, Ben Brummel, John Christianson, Kris Gustafson,
Nick Newton, Jessika Palmer, Reid Verner, Morgan West, and others.

275

ILLIG.OFFTOPRINTER

276

12/13/2006 4:37:53 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:2

D. Pricing and Efficiency ........................................................348
A Test: Revisiting the Early Caselaw ........................................350
A. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype ..................................................352
B. Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries............................................360
Conclusion ...........................................................................................365
III.

INTRODUCTION
Close corporation law ignores investor intentions. Out of concern
1
for the vulnerable status of minority investors, lawmakers in a
majority of jurisdictions have sought to impose on close corporations
a uniform allocation of power that places fixed limits on the ability of
2
controlling shareholders to determine corporate policy.
1. For a discussion comparing the law’s treatment of vulnerable shareholder
minorities with its treatment of racial and ethnic minorities, see Anupam Chander,
Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 120 (2003) (arguing that
unlike constitutional law, which often requires blinding itself to minority status to
achieve equality, corporation law mandates that minority status be taken into
account to ensure equality). This analogy is considered in more depth in Part I.D.1.
2. Minority investors are inherently susceptible to attempts by controlling
shareholders to misappropriate the value of their investment. See, e.g., Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975)
(describing the “true plight of the minority stockholder in a close corporation”).
Such opportunistic behavior by controlling shareholders is referred to as
“oppression” and comes in many guises. See, e.g., Willis v. Bydalek, 997 S.W.2d 798,
801 (Tex. App. 1999) (defining “oppression” as conduct that either “substantially
defeats the minority’s expectations” or is “burdensome, harsh, or wrongful”) (citing
Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 381-82 (Tex. App. 1988)).
Perhaps the most common variations involve abuse of the controlling
shareholders’ control over the payment of compensation and dividends. Because
close corporation shareholders typically serve a dual role as both owners and
employees of the company, a controlling shareholder has the power to pay herself a
large salary while restricting the payment of salary and dividends to other investors.
In this way, she can pay out the corporation’s profits only to herself, either on an
ongoing basis or as a prelude to eliminating the minority. See, e.g., Shelstad v. Cook,
253 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 1977) (addressing a situation where the controlling
shareholders withheld dividends and salaries from forty-six percent minority
investors); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977) (declining to compel the
majority shareholders to pay out larger dividend to benefit the minority); Wilson v.
Wilson-Cook Med., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 533 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (adjudicating a situation
where the majority shareholders forced out a minority shareholder from his position
as president of the corporation absent any malfeasance).
Other common variants include: signing sweetheart agreements with unrelated
companies that the controlling shareholders also control, see, e.g., Wometco Enters.,
Inc. v. Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 528 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1976)
(discussing how a controlling interest holder in a corporation formed a distinct
private company which purchased and leased equipment to the corporation, thereby
gaining assured profit); Street v. Vitti, 685 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (examining a
situation where the majority shareholder used the corporation’s funds to provide a
loan to another corporation in which he was also a majority shareholder); causing
the corporation to redeem a small percentage of the controlling shareholders’ stake
for a large price, see, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 505 (finding a breach of fiduciary
duty where the controlling stockholders allowed the company to purchase a former
controlling stockholder’s shares for a price much greater than minority stockholders
could have sold their shares); and structuring a corporate merger or other
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Entrepreneurs and other investors have a variety of risk preferences
and investment goals, however, and so differ widely in their ideal
3
investment bargain. Nonetheless, progressive courts and scholars
have been unwilling to sanction a scheme that would permit the
4
waiver of shareholder protections in close corporations.
Their
acquisition transaction so that the bulk of the consideration flows to the controlling
shareholders, see, e.g., Landy v. Amsterdam, 815 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing
minority shareholders’ claim of unfairness in a merger pushed through by majority
shareholders); Carl Marks & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 233 A.2d 63 (Del. Ch.
1967) (denying a minority shareholder petition for appraisal of her shares by the
Delaware Court of Chancery in a short-form merger context).
In each of these cases, the abusive conduct may be an end to itself or an attempt to
force the minority to sell its shares back to the controlling shareholders for less than
fair value, a transaction known commonly as a “squeeze-out.” See generally 1 F. HODGE
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC
MEMBERS:
PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER
INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 1:1, 1-2 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) (defining the term squeezeout as “the use by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of
strategic position, inside information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some
legal device or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners
or participants”).
For a discussion of the underlying causes of the vulnerability of minority investors
to such oppressive conduct, see infra Part I.A. For a discussion of the development of
the remedy of oppression, see infra Part I.B.
3. See, e.g., ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 540 (2004)
(explaining that, in some cases, an investor may be willing to “pay more in return for
less control dilution”). For a discussion of investor expectations in the venture
capital context, see infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
4. The issue of minority investor vulnerability has received a great deal of
scholarly attention over the years. See, e.g., Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for
Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969)
(examining the strengths and defects of the oppression provisions of the English
Companies Act of 1948 and the Uniform Australian Companies Act of 1961 in order
to assess their applicability to the United States); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1985-1986)
(assessing differences between close and public corporations); J.A.C. Hetherington,
The Minority’s Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations, 1972 DUKE L.J. 921 (discussing
situations that may obligate minority stockholders to take the interests of other
parties into account when they exercise their rights as owners); J.A.C. Hetherington
& Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977) (hypothesizing that the
problem of exploitation is related to illiquidity and therefore cannot be remedied by
contract or judicial decision); Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out:
Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992)
(considering close corporations from the standpoint of a “Coasean Contractual
Theory”—“because it is costly to bargain around the law, courts should imply
standard form or ‘default’ contract terms that mimic the terms that most parties
would have explicitly included in their contracts”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close
Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143 (1989) (examining how limited liability
affects agency problems in the structure of close corporations and how unlimited
liability in the partnership form induces beneficial monitoring activity); Lawrence E.
Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675
(1990) [hereinafter Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty] (observing that courts are
increasingly relying on marketplace morals to define internal corporate conduct);
Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the Shareholder
Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine of
implied-in-fact contracts is not sufficient to protect minority investors from
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response to the threat of oppression, in other words, does not
attempt to interpret or enforce the particulars of the parties’ initial
5
investment contract. Rather, the legal protections that have evolved
to shield minority investors from oppression restrict the parties’
freedom to structure their enterprise in a manner that they deem
6
optimal.

oppression because the parties’ bargain is often too indefinite to enforce under
contract law and because compensatory damages may not provide an oppressed
investor with an adequate remedy); F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing
Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873 (1977-1978) (summarizing close
corporation legislation since World War II and making recommendations for
additional reforms); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913
(1999) (evaluating the extent to which the law should permit minority shareholders
to exit in light of the possible loss of match-specific assets that are of greater value to
the firm than to outsiders); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and
Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988) [hereinafter
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution] (analyzing the historical development of the
reasonable expectations standard and its future implications); Robert B. Thompson,
The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 699-703 (1993)
[hereinafter Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action] (discussing how legislatures and
courts have responded to “squeeze-outs” by majority shareholders).
The issue of the waiver of fiduciary duties has been addressed more broadly as
well. See, e.g., Lucien Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989) (arguing
that substantial reasons exist for limiting a corporation’s ability to opt out of the rules
of corporation law after its initial charter has been adopted); Victor Brudney,
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403
(1985) (criticizing the idea that private bargaining sufficiently restrains management
shirking and self-dealing in the public company context); John C. Coffee, Jr., No
Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of
Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988) (exploring the boundary line that separates
areas of corporation law that should be subject to private ordering from those that
should be mandatory); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 46 (1990) (providing a
“comprehensive response” to critics of the contractual theory of the corporation).
5. But see Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 1836 (“The main problem with the
shareholder voting mechanism is the lack of information. . . . most voting
shareholders do not know whether the proposed amendment is value-decreasing or
value-increasing”); Brudney, supra note 4, at 1414 (“Insofar as managers’ duties and
entitlements are expressly defined by agreement, those agreements are rarely, if ever,
exhibited to public stockholders, let alone negotiated with stockholder
participation.”). Characterized by Butler and Ribstein as “anti-contractarian”
scholars, Bebchuk and Brudney argued against the enforcement of a waiver of
fiduciary duties in the public company context based on, among other things, the
presumed ignorance of most investors regarding the nature and content of their
investment contract. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 42. Presumably, they would
not view the typical close corporation investor as any less ignorant than her public
company counterpart. For a discussion of the defects of this approach in the close
corporation context, see infra Part I.D.4.
6. See infra Part I.B, which explores the objective nature of current approaches
to the problem of minority investor vulnerability. See also Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr.,
Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 216, 218-19 (1992) (arguing that many investors rationally prefer the statutory
allocation of power in favor of controlling shareholders).
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The law regarding oppression is not settled, however. Whereas
progressive lawmakers would provide minority investors with
protections for which they did not bargain, others would sacrifice
legal protections for the most vulnerable investors in order to
strengthen private ordering. Delaware courts, for example, have so
far declined to extend special protections to minority investors in
close corporations, believing instead that investors should protect
7
themselves through contractual means. Similarly, economists and
legal scholars of the contractarian school have argued in favor of
permitting investors to opt out of fiduciary duties like those that
8
protect minority investors. Although their economic arguments
regarding the operation of efficient markets apply only to public
corporations, such scholars nonetheless posit that the ability for close
corporation investors to deal directly with one another justifies a
9
scheme that maximizes the investors’ freedom to bargain.
What is needed, then, is a tool to determine when protections for
minority investors should be set aside in favor of private ordering. To
the extent courts could determine whether an aggrieved investor had
been previously compensated for bearing the risks associated with her
minority status, the law would not need to answer the difficult
normative question of which minority investors deserve legal
7. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1933) (rejecting a “special
rule” applicable only to minority investors).
In other states—most notably
Massachusetts—controlling shareholders owe the minority the “utmost good faith
and loyalty.” Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d
505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (holding that the controlling shareholder could not use his
position to create a market for only his shares, to the exclusion of the minority
shareholder); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass.
1976) (holding that the dismissal of a minority stockholder from the payroll with the
intention of pressuring the minority stockholder to sell his shares to the corporation
at less than fair value constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty). Moreover, even in states
that apply such protections, numerous standards abound and the outcome of any
particular case is likely to depend in large part on the preconceptions of the trier of
fact. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 825-26 (2000) (stating that whereas a
minority-perspective court finds oppression in any action—justifiable or not—that
hurts the minority shareholders, a majority-perspective court finds oppression only
when the controlling shareholders have taken action that is not justified by a
legitimate business interest). As a result, an investor contemplating a minority
participation is faced with a great deal of uncertainty as to whether, and to what
extent, she can rely on the legal system to protect her investment.
8. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 271 (assessing differences
between close and public corporations); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 250 (1991); Butler & Ribstein, supra
note 4, at 46.
9. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 20 (“In closely held corporations
and partnerships, in which all owners generally are active in control of the business,
monitoring of agents is less of a problem than in public companies, in which
ownership is separated from control.”).
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10

protection. Rather, the parties’ bargain could be enforced as it was
intended.
Fortunately, such a tool already exists. The parties’ expectations
are often visible in the price they paid for their shares when first
investing. Certainly, many sophisticated and wealthy investors are
likely to engage counsel to identify and allocate with precision the
11
many risks involved in a particular transaction.
Unsophisticated
investors and those lacking resources, on the other hand, are more
likely to take the approach of simply adjusting the purchase price to
12
compensate for the presence of additional risk.
Indeed, where
resources are few or the size of the investment small, allocating risk
13
through price adjustments may be both economical and efficient.
Thus, where the purchase price paid by controlling and minority
shareholders is essentially equivalent, one can safely assume that the
parties did not expect the minority to bear a disproportionate
amount of the investment risk. In such a case, the exercise of undue
influence by the controlling shareholders would likely be deemed
oppressive. On the other hand, to the extent the purchase prices
diverge, it may be possible to infer that the parties intended to
allocate a greater degree of influence over corporate policy to the
controlling shareholders.
In other words, the controlling
10. Scholars have long debated whether the law should protect minority investors
who fail to protect themselves. Compare Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 3638 (arguing that minority shareholders face great difficult in contracting for
protection against majority shareholders in close corporations; therefore the law
should protect minority shareholders with a statute requiring majority holders to
purchase minority shares in certain circumstances), with Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 4, at 284-86 (explaining that, because many minority shareholders of close
corporations are sophisticated, the terms of their investment contracts are often
negotiated, and because many contract terms protecting minority shareholders are
expensive, the law should not imply these terms). See also Johnston, supra note 4, at
292 (asking “whether the law should imply and enforce limits on opportunistic
behavior in cooperative ventures, or instead leave the parties to whatever protection
for which they explicitly bargained”).
11. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 253-55 (1984) (arguing that business lawyers create
value as “transaction cost engineers” by enabling parties to behave based on the
premise that the assumptions of the market are correct).
12. See JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 21 (1975) [hereinafter FREUND, ANATOMY OF A
MERGER] (arguing that all issues in a negotiation, regardless of how sacred, can be
reduced to dollars). Though now fairly dated, Freund’s explication of the
negotiation of corporate mergers and acquisitions remains the best treatise yet
written on the subject. For another useful treatment, see generally JAMES C. FREUND,
THE ACQUISITION MATING DANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON NEGOTIATING (1987)
[hereinafter FREUND, MATING DANCE].
13. Presumably, one does not need to be an expert in the details of corporation
law to recognize that a thirty-percent shareholder will be more vulnerable to
opportunistic behavior than will a seventy-percent shareholder, and to negotiate the
price accordingly.
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shareholders in such cases may have purchased the right to exercise
14
control. As a result, the level of discretion the parties intended to
allocate to the controlling shareholders will in most cases be evident
in the purchase price, thereby enabling price to serve as a window
into the parties’ bargain.
A better, more nuanced approach to the problem of minority
investor vulnerability would therefore retain legal protections for
minority investors but treat them as default norms which they are free
to waive. The result would be a two-step analysis of alleged instances
of oppression. Courts should initially consider whether there is clear
evidence in the negotiation of the initial investment contract that the
minority investor had been compensated for the risks associated with
her vulnerable status. The threshold question, in other words,
should not be whether the minority had a complete understanding of
the risks associated with her minority status, but whether she was paid
to bear them. Even if she were ignorant of the myriad and detailed
ways in which she was vulnerable, the presence of compensation
15
would generally indicate the absence of a legally cognizable injury.
Admittedly, however, where the parties’ intentions remain ambiguous
following a close examination of the price, it may still be necessary to
16
impose an objective standard to avoid injustice. Thus, when such an
analysis fails to uncover the parties’ intentions, courts should
continue to apply an objective standard as a second step, prohibiting
a range of conduct that appears inconsistent with the typical
17
investor’s reasonable expectations.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the nature of minority investors’
vulnerability and the legal doctrines that have evolved to protect
them from oppression. It then assesses four possible reasons why
progressive scholars and lawmakers prefer to impose mandatory rules
rather than structure legal protections for minority investors as
default norms: (1) a largely emotional response to the similarities
14. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 465 (characterizing control as a commodity akin
to a financial product such as an option or call that can be valued, purchased and
sold as a separable economic good).
15. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3, 735-38 (4th ed. 2004)
(discussing what happens when one party to a contract “err[s] in calculating the net
benefit to be anticipated from performance of the agreement”).
16. See, e.g., O’Neal, supra note 4, at 881 (“Statutory protection is needed for
minority shareholders who fail to bargain for and obtain protective contractual
arrangements.”); Afterman, supra note 4, at 1075-77 (holding up an early South
Carolina oppression statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23(b) (Supp. 1968), as
improving upon past American protections for aggrieved minority investors).
17. See generally Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 193 (tracing the
historical development of the “reasonable expectations” standard for corporate
dissolutions).
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between the vulnerability of minority investors and the vulnerability
of other aggrieved minorities, (2) the structural parallels between
close corporations and partnerships, (3) an assumption that each
share of a corporation’s stock is intended to represent an equivalent
investment bargain and, most importantly, (4) the difficulty of
distinguishing between a knowledgeable waiver of fiduciary duties
and an unfair surprise.
Part II then explores the possibility that a close examination of the
consideration paid by each shareholder when initially investing can
shed light on the parties’ intentions. By borrowing from the
18
literature regarding the valuation of close corporations, Part II
argues that the degree of discretion afforded to the controlling
shareholders is but one of a host of risks that investors consider when
pricing their stock. It concludes by arguing that adjustments to the
purchase price, rather than merely representing agency costs
associated with the risk of controlling shareholder opportunism, can
instead be viewed in the close corporation context as an attempt by
unsophisticated investors to directly allocate the risks of such
19
opportunism. Thus, minority investors may already contemplate a
privately negotiated resolution to the problem of minority
vulnerability—they may simply be paying less to compensate for the
greater risks they assume.
Finally, in Part III, the Article tests the proposition that price can
20
illuminate the parties’ bargain by revisiting two leading precedents
that helped shape the modern cause of action for oppression. In
many circumstances, the application of a broad, uniform standard
21
appears to have resulted in an equitable outcome.
In others,
however, conduct that seems unjust when measured against a
uniform norm was actually contemplated by the parties’ particular

18. See generally, e.g., SHANNON P. PRATT, BUSINESS VALUATION DISCOUNTS AND
PREMIUMS (2001) [hereinafter PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS] (exploring the use
of discounts and premiums in the appraisal of close corporations); SHANNON PRATT,
VALUING A BUSINESS (1981) [hereinafter PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS] (examining the
theory and practice of valuing a business or an interest in a business); ROBERT T.
SLEE, PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKETS: VALUATION, CAPITALIZATION, AND TRANSFER OF
PRIVATE BUSINESS INTERESTS (2004) (explaining that the key to understanding private
capital markets is to examine the interplay between valuation, capitalization, and
business transfer). For a comprehensive treatment of the subject that is not limited
to the valuation of private corporations, see generally TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART
& DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES
(2005).
19. See infra Part II.D.
20. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(Mass. 1975); Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd., [1972] 2 All E.R. 492.
21. See infra Part III.A.
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22

bargain. Controlling shareholders, in other words, often purchase
the freedom to engage in what otherwise might be considered
23
When there is evidence of adequate
oppressive conduct.
consideration, courts should not deny them the benefit of their
bargain.
I.

A CHALLENGE: MINORITY INVESTOR VULNERABILITY

Business law scholars are understandably concerned about the
vulnerability that is inherent in the status of minority investors in
24
close corporations. Some, in fact, have gone so far as to compare
their vulnerability to that which is suffered by racial and ethnic
25
minorities in civil society. As Robert Thompson and Hodge O’Neal
have repeatedly stressed, the structure of corporation law seems

22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
24. Some commentators make a distinction between the terms close corporation
and closely held corporation. 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:4, 1-14 (rev. 3d ed. 2004). In
common usage, however, the two terms appear to have essentially the same meaning.
Id. (“The terms ‘close corporation,’ ‘closed corporation’ and ‘closely held
corporation’ are often considered to be synonymous and are used
interchangeably.”). Although the precise definition of a close corporation varies
depending upon the source, it is generally believed to have three distinct elements:
(1) few shareholders, (2) a limited market for their securities, and (3) substantial
shareholder participation in management. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511
(deeming a close corporation to be characterized by a small number of shareholders,
no ready market for the corporate stock, and substantial majority shareholder
participation in management, direction, and operations); Galler v. Galler, 203
N.E.2d 577, 583 (Ill. 1964) (“For our purposes, a close corporation is one in which
the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few famiiles, and wherein it is not at all, or
only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at
273 (“Closely held corporations tend to have certain common characteristics. Most
importantly, they tend to have relatively few managers, who tend to be the largest
residual claimants.”). Many state corporation statutes also use these characteristics to
define close corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a) (2006) (providing
a three-part definition for a close corporation that limits the number of shares per
shareholder and places restrictions on a shareholder’s ability to transfer the shares);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT STAT. CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 3(b) (2005) (“A corporation having
50 or fewer shareholders may become a statutory close corporation by amending its
articles of incorporation to include the statement” to that effect); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 1.06 (1994) (defining a close corporation as “a corporation the equity securities of
which are owned by a small number of persons, and for which securities no active
trading market exists”). Many foreign jurisdictions also have similar requirements.
Under the English Companies Act, for example, a private company is one “whose
shares were held by few members, were not offered for public subscription, were not
traded on the stock exchange, and whose transferability was restricted by the articles
of association”. Marcus Lutter, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies, in
XIII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7 (1998).
25. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 1, at 120 (contrasting the different approaches
taken by corporation law and constitutional law to the “problem” of minority status).
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better suited for public companies than for private.
The high
likelihood in a close corporation that a single shareholder or
shareholder group will exercise control over its affairs makes
27
investing in a minority position extremely risky.
At the same time, there are often instances where shareholders
voluntarily and deliberately relinquish control over the corporate
enterprise and so consciously assume a risky position in exchange for
28
some other benefit. The most common example of this might be
the entrepreneur who chooses to finance the growth of her business
by attracting a private equity investment from a venture capital fund.
Typically, a venture fund that invests in early stage enterprises will
26. See, e.g., 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 1:14, at 1-88 to -92 (“Even
scholars working and writing in the field of corporate law, and most lawyers with a
business practice, seem to have been oblivious, until after World War II, to the
special needs and problems of the close corporation.”); Thompson, Shareholder’s
Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 699 (“Corporate statutes and judicial decisions reflect
norms designed for publicly held corporations and do not always meet the needs of
closely held enterprises.”). Larry Ribstein makes a related point when he argues
more generally that the law is incapable of crafting a sufficient variety of standard
forms of business to meet the needs of every business relationship. Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407, 409 (1999) (arguing that “there are
not, and cannot be, enough business forms to suit all business relationships”). In
order to meet this need, he proposes that the law recognize an ultra-flexible
“contractual entity.” Id. at 410.
27. The greater concentration of ownership in close corporations is
distinguished from the widely dispersed ownership that is typical among public
corporations in the US, as was most famously identified by Berle and Means in their
1933 treatise. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933). For more recent works on the subject, see, e.g., MARK
J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:
RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995). Thus,
in most public corporations, the greater risk appears to be that the managers—
rather than a block of controlling shareholders—will engage in opportunistic
behavior. See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 868-76 (1984) (discussing the application of liability
rules as a means to curb agency costs in public corporations). To the extent a public
corporation is dominated by a single controlling shareholder or group of controlling
shareholders, however, the same limitations on their conduct would apply as in a
close corporation. See, e.g., Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 115 (Del.
1992) (holding that the majority shareholder of a public corporation owned a duty
to “disclose information, within its knowledge, which might assist the minority
shareholders in responding to the proposed merger”); Kahn v. Household
Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 1666 (Del. 1991) (same). But see Kahn v. Sprouse, 842 F.
Supp. 423 (D. Or. 1993) (refusing to extend fiduciary duties to a majority
shareholder in a public corporation).
28. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 392 (2006)
(arguing that, from an economic point of view, an investor should always relinquish
any control rights that other investors value more highly than does the investor); see
also O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 218 (arguing that minority investors sometimes
“rationally choose and prefer” to adopt the statutory allocation of control that favors
the controlling investors); Rock & Wachter, supra note 4, at 913-14 (noting that close
corporations include not only “the traditional ‘mom and pop’ businesses,” but also
“high-tech start-ups, and mature publicly held corporations post leveraged buyouts”).
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require control over the corporation’s affairs as a condition to its
29
investment. In fact, it is typical for the parties to agree ex ante that
this control will include the ability to terminate the employment of
30
the very entrepreneur who founded the corporation.
In other
circumstances, the presence of a high level of trust or of strong
market forces could empower some investors to forgo additional
31
protections in favor of obtaining more favorable investment terms.
Thus, it is not always the case that the private allocation (and
subsequent exercise) of a high degree of control by a particular party
32
amounts to an injustice. Rather, control is often exchanged for
33
other forms of consideration. In the case of an early stage venture
29. In many cases, venture investors require a controlling stake in the
corporation before making an early stage investment. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY &
CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW 191 (1998)
(explaining that venture funds that invest in early stage companies typically negotiate
for forty to sixty percent of the equity); BRIAN E. HILL & DEE POWER, INSIDE SECRETS
TO VENTURE CAPITAL 42 (2001) (noting that entrepreneurs sometimes expect to give
up as much as seventy or eighty percent of their equity in order to attract venture
funding). Alternatively, control can be maintained just as easily by controlling the
board of directors. See JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 94
(1999) (explaining that the founders, even if they remain in control of management,
are ultimately subservient to the board). By negotiating for a charter amendment
that fixes the number of board seats allocated to the venture capital fund, for
example, the fund can ensure that its control will be maintained through subsequent
rounds of financing. ALEX WILMERDING, TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS: A LINE BY LINE
LOOK AT THE INTRICACIES OF TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS 37 (2005).
30. BARTLETT, supra note 29, at 124-26 (discussing the balance that is typically
negotiated by venture funds between incentivizing the entrepreneurs to remain
engaged during the early stages of the corporation and retaining the ability to
terminate the entrepreneurs after the firm matures). In fact, even if the
entrepreneur has an ironclad employment agreement with a fixed term, principles
of agency permit the board to terminate the employee provided they are willing to
pay damages. Id. at 125.
31. In any multi-issue negotiation, including an investment in a close
corporation, the parties engage in numerous trade-offs, frequently compromising on
one issue in order to “win” on another. See HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 131 (1982) (introducing multi-issue “integrative” bargaining); BRUNER,
supra note 3, at 927 (urging deal lawyers to take a “whole deal” approach to complex
business transactions). In such cases, then, each “win” can be assumed to have cost
the winning party some other concession. Therefore, where a party judges a
particular risk (such as the risk of oppression) to be relatively minor, she may choose
to bear the risk rather than to make a costly concession in order to have it removed
or eliminated. In other words, if market forces and/or societal norms of trust are
working to remove the threat of oppression, the minority investor may prefer to cede
control in order to negotiate for some other right or concession that they value more
highly.
Economists have also argued that parties may cede control rights as a substitute for
a weak balance sheet and “necessarily limited cash-flow rights.” See TIROLE, supra
note 28, at 388 (citing the work of Aghion and Bolton, Hart, and Hart and Moore).
32. See BARTLETT, supra note 29, at 94 (explaining that, even in successful
venture-backed companies, it is often common for the founders to be “fired, retired,
or otherwise relieved of their duties” by the venture capital investors).
33. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 540 (describing situations in which a buyer may be
willing to “pay more in return for less control dilution”).
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capital investment, for example, entrepreneurs often sell control in
order to obtain risk capital that may not be available from any other
34
Investors, in other words, frequently opt for a lopsided
source.
allocation of control.
The following sections briefly describe the nature of the problem
of minority investor vulnerability and the legal responses that have
evolved to attempt to ameliorate such vulnerability. They conclude
that the assumptions supporting the existing scheme of mandatory,
objective standards rely themselves on four underlying
misconceptions.
A. The Nature of the Challenge
Minority investors occupy an inherently vulnerable position in
35
close corporations.
As a result of the corporation law norms of
centralized control and majority rule, a shareholder or shareholder
group that holds a controlling block of shares can dictate corporate
36
policy through its control of the board of directors. In general, the

34. See BARTLETT, supra note 29, at 96 (noting that much of the power that
venture capital investors wield comes informally from the fact that they are often the
only source of funds available to the entrepreneur); BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 29,
at 191 (explaining that one downside of raising money from venture capital investors
is that they are likely to require the ability to take over control “if the entrepreneur
stumbles”).
35. See infra note 2. Oppression can also work to the disadvantage of controlling
shareholders. O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 219 (explaining that, as the adaptability of
minority investors is enhanced, “so is the risk of minority opportunism”);
Hetherington, supra note 4, at 946 (arguing that “the policies underlying the
fiduciary responsibilities imposed on those who have control should be applicable to
any shareholder whose vote or other conduct as a shareholder is in fact controlling”
in a particular situation,” including a minority investor). For example, if a
corporation’s charter documents require a supermajority vote to take a particular
action, a minority investor with a sufficiently large share of the stock could use her
ability to block such action as a sword with which to extract value from the other
shareholders. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Radom &
Neidorff, Inc., 207 N.Y. 1 (1954) (addressing a shareholder dispute where a fifty
percent shareholder used her blocking interest to prevent the other fifty percent
shareholder from paying himself a salary); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
4, at 279 (noting that high percentage voting requirements increase the possibility of
deadlock and make it more difficult for those in control to act without the consent of
minority shareholders).
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of
directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be
managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of
directors”). See also, generally, 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 1:2, at 1-3 to -4
(discussing the traditional pattern of corporation management through examination
of the “majority rule” principle: those with a majority of shares have the voting
power to control the entire corporation); O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 216-17, 219
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holders of fifty-one percent of the stock have the power to make one37
hundred percent of the decisions. Moreover, shareholders in close
corporations typically serve simultaneously as both owners and
38
managers. Thus, the value of the minority’s investment depends
directly on the level of diligence, competence and honesty displayed
39
by the controlling shareholders. Acquiring a minority participation
means relying upon, and to a large degree trusting, the controlling
40
shareholders.
(characterizing the vulnerability of minority investors as being the result of the fact
that “the typical closely held corporation [contract] is mostly gaps”).
37. Although the fifty-one percent mark is sometimes used in this and other
examples throughout the text to indicate a controlling stake, the exact percentage
necessary to exercise control over a corporation’s affairs will vary depending upon its
capital structure. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 467-68 (noting that control is relative).
Indeed, under certain circumstances, it might be possible to exercise effective
control with less than a majority of the outstanding shares. This might be the case,
for example, if a significant percentage of the shares were not voted, thereby
increasing the impact of those shares that were voted, or if the shareholders with
smaller percentage holdings were divided in their preferences. Similarly, if the
corporate charter included supermajority voting requirements, such that a higher
percentage than a simple majority were necessary to take a particular action, then it
might be necessary to hold more than fifty-one percent in order to exercise control.
As late as 1985, for example, fully half of the corporation statutes in the US required
supermajority approval for a merger, with about one-third of states currently
retaining the requirement. 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 5:2, at 5-7 n.11.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-210 to -220 (2006). The same would be true
in the event the parties had entered into a shareholders’ agreement that directly
allocated control in some manner other than through the mechanism of simple
majority voting. See infra Part II.C. With this in mind, this Article uses the term
“controlling shareholders” rather than the more typical reference to majority
shareholders.
38. See, e.g., Robert Kramer, Foreword to Symposium, The Close Corporation, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 433, 433 (1955) (stating that shareholders in close corporations
often serve a dual role as owners and officers, thus essentially controlling the
business). Typically, either the stockholders themselves are the directors, or they so
closely dominate and control the directors that the latter are in fact little more than
their agents. Id.; see generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 1:9, at 1-35
(describing common management structures in close corporations).
39. Economists refer to any individual conduct that is not in the interests of the
firm as “shirking.” See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 3536 (2002). The most common forms of shirking include “not only culpable cheating,
but also negligence, oversight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes.” Id. Thus,
minority investors are at risk not only from intentional misappropriation of their
investments but also from other forms of residual loss as well.
40. This reliance on, and hence vulnerability to, one’s fellow investors is one of
the core justifications for the imposition of fiduciary duties, both in general, see, e.g.,
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Joint adventurers, like
copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest
loyalty.”), and in the particular context of close corporations, see, e.g., Crosby v.
Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989); Orchard v. Corvelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548,
1556 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff’d 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1987). Not coincidentally, the
concept of reliance on the efforts of others also lies at the heart of what it means to
be a regulated security under federal law. An “investment contract,” for example—
the catchall for instruments that fit within the definition of a “security” under section
2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 et seq. (2005)—is defined as a
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The vulnerability of minority investors in close corporations is
exacerbated because, unlike investors in public corporations, they
have no easy means of exit. By definition, no active trading market
41
exists for shares of a close corporation. Moreover, minority blocks
of shares, being less desirable than controlling blocks, are even less
42
Thus, minority investors who desire to exit may find
liquid.
themselves unable to find a buyer willing to pay a reasonable price for
their shares. Whereas a dissatisfied public company shareholder can
usually exit quickly and at minimal cost, a minority investor in a close
corporation who disagrees with management policy has no choice
43
but to acquiesce and hope for a positive outcome.
Control in any organization, of course, must be allocated in some
manner. Some individual or group must have the ultimate authority
to make a particular set of decisions, or some mechanism for joint
decision-making must be established. Otherwise, all decisions would

contract, transaction or scheme whereby (1) a person invests money, (2) in a
common enterprise and (3) is led to expect profits, (4) solely from the efforts of
others. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
41. The lack of a trading market for the corporation’s shares is typically
understood to be one of the defining characteristics of a close corporation. See, e.g.,
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass.
1975) (identifying the lack of a market as one of the defining elements of a close
corporation); Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (Ill. 1964) (explaining that no
ready markets exist for close corporation shares); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342
(stating that a close corporation “shall make no offering of any of its stock of any
class which would constitute a ‘public offering’”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT STAT. CLOSE
CORP. SUPP. § 11(a) (“An interest in shares of a statutory close corporation may not
be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred”). A public corporation, by contrast,
generally provides its investors with an exit by dint of the fact that its securities are
listed on a securities exchange for trading by the general public. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a public corporation as one “whose shares
are traded to and among the general public”).
42. See infra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3. But see BRUNER, supra note 3, at 471-72
(explaining that even control positions can sometimes be illiquid, such as when they
are relatively large in size).
43. As a matter of corporate governance theory, it is sometimes said that public
company shareholders who disagree with management’s policies are better off
exercising their exit rights by selling their shares rather than taking action to
influence or change management. This ability of public company shareholders to
exit at minimal cost is known informally as the “Wall Street Rule” and is
distinguished from the close corporation context where no such exit is typically
available. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601. 619 (2006) (arguing against the expansion of
shareholder democracy because, among other reasons, “[m]any investors, especially
institutions, rationally prefer liquidity to activism. . . . the so-called ‘Wall Street’
Rule”). One of the earliest uses of this term in a law review article appears in Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1278 (1982)
(“The ability freely to sell one’s shares, therefore, the so-called ‘Wall Street Rule,’ is
without question the single most important safeguard to all shareholders that
managers will act in their best interests.”).
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result in deadlock. In a close corporation, as we have seen, the
default allocation of power places near-complete control in the hands
45
of any shareholders who hold more than fifty percent of the shares.
There are, however, any number of other ways for control over the
future management of a corporation to be divided among its
shareholders. Depending on its capital structure, for example,
different levels of influence over a close corporation’s affairs might
include (in order, from the highest level of control to the lowest):
• One-hundred percent ownership;
• Supermajority ownership sufficient to overcome any
supermajority voting requirements contained in the
corporation’s charter documents;
• Simple majority ownership insufficient to overcome any
such supermajority voting requirements;
• Shared control (fifty percent) where another shareholder
owns the other fifty percent;
• Swing vote potential (a minority interest where no other
single shareholder controls a majority of the shares, such as
when there are three equal shareholders);
• Minority veto interest sufficient only to reject any proposal
requiring a supermajority vote; and

44. Deadlock is, in fact, one of the most important grounds for judicially
determined dissolution. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (authorizing the
Court of Chancery to appoint a receiver to dissolve a corporation if its business “is
suffering or is threatened with irreparable injury because the directors are so divided
respecting the management of the affairs of the corporation that the required vote
for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained and the stockholders are
unable to terminate this division”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(2)(i)
(authorizing the appropriate court to dissolve a corporation where “the directors are
deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the shareholders are unable
to break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or
being suffered”). Courts, however, appear to be highly reluctant to grant dissolution
based solely on the presence of a deadlock. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Voluntary
Dissolution of Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 2 (1954) (rejecting a claim for
voluntary dissolution where the corporation was operating profitably); In re
Lakeland Dev. Corp., 152 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Minn. 1967) (holding that dissension
and deadlock among the shareholders of a corporation are grounds for involuntary
dissolution only where the resulting deadlock is irreconcilable and where, as result of
such deadlock, the corporation’s business can no longer be conducted with
advantage to the shareholders); Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc.,
632 P.2d 512, 517 (Wash. 1981) (holding that, when determining whether a
corporation should be dissolved, the court should consider the seriousness of the
deadlock, whether the corporation is able to conduct its business profitably despite
the deadlock, and whether dissolution will be beneficial or detrimental to the
shareholders and/or injurious to the public).
45. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Bruner defines control as “the
right to direct the strategy and activities of the firm, to allocate resources, and to
distribute the economic wealth of the firm.” BRUNER, supra note 3, at 465.
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•

True minority interest without any ability to control or
46
influence corporate decisions.
Minority oppression occurs when the conduct of the controlling
47
shareholders exceeds the discretion allocated to them.
There is
nothing inherently wrong with majority shareholders wielding a
greater or lesser degree of control over the corporation’s policies and
48
direction. After all, centralized control is often considered one of
46. See PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 18, at 28 (examining different
definitions of value); SLEE, supra note 18, at 43-49 (analyzing four levels of private
ownership—enterprise, control, shared control, and minority interest); see also
TIROLE, supra note 28, at 393-94 (noting that, in practice, “there are multiple control
rights to be divided between insiders and outsiders”). The parties’ preferred
allocation of control can be implemented by means of any of a variety of well-known
strategies. For examples, see infra Part II.C.
47. Typically, conduct constituting “oppression” is contemplated by the statute
and so is technically permissible. For example, it is solely within the discretion of the
board of directors to determine whether and when to declare dividends. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (“The directors of every corporation, subject to any
restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, may declare and pay
dividends upon the shares of its capital stock”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (“A
board of directors may authorize and the corporation may make distributions to its
shareholders”). Therefore, it is not impermissible on its face for the board, at the
direction of the controlling shareholders, to withhold dividends. Rather, otherwise
lawful conduct rises to the level of oppression only when its goal or effect is to
misappropriate the value of the minority’s investment. But see Dodge Bros. v. Ford
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (ordering Ford to declare a special
dividend where there was evidence the controlling shareholder was operating the
business for the “merely incidental benefit” of the investors and for “the primary
purpose of benefiting others”).
48. The power to determine the compensation of corporate officers, for
example, presents ample opportunity for tax planning, and employee salaries and
benefits should presumably be adjusted periodically to take into account the impact
of such factors as inflation and the changing outlook for the corporation. For
example, the Internal Revenue Code allows deductions for all “ordinary and
necessary expenses” paid in “carrying on a trade or business.” I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
A reasonable allowance for salaries is included among these expenses, while
dividends are not. Id. § 162(a)(1). Therefore, close corporations have an incentive
to characterize any distributions they make to their shareholders as salaries rather
than as dividends so as to avoid the effects of the double tax. See Elliotts, Inc. v.
C.I.R., 716 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing the issue of the deductibility
of payments ostensibly made by a corporation as compensation for an employee who
is also a shareholder). To take advantage of the deductibility of employee salaries,
close corporations typically pay out a large percentage of their profits in the form of
salaries. See id. In order to accomplish this, the corporation hires the shareholders
as officers and pays them salaries while withholding (otherwise taxable) dividends.
See id. at 1245-47 (assessing the reasonableness of the shareholder manager’s duties
as compared to her salary in determining the legality of withholding dividends).
Other methods for distributing profits while avoiding double taxation include:
establishing an employee stock ownership plan, see, e.g., Michael McEvoy, Getting
Money out of the Closely held Corporation, in 1993 A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX’N ANN. ADVANCED
STUDY SESSIONS 119, 162 (explaining how employee stock ownership plans are
particularly useful in close corporations); paying rent, see I.R.C § 162(a)(3) (2006)
(allowing a deduction for trade or business rentals); and paying interest on loans, see
I.R.C. § 163 (2006) (allowing a deduction for all interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year). See generally Matthew G. Dore, “Tax Planning Comparison Table,” 5 IA.
PRAC. SERIES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2:10 (2006). If controlling shareholders are
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49

the chief benefits of the corporate form.
However, when the
controlling shareholders use their control to opportunistically benefit
themselves at the expense of the minority, such conduct is likely to
50
violate the parties’ implicit bargain.
Minority oppression therefore appears to operate on a sliding
scale. Where the business deal is that the controlling shareholders
will be entitled to exercise wide latitude over corporate policy, only a
significant departure from the norm would seem oppressive. On the
other hand, where the parties negotiated for tight limits on
managerial discretion, even slightly opportunistic behavior would
appear to contravene their bargain. In other words, the parties have
the ability to negotiate for the allocation of control that is optimal for
their own particular needs and the needs of their corporate
51
enterprise. Depending on dynamics such as their mutual level of
52
53
trust and the impact of market forces on the business, investors can
negotiate to share power over the corporation’s management and
affairs in whatever manner is most appropriate for their unique
circumstances. Therefore, before deeming conduct to be oppressive,
policymakers should compare such conduct to the standards set by

given wide discretion to craft one of these structures, however, they could benefit
themselves by, among other things, firing the minority investors from their positions
as salaried employees, thereby removing the only way in which they are able to
withdraw funds from the corporation. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson-Cook Med., 720 F.
Supp. 533, 541 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (adjudicating a situation where majority
shareholders forced out a minority shareholder from his position as president of the
corporation absent any malfeasance).
49. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.1, 2 (1986) (describing
centralized management as one of the four key characteristics of the corporate form
that “serve the positive functions of greatly facilitating the efficient aggregation of
very large amounts of capital”).
50. See generally Moll, supra note 4, at 989 (comparing the doctrine of minority
oppression to implied-in-fact contracts); see also BRUNER, supra note 3, at 468
(explaining that “[o]ne reason control might be valuable is that it presents the
opportunity for the majority to expropriate wealth of the minority”).
51. See, e.g., ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS
149-50 (2007) (explaining how the different risk-tolerances of investors can be used
to design an appropriate portfolio of investments); see also BRUNER, supra note 3, at
540 (explaining that control can be exchanged for an increase in price).
52. For an overview of the important role that social norms such as trust play in
corporate governance, see generally Symposium, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1607 (2001) (exploring how societal norms, such as trust, are critical in
corporate governance because corporate relationships are often non-contractual).
53. See generally Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 33-53 (considering the
“Adequacy of Market Constraints on Contract Terms”). Butler and Ribstein confine
their discussion of market forces to public corporations. However, they present a
helpful overview of how such forces might impact the structure of power between
owners and managers generally. See id.
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the parties, not to some uniform norm established by the trier of
54
fact.
The historical development of corporation law further exacerbated
the problem of minority investor vulnerability. Whereas the 19th
Century norm was to treat the corporate charter as a contract that
could be amended only with the unanimous consent of all of the
investors, the early 20th Century witnessed a general movement
55
toward the norm of majority rule. The effect of this trend was to
streamline decision-making by removing the minority’s veto power
over most corporate decisions, leaving the majority firmly in control
56
of corporate policy.
At the same time, other devices that had
previously served to limit the ability of controlling shareholders to
engage in opportunistic behavior, such as cumulative voting and
57
preemptive rights, also ceased to be the statutory norm.
54. For an argument in favor of permitting investors the freedom to structure the
corporation for the unique needs of their own particular circumstances, see id. at 32
(advocating “a presumption in favor of private ordering in the corporation”).
55. See HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 668 (1946)
(noting that the requirement of unanimous consent for the sale of a corporation’s
assets has been changed by statute in nearly all the states ); CLARK, supra note 49,
§ 10.6, 443-58 (stating that appraisal rights have been given to shareholders in
replacement of the abandoned rule that major corporate changes require
unanimous consent of the shareholders); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’
Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 614 (1998)
(discussing the move away from the requirement of unanimous shareholder
consent); Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America:
Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 895, 909-13 (1996) (tracing the development to the ascendance of the theory of
the corporation as a “real entity”); see also Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (characterizing a corporation as a contract
among the state, the corporation, and the investors).
56. See Wertheimer, supra note 55, at 614-15 (describing the loss of a minority
shareholder’s veto power over corporate changes).
57. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX AND HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS
§ 13.22 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining that, in most jurisdictions, cumulative voting rights
are permissive, not mandatory); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 2.1.3, 136
(2000) (“At common law, preemptive rights existed as a matter of course. Statutes
now generally make this subject controlled by the corporation’s articles. . . . Most
statutes exclude preemptive rights unless the articles expressly provide them.”)
(citations omitted).
Cumulative rights allow each share to receive one vote for each director to be
elected. Id. Where more than one director is to be elected, these votes may be cast
cumulatively for a single director, thereby providing the minority shareholder with a
better chance at securing representation on the board of directors. Id. State
corporation statutes often address when shareholders can use cumulative voting. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2006) (stating that the certificate of incorporation
may provide for cumulative voting); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.28(b) (2005) (stating
that shareholders do not have a right to cumulate their votes for directors unless the
articles of incorporation explicitly say so).
Preemptive rights allow existing shareholders to purchase their pro rata share of
any newly issued stock by the corporation. GEVURTZ, supra note 57, § 2.1.3, at 135-37.
These rights are meant to protect the minority shareholder against dilution when the
corporation issues new stock. Id. Many state statutes exclude preemptive rights
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Even as the architecture of corporation law no longer allocated
power in a manner that was favorable to minority investors, courts
were becoming hostile to private attempts to change the default
58
allocation of control by contract.
Courts frequently voided
contracts, for example, in which a group of shareholders attempted
to protect the minority by agreeing to elect each other as directors
59
and then, as directors, to appoint each other as officers. The stated
reason for such decisions was to protect minority investors by
requiring that the directors exercise unfettered their best business
60
judgment.
The effect, however, was to limit private efforts to
restrain the controlling shareholders’ discretion over the
61
Thus, courts (perhaps
corporation’s conduct and affairs.
unless they are specifically included in the corporation’s charter. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (mandating that no shareholder shall have a preemptive
right unless the corporation specifies this right in its certificate of incorporation);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.30(a) (stating that the shareholders do not have a
preemptive right to acquire the corporation’s unissued shares unless the articles of
incorporation so provide).
58. See generally Lutter, supra note 24, at 7-8 (“Before World War II, American
corporation laws did not provide much flexibility to accommodate the needs of
private companies. . . . Courts were inclined not to interpret [the law] in a
permissible and adaptable way, causing quite a few planners to conclude that for
small enterprises, the partnership, despite its risks, was the suitable vehicle.”)
(citations omitted).
59. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 898 (Del. Ch. 1956) (“[O]ur
corporation law does not permit actions or agreements by stockholders which would
take all power from the board to handle matters of substantial management
policy.”); Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 77 N.E.2d 633, 635
(N.Y. 1948) (holding that an agreement by shareholders to restrict the power of
directors violated applicable statutes); McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236
(N.Y. 1934) (“[S]tockholders may not, by agreement among themselves, control the
directors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by virtue of their office to
elect officers and fix salaries.”); 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:20, at 5-104
to -105 (noting judicial decisions that prohibit shareholders’ agreements from
controlling the appointment of directors). With respect to agreements limiting the
discretion of shareholders to vote their shares as they choose, many early courts held
that the voting power of stock could not normally be separated from the other
incidents of ownership (although exceptions were often made when the voting
agreement was revocable or coupled with an interest in the shares). Id. at 5-102.
Likewise, early court decisions frequently rejected agreements that purported to limit
the discretion of the directors—for example, by requiring the board to appoint the
shareholders or their designees to corporate offices. Id. at 5-103 to -104.
60. See, e.g., McQuade, 189 N.E. at 236 (holding that “stockholders may not, by
agreement among themselves, control the directors in the exercise of the judgment
vested in them, by virtue of their office”); 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24,
§ 5:20, at 5-103 to -104. But see Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1936)
(upholding a shareholders’ agreement where all of the shareholders were parties
and thus “the enforcement … damages nobody—not even, in any perceptible
degree, the public”).
61. Even in those instances where courts appeared willing to uphold a private
allocation of power among the shareholders, they were generally loathe to impose
the remedy of involuntary dissolution. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at
26 (“Courts traditionally have regarded dissolution as a drastic remedy to be invoked
only as a last resort.”); Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 721
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unwittingly) imposed a fixed allocation of power—strongly in favor of
controlling shareholders—by striking down private agreements that
attempted to restrain the free exercise of that power.
The coalescing of these two trends meant that minority investors
were losing their traditional veto power while also being blocked
from negotiating privately for a contractually based veto right. As a
result, minority investors were both unprotected by the law and
legally prohibited from protecting themselves through private
62
ordering.
The situation practically invited overreaching by the
63
controlling shareholders.
B. The Nature of the Response
Faced with the problem of oppression, corporation law has
adjusted in several important ways to ameliorate the vulnerability
imposed on minority investors. In the first place, courts have become
far more liberal in enforcing private shareholders’ agreements that
seek to trump the law’s default allocation of power, especially when
64
all of a corporation’s shareholders are parties to the agreement.
(“Often, a court expressly will choose a buyout over dissolution as a less harsh
remedy.”). This reluctance appears to have survived even to today, with courts
demonstrating a distinct preference for remedies that do not disrupt the perpetual
life of the corporation. See id. at 721-22 (“The recognition of the possibility of a
buyout as a less drastic remedy undoubtedly has contributed to the breakdown of the
traditional judicial and legislative resistance to granting relief where there is
dissension among shareholders.”).
62. See generally Wertheimer, supra note 55, at 705 (discussing the need of
minority investors for protection from overreaching by controlling shareholders).
63. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 533 (M.D.N.C.
1989) (providing an example of a controlling shareholder’s dismissal of the
president of a corporation who was a minority shareholder where there was no
evidence of any wrongdoing); Shelstad v. Cook, 253 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 1977)
(addressing a situation where a controlling shareholder withheld dividends and
salaries from the minority shareholders).
64. The modern view is that shareholders’ agreements should be respected to
the extent they do not cause harm to third parties. See, e.g., 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note 24, § 5:6, at 5-25 to -26 (“Since at least 1960 courts and legislators have
shown an increased sensitivity to the need of close corporations to depart from the
traditional statutory norms. Court decisions reflect a definite trend toward greater
judicial readiness to uphold shareholder control agreements, at least in close
corporation settings.”). This appears to be the case, in fact, even when the
shareholders’ agreement conflicts in some respect with the statutory law. The New
York Court of Appeals, for example, in an early decision favoring the ability of
investors to bargain freely, declared that “[i]f the enforcement of a particular
[shareholders’] contract damages nobody . . . one sees no reason for holding it
illegal, even though it impinges slightly upon the broad provision of section 27” of
the New York Business Corporation Law. Clark, 199 N.E. at 642. Similarly, the
Illinois Supreme Court noted in 1964 that “there has been a definite, albeit
inarticulate, trend toward eventual judicial treatment of the close corporation as sui
generis,” and even some “shareholder-director agreements that have technically
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Investors now retain for themselves a great deal of freedom to craft
an allocation of power that they deem optimal for their own
particular circumstances and, at least in cases where that allocation is
65
express, courts will generally uphold their agreement. Indeed, most
corporation statutes now include specific language authorizing
shareholders to depart from the statutory default rules by contract,
even in cases where such departures conflict with express statutory
66
provisions.
More importantly, policymakers have also adopted remedies
67
specifically aimed at minimizing minority investor vulnerability. For
example, in addition to the protections afforded by the traditional
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, and by traditional notions of
‘violated’ the letter of the [Illinois] Business Corporation Act have nevertheless been
upheld in the light of the existing practical circumstances.” Galler v. Galler, 203
N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. 1964). But see 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:6, at 519 to -23 (cataloguing early cases where a shareholders’ agreement was invalidated
because it was found to be in conflict with the applicable statute).
The law’s evolution toward increased acceptance of private shareholders’
agreements can be viewed as part of a larger trend toward viewing the corporate
relationship as one based in contract. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 64
(arguing that “the dominant trend in corporate law over the last 200 years has been
to free corporate law from its state concession origins and treat it as a contractual
relationship”).
65. See, e.g., Clark, 199 N.E. at 642 (upholding a shareholders’ agreement where
all of the shareholders were parties and thus “the enforcement … damages nobody—
not even, in any perceptible degree, the public”). But see O’Neal, supra note 4, at 884
(noting that a minority investor’s lawyer, “if he has one, may not have the knowledge,
experience and skill necessary to draft effective protective arrangements”).
66. Beginning first in the 1960s in Florida, Delaware, and Maryland, state
legislatures began to adopt specific statutory authority for the enforcement of
shareholders’ agreements in the close corporation context. See 1 O’NEAL &
THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:27, at 5-139 (“Most general corporate codes now
permit organizers of a corporation to depart from the statutory norms of director
control and majority rule by appropriate provisions in the corporation’s charter.
The special close corporation statutes generally make it even easier to implement
alternative control arrangements in statutory close corporations by expressly
authorizing shareholder control agreements.”). Section 7.32 of the current version
of the Model Business Corporation Act, for example, expressly states that “[a]n
agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies with this section
is effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is
inconsistent with one or more other [listed] provisions of this Act.” MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (2005). However, section 7.32(a) ceases to apply to any
corporation that has a class of stock registered for trading on a national stock
exchange. Id. The Delaware Code contains a similar provision. It states:
A written agreement among the stockholders of a close corporation holding
a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, whether solely among
themselves or with a party not a stockholder, is not invalid, as between the
parties to the agreement, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of
the business and affairs of the corporation as to restrict or interfere with the
discretion or powers of the board of directors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2006). In fact, in modern legal practice, the adoption
of a shareholders’ agreement appears to be common practice when organizing a new
entity. See infra notes 172, 309 and accompanying text.
67. See infra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2.
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contract law, many jurisdictions now provide aggrieved minority
68
Other
investors with a specific cause of action for oppression.
protections, most notably the statutory right of appraisal, have also
69
evolved to protect minority investors.
The following sections
describe the underpinnings and operation of these two important
protections afforded to minority investors.
1.

The remedy of oppression
As Robert Thompson has carefully described, minority investors in
close corporations now generally have a direct, yet still evolving, cause
70
of action for oppression.
The corporation statutes in a growing
71
number of states—though not Delaware —as well as judicial

68. See generally Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 699
(tracing the development of the evolving cause of action for oppression). For a
more detailed discussion of the remedy, see infra Part I.B.1. Notably, however, a
number of jurisdictions have resisted this trend. In particular, Delaware has failed to
recognize an increased level of fiduciary duties owed by the majority in the
oppression context. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1366 (Del. 1933)
(rejecting a “special rule” applicable only to minority investors); Robert A. Ragazzo,
Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Hold Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099
(1999) (explaining that Delaware’s treatment of fiduciary duties in the context of
close corporations differs, not only from Massachusetts, but from the majority of
jurisdictions). Given Delaware’s prominent role in creating corporation law, its
failure to follow the trend might appear to suggest that the remedy of oppression
constitutes only a relatively minor protection. Certainly, a disproportionate number
of close corporations are incorporated in Delaware. Unlike the overwhelmingly
dominant position it maintains with respect to public companies, however, Delaware
is not nearly as dominant in the realm of private corporations. Thus, a significant
majority of close corporations probably operate in jurisdictions that recognize some
form of the remedy.
69. Other legal provisions that might be viewed as protective of minority
investors—such as the SEC’s “all-holders, best-price” rule that governs public
company tender offers, as well as the more general duty of loyalty—apply only to
public companies or are otherwise beyond the scope of this Article. The duty of
loyalty would come into play where the controlling shareholders cause the
corporation to enter into an agreement with a party in which they have an interest.
See, e.g., Wometco Enters., Inc. v. Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 528 F.2d
1128 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing a purchase and lease contract between two close
corporations where the controlling interests in both corporations were the same and
the contract gave one corporation the advantage of assured profits at the possible
expense of the other); Street v. Vitti, 685 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (analyzing a
situation where a controlling shareholder used corporate funds to provide a loan to
another corporation in which he was also a controlling shareholder). The “allholders, best-price” rule was promulgated by the SEC under section 14(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for third party tender offers and under section
13(e) for issuer tender offers. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4, 240.14d-10 (2006). Generally,
the rule requires that the tender offer be extended to all shareholders of the specific
security and that the per share consideration paid pursuant to the tender offer be
equal among all the shareholders. See generally 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.14, 298-99 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that the SEC adopted a
“best price” rule that requires equal treatment for all shareholders).
70. Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 699.
71. See supra notes 7 and 68.
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decisions in many others, now contemplate a variety of fiduciary72
based remedies for oppressed minority investors. These include not
only the traditional remedy of dissolution, but also court-ordered
buyouts of the minority’s position, mandatory dividend payments, the
73
appointment of a receiver, and other forms of equitable relief. In
addition, courts are increasingly willing to permit minority investors
to bring their claims in the form of a direct action, thereby allowing
them to avoid many of the legal and practical hurdles typically
74
associated with derivative suits.
In fact, much of the current
scholarship regarding minority oppression has moved beyond the
question of whether such a cause of action is uniformly advisable and
75
is focused instead on its proper scope and operation.
Although the grounds for relief are seldom defined in corporation
statutes, courts applying the remedy of oppression most commonly
employ one of three standards (which are each variously described as
being either a subset of, or an addition to, traditional fiduciary

72. See Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 699 (addressing
how legislatures and courts have responded to the “squeeze out” situation).
73. See id. at 718-24 (discussing various ways in which legislatures and courts have
provided remedies for oppressed minority investors).
74. See id. at 735 (explaining that courts are increasingly likely to allow direct
suits in a close corporation setting whereas in a public corporation the suit would
usually have to be brought as a derivative action). Under normal corporation law
rules, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling shareholders would
generally be made in the name of the corporation and would be subject to the usual
limitations on derivative lawsuits. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (providing
an example of a shareholder derivative suit brought by investors claiming that the
company breached its fiduciary duty by approving a large severance package for its
former president); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981)
(providing an example of a shareholder derivative lawsuit brought against ten
officers and/or directors of the company to recover damages). In the event the
allegedly oppressive conduct involved a failure to pay dividends, however, merely
requiring the majority to fill the corporation’s coffers without simultaneously
requiring that the corporation share its treasure with the minority would seem to
miss the point. Given this obvious flaw in the use of a derivative action as the basis
for a remedy for oppression, courts have increasingly been willing to allow the claim
to proceed in the name of the minority investors, with the proceeds of any damages
award therefore being paid directly to the minority. Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of
Action, supra note 4, at 735-38. An oppressed minority investor, therefore, no longer
needs to bootstrap her claim of mistreatment to a cause of action for fraud or waste.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 68, at 1099 (comparing the approach of
Delaware, which makes no distinction between public and close corporation
shareholders, and the approach of those states for which such distinction is central to
their oppression jurisprudence); Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 194
(analyzing the historical development of the reasonable expectations standard for
resolving conflicts within close corporations). But see Moll, supra note 4, at 989
(analyzing whether the oppression doctrine is necessary or whether contract law
provides all of the tools that minority investors need).
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76

duties). The most important of these—certainly the one that has
garnered the most scholarly attention—prohibits conduct that
exceeds the minority’s “reasonable expectations” as to the future
77
management of the corporation.
Courts or legislatures have
78
adopted this cause for relief in approximately one-third of the states.
In other states, policymakers equate oppression with conduct that is
79
“burdensome, harsh and wrongful,” while still others link the cause
of action to the controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty of good
80
While the latter two remedies are based in part on a
faith.
determination of the wrongfulness of the controlling shareholders’
conduct, the reasonable expectations standard omits considerations
of fault and instead focuses only on whether the conduct departs
81
from a particular norm.
What each of these standards has in common is that they are all for
the most part objective in their analysis. They each operate by
comparing the alleged misconduct to a fixed notion of the proper

76. Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 711-12; see also Moll,
supra note 4, at 1001-02.
77. Hodge O’Neal argued for this standard in his 1975 treatise, and Robert
Thompson, his co-author, has picked up the mantle of his argument. See F.H.
O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE-OUTS” OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975); Thompson, Corporate
Dissolution, supra note 4, at 193; see also Afterman, supra note 4, at 1063 (arguing in
1969 that oppression was best understood under English law “in terms of the
reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders”).
78. The states that have applied the reasonable expectations standard include
Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 7:15, at 7-106 to -107.
Massachusetts has applied the reasonable expectations standard to grant relief based
on breach of fiduciary duties. Id. at 7-107 n.20. Also, the South Carolina Supreme
Court and the oppression statute of Minnesota consider the parties’ reasonable
expectations as a factor in determining whether relief should be granted. Id. at 7107.
79. Id. § 7:13, at 7-96. These states include Arkansas, Missouri, Montana, New
York, Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. at 7-96 n.12.
80. Id. These states include Mississippi and Oregon. Id. at 7-96 to -97 n.13.
81. When applying the reasonable expectations test, a court will consider the
aggrieved minority shareholder’s expectations and not focus on the wrongful acts or
fault of the controlling shareholders. See Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of
Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority
Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 465 (1990) (explaining that “the crux is not
identifying a traditional wrong but rather identifying the basis of the bargain—what
were the explicit or implicit conditions pursuant to which the parties associated
themselves together in the corporate form”); see also Thompson, Corporate Dissolution,
supra note 4, at 219-20 (“[T]he reasonable expectations standard reflects a move
away from an exclusive search for egregious conduct by those in control of the
enterprise and toward greater consideration of the affect of conduct on the
complaining shareholder, even if no egregious conduct by controllers can be
shown.”). But see Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 1677 (“The new
tests, while often couched in fiduciary language, require proof of some form of
affirmative bad faith or intentional misconduct by the fiduciary.”).
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allocation of control and to a uniform set of expectations about what
conduct is reasonable, rather than to the allocation selected in each
case by the parties themselves. Policymakers—not investors—
determine what conduct is burdensome, harsh and wrongful, for
example, or not in good faith, and investors are not free to deviate
82
from these norms.
The reasonable expectations standard, for example, treats all
83
minority investors as uniformly vulnerable and equally deserving.
Admittedly, it appears on the surface to constitute a subjective inquiry
in that it purports to look at the parties’ expectations. In fact,
however, it contemplates an examination of the typical minority
84
investor’s reasonable expectations, not her actual bargain. Moll, for
example, characterizes the standard as requiring evidence that the
controlling shareholders’ conduct fits “a common pattern of
behavior” and understands the economic rationale that leads “a
85
typical
close
corporation
shareholder”
to
invest.
Thus, questions regarding the particular investor’s complicity in
82. In other words, the statutory allocation of control, interpreted in light of the
remedy of oppression, is a mandatory rule, rather than a default position that the
parties may opt out of. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 17 (arguing that “it is
one thing to propound a default rule to cover situations not covered in the parties’
contract, and another thing to state a general rule applicable irrespective of
contract”) (citations omitted).
83. See Moll, supra note 4, at 1012 (noting that “courts seem to appreciate that a
rational minority stockholder would not invest in a close corporation without
reaching a shared understanding of continued employment and management
participation with the majority stockholder”). But see O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 218
(arguing that minority investors sometimes “rationally choose and prefer” to adopt
the statutory allocation of control that favors the controlling investors). For
examples of situations where investors choose to invest without guarantees of
continued employment, see supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
84. The objective nature of the remedy can even be seen in the particular
choice of language in the caselaw. Rather than describe the “true plight” of the
plaintiff—a woman—by referring to her with a feminine pronoun, for example, the
opinion in the leading case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England,
Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), chose to use the masculine pronoun, presumably
as a placeholder for an idealized everyman minority investor:
The stockholder may have anticipated that his salary from his position with
the corporation would be his livelihood. Thus, he cannot afford to wait
passively. He must liquidate his investment in the close corporation in order
to reinvest the funds. . . . He cannot easily reclaim his capital.
Id. at 591 (emphasis added). For the Donahue court, then, all minority shareholders
are the same—hence the use of the generic masculine pronoun—and the individual
characteristics of a particular investor are for the most part unimportant. Minority
investors, in the court’s view, constitute a uniform category, not a collection of
unique individuals.
85. Moll, supra note 4, at 1004. Moll describes the requirement that the
aggrieved investor show specific evidence that her claim fits within the general
pattern as “slight at best.” Id. at 1010-11 (noting that “the liability inquiries of many
oppression courts seem to turn in large part on general evidence of a behavioral
pattern in close corporations”).
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shaping her vulnerability and the degree to which she was previously
compensated for bearing the risk of her minority status typically are
not part of the analysis. Moreover, the test is predicated on the
notion that the parties did not have any discernable bargain with
respect to the allocation of control. Indeed, if the parties had agreed
on a private allocation of control, either expressly or implicitly, the
remedy of oppression would not be needed. In such a case,
86
principles of contract law would be sufficient to ensure a just result.
Thus, the reasonable expectations standard can best be understood
as providing minority investors with the bargain that the trier of fact
believes they should have negotiated. The court’s function, in other
words, is not to attempt to uncover the parties’ unique bargain, but to
87
reason logically toward an imagined realm of permissible conduct.
The particular intentions of the parties are expressly ignored in favor
of a more generalized understanding of what constitutes a fair
bargain between close corporation investors.
Like the other
standards for oppression, the reasonable expectations test presumes
the uniformity of all minority investors in close corporations and so
imposes a mandatory, judicially determined threshold of acceptable
88
commercial behavior that the parties may not cross. Under this
standard, what is oppressive for one reasonable minority investor is
oppressive for all, for all are presumed to have the same (reasonable)
expectations.

86. A contract may sometimes be said to be implied-in-fact where the presence of
an agreement is not stated expressly but rather is inferred from the conduct of the
parties. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 3.10, at 129-30. Thus, where a bargain can
reasonably be inferred from the conduct of the parties to a close corporation, an
allegedly oppressed party has recourse to a contract law remedy and so does not
require the presence of an additional corporation law cause of action. See id. But see
Moll, supra note 4, at 1017-25, 1027-35 (arguing that the doctrine of oppression is
superior to the contract law doctrine of an implied-in-fact bargain because the latter
fails to provide an adequate remedy and also requires a level of definiteness that is
generally absent from the typical close corporation contract).
87. See Moll, supra note 4, at 1006-07 (“To ascertain the reasonable expectations
of close corporation shareholders, one could gather empirical evidence by asking a
large number of stockholders about the entitlements they expected to receive as a
result of their investments in close corporations. Short of this empirical approach,
however, one could simply observe what many close corporation shareholders do in
fact receive once they commit capital to a venture. . . . In oppression disputes, this
latter approach is mimicked to a great degree.”).
88. See id. at 1007 (discussing the investment expectations of “typical close
corporation shareholders”); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (noting generally that “the primary expectations of minority shareholders
include an active voice in management of the corporation and input as an
employee”).
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The refusal by Delaware and some judges to provide special
protections for minority investors is also essentially objective in its
approach. The Delaware approach does not attempt to compare the
90
parties’ conduct to their particular bargain. Rather, it interprets
contractual silence in all cases as a deliberate choice to elect the
default allocation of control, just as jurisdictions like Massachusetts
91
interpret contractual silences in all cases as indicative of oversight.
Both extremes impose a fixed norm of acceptable conduct—one low
and the other high—instead of attempting to uncover the range of
permissible conduct the investors themselves actually preferred.
The use of these standards therefore appears to represent a policy
decision to ignore the particulars of the investors’ privately
negotiated allocation of power and instead establish a fixed realm of
92
prohibited conduct. The question for the court is not whether the
parties agreed to permit the controlling shareholders to take a
certain action, but whether such action is within the bounds of what
93
the courts and legislatures mandate as proper.
Over time, the
accumulation of caselaw will define the range of conduct that (in the
opinion of the trier of fact) is not permissible under any
94
circumstance. The use of objective standards therefore imposes a
uniform allocation of control as the obligatory norm. Shareholders

89. See Moll, supra note 7, at 825-26 (noting that, even in jurisdictions that
recognize a remedy for oppression, the preconceptions of the judge are often
outcome determinative and thus may make the remedy unavailable in practice).
90. See supra notes 7 and 68.
91. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1366 (Del. 1933) (rejecting a “special
rule” applicable only to minority investors).
92. See generally, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 1820 (providing arguments that
certain corporation law rules should not be waivable); Brudney, supra note 4, at 1403
(arguing against a view that accepts corporation law as a contract that can be
endlessly waived and mutated); see also infra Part I.D (exploring the possible bases for
such a policy decision to prefer the protection of vulnerable minorities over the
promotion of private ordering).
93. Note that widespread skepticism over the competence of courts to rule on
complicated business matters is the basis for the business judgment rule, which
presumes the good faith, loyalty and due care of corporate directors. See Dodge
Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (expressing concern that
“judges are not business experts”); Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (2006) (“Our law presumes that ‘in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”)
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). For a general discussion
of the business judgment rule and its application to corporate governance, see CLARK,
supra note 49, § 3.4, at 123-24.
94. See Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 1680 (describing a process
by which the accretion of additional case law serves to codify particular fiduciary
standards).
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are blocked from privately negotiating an allocation of control that
95
differs from the legal default unless they do so expressly.
2.

The dissenters’ right of appraisal
In addition to the remedy of oppression, minority investors are also
protected by the dissenters’ right of appraisal. This right, which is
96
contained in the corporation statutes of most states, allows investors
to seek a court-supervised appraisal of the fair value of their shares in
the event they dissent from a corporation’s decision to merge or
97
enter into some other fundamental transaction. If the appraised
price turns out to be greater than that received by the complaining
minority investor, then the corporation must make up the difference
98
in cash.
Although often thought of in the context of public
corporations, the appraisal right is also available as a remedy for
99
minority investors in close corporations.

95. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
96. 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 9:5, at 9-22.
97. See id. (explaining that the appraisal right is triggered in all states by statutory
mergers and consolidations and in most states when the corporation sells the
majority of its assets, with Delaware being a notable exception). In addition,
approximately half of the states provide appraisal rights for charter amendments and
for asset sales comprising “substantially all” of the assets of the selling corporation.
See id. Several states even provide appraisal rights in situations where shareholders
have no voting rights, such as in the case of a sale of a controlling block of a
corporation’s shares. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1799 (West 2006); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 35-2-111 (2006).
98. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (2006) (“The Court shall direct the
payment of the fair value of the shares, together with interest, if any, by the surviving
or resulting corporation to the stockholders entitled thereto”); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 13.30(e) (2005) (entitling each dissatisfied shareholder to the amount of the
fair value of the shares, as determined by the court, that exceeds the amount already
paid to the shareholders). The Model Act requires the corporation to advance its
estimated fair value to a dissenting shareholder who demands payment. MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 13.24(a). If the court later determines that this estimated amount was
less than the true fair value of the shares, the corporation would then be ordered to
pay the difference. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.30(e). The Delaware statute, in
contrast, only requires that payment be made upon the resolution of the dispute.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)-(i).
99. See 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, at § 9:5, 9-21 to -22 (noting that
appraisal rights is one technique for minority investors in a close corporation to
mitigate possible abuse by controlling shareholders). For examples of appraisal
rights cases in the public corporation context, see, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby,
406 A.2d 54 (Me. 1979); Oakridge Energy, Inc. v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130 (Utah 1997).
It is worth noting, however, that many corporation statutes include a “market
exception” that makes the appraisal right unavailable with respect to corporations
whose shares are listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more
than a specified number of shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
262(b)(1)(i); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a)(1)(A) (West 2006); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-23-102(c) (West 2006).
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Though the history and operation of the two remedies are
quite different, the dissenters’ right of appraisal can be viewed in one
respect as akin to a subset of the more general remedy of
102
oppression. This is because it operates to protect minority investors
100. Interestingly, the appraisal remedy was originally developed to solve a very
different problem that arose as corporation statutes began to move away from a
requirement of unanimous shareholder approval for fundamental corporate
changes. See, e.g., Salomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650, 652
(Del. Ch. 1989) (“[A]ppraisal rights were provided as a ‘quid pro quo for the
minority’s loss of its veto power’”) (quoting In re Shore, 67 A.D.2d 526, 531-32 (N.Y.
1979)). Because such decisions were thenceforth to be made by a majority or
supermajority vote rather than as a unanimous decision, it became possible—even
likely—for some shareholders to become investors in a merged company against
their will. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.6, at 444; Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of
the Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN. L. REV. 661, 677 (1998). In order to avoid
such a result, statutory provisions were drafted that permitted such a dissenting
shareholder to seek to be cashed out by the corporation. Thus, the appraisal remedy
was initially created to provide an exit for shareholders who did not agree with
corporate policy with respect to fundamental decisions. Id. at 681.
As the years passed and the norm of majority shareholder rule became more fully
internalized by investors, however, this concern has waned. See CLARK, supra note 49,
§ 10.6, at 444 (“[I]nvestors nowadays care only about the risks and expected return
presented by their investments. They are not usually attached, out of sentiment or
ideology, to a particular company or kind of company . . . . [S]hareholders in today’s
large publicly held companies do expect mergers and other major changes in the
nature of their investments to occur with some frequency, and on the basis of
majority vote.”). The statutory right of appraisal, however, found new relevance by
evolving into a remedy for minority investors who have been squeezed out at an
unfair price. See Wertheimer, supra, at 677-78 (describing the development of
squeeze-out mergers in the mid-1970s that were used by controlling shareholders
“for the sole purpose of eliminating the minority shareholders”); see also Elliott J.
Weiss The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 64748 (1981) (describing courts’ approaches in California, New York, and Delaware in
protecting minority investors by using appraisal rights regardless of whether cash is
considered a form of consideration in that state).
101. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
102. The procedures for accomplishing mergers and other fundamental changes
provide numerous opportunities for minority investors to suffer oppression. In the
case of a merger, for example, because they have final approval over the transaction
documents, controlling shareholders can negotiate the structure and composition of
the consideration in such a way as to appropriate for themselves some or all of the
value of the minority’s investment. See, e.g., Landy v. Amsterdam, 815 F.2d 925 (3d
Cir. 1981) (merging a Pennsylvania real estate investment trust with a corporation in
a share-for-share exchange that resulted in the corporation having eighty-seven
percent of the voting power of the new company); Carl Marks & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 233 A.2d 63, 64 (Del. Ch. 1967) (describing the terms of the merger of
Universal Pictures Company, Inc. into Universal City Studios, Inc. where
stockholders were given no choice but to accept $75 cash per share, which the
stockholders thought constituted a “confiscation of [their] property without due
process of law”); see also, e.g., Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 758-59
(Del. 1959) (denying appraisal rights where a sale of assets was held not to constitute
a de facto merger). The appraisal right, by limiting the ability of the controlling
shareholders to structure the consideration, provides a remedy for a specific subset
of oppression techniques—those culminating in an attempt to squeeze out the
minority at an unfair price. See 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 9:5, at 9-22
(“Appraisal rights ostensibly protect minority shareholders against the majority’s use
of its voting power to force the minority out of an enterprise at an unfair price.”).
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from a particular subset of opportunistic behavior: the squeezing-out
of minorities at an unfair price by means of a merger, consolidation
103
or other fundamental transaction.
104
The linchpin of the appraisal right is its “fair value” standard.
Rather than ordering an appraisal of the shares’ fair market value, a
standard that might be interpreted as taking into account the
different values placed on blocks of controlling and minority
105
shares, most statutes require that minorities be paid an amount
106
Thus, in a
based on their pro rata interest in the corporation.
typical appraisal of the fair value of a block of shares, the court first
107
estimates a value for the enterprise as a whole. Once this is done,
the court simply divides the whole by the number of shares
103. For examples of cases involving the interplay between squeeze-outs and
appraisal rights, see, e.g., Morley Bros. v. Clark, 361 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Mich. 1984)
(allowing the aggrieved shareholder to enforce her appraisal rights after the
corporation consummated an unfavorable acquisition); Pratt v. Ballman-Cummings
Furniture Co., 549 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Ark. 1977) (finding a de facto merger and
granting shareholders’ appraisal rights); Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two
Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Mo. 1968) (holding that a sale of substantially
all of the corporate assets triggered the appraisal rights). But see Hariton v. Arco
Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (refusing to grant appraisal rights where
the corporation undertook a plan to sell all of its assets in exchange for stock in a
separate corporation, distribute the new stock to the shareholders, and then dissolve
the old corporation). See generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:6, at 5-19
to -31 (discussing instances where shareholders’ agreements were deemed to be
invalid because of their violations of specific statutory norms that protect minority
shareholders); id. § 9:27, at 9-184 to -189 (noting that these shareholders can petition
for relief based on oppression, which is broader than the traditional relief of
involuntary dissolution).
104. See Wertheimer, supra note 55, at 626 (“The statutory command in an
appraisal proceeding is to find the ‘fair value’ of the dissenting shares.”). The
Delaware Code and the Model Business Corporation Act provide examples of
statutory language describing appraisal rights. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a)
(stating that qualified dissenting shareholders “shall be entitled to an appraisal by
the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock”); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (mandating that “[a] shareholder is entitled . . . to obtain
payment of the fair value of that shareholder’s shares”).
105. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (stating that, in an appraisal
proceeding, “the Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair value
exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger or consolidation”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (defining fair value
as “the value of the corporation’s shares determined . . . without discounting for lack
of marketability or minority status”). For a definition of “fair market value,” see infra
note 251.
106. See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, 32 & n.17 (Del. Ch.
1996) (defining fair value as “the pro rata value of the entire firm as a going
enterprise”), rev’d on other grounds, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 13.01(4) (defining fair value as “the value of the corporation’s shares determined:
immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the
shareholder objects” excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of
the corporate action”).
107. See Wertheimer, supra note 55, at 628-29 (describing various common
methods of finding the value of the company and thus the value of a particular block
of shares).
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outstanding, thereby establishing a per share value that can be used
108
to calculate the price to be paid to the dissenting shareholder.
Under this standard, minority investors are entitled to the same
consideration per share as are controlling shareholders.
Similar to the tests used to judge instances of oppression, the fair
value standard is objective because it evidences an underlying
109
conviction that each share is equivalent. No discount is calculated
for the lack of control over the corporation’s policies and strategies,
nor for the illiquidity that normally accompanies a minority position
110
that lacks control.
Rather, courts look at each share of stock
individually as representing a fragmented and separable—and
uniform—interest in the enterprise as a whole. In other words, the
fair value standard ignores the impact of the parties’ private
111
allocation of the risks associated with a lack of control.
The
dissenters’ right of appraisal thereby elevates the minority shares to
the status of controlling shares. The fair value of each share is made
equivalent, even if the particulars of the parties’ bargain would
suggest that some shares were intended to bear more of the risks than
others. The appraisal right, like the remedy of oppression, again
fixes a mandatory allocation of control and removes from the parties
the discretion to negotiate their own unique deal.
C. The Sources for the Response
The law has responded to the vulnerability of minority investors by
retreating to objective, uniform standards. It treats all minority
investors as members of a similarly situated, and equally vulnerable,
category, thereby ignoring the possibility that some investors might
prefer a different deal. As described in the preceding sections, the
standards that have been adopted to ameliorate minority
vulnerability are mandatory and objective, rather than default and
112
subjective.
Each therefore ignores the deal actually negotiated by
the parties and in doing so mandates a level of acceptable
commercial behavior established by statute or caselaw.

108. See id.
109. But see infra Part I.D.3.
110. For an explanation of the factors impacting the analysis of a share’s value, see
infra Part II.B.
111. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 10 (“Despite shedding their statecreation origins, modern corporate statutes do include many mandatory terms.”).
112. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2 (discussing the problems with an objective
standard in evaluating a minority shareholder’s cause of action for oppression and a
court’s calculation of the fair value of the shareholder’s shares).
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In developing the remedies for oppression as objective standards,
courts and legislatures appear largely to have been following the
approaches taken by the scholarly literature. Hodge O’Neal and
Allen Afterman, for example, both advocated early on for the
adoption of a blanket set of protections available equally to all
113
Rather than make any distinctions among
minority investors.
minority investors, they assumed in all cases that silence in an
investment contract indicated investor ignorance as to the risks of
114
minority status.
When minority investors failed to protect
themselves, they believed it self-evident that the law should do so on
115
their behalf.
Hetherington and Dooley similarly argued that all
minority investors, regardless of their individual circumstances,
should be granted certain legal protections—in their case,
116
partnership-like dissolution rights.
More recently, prolific close corporation scholars such as Robert
Thompson and Douglas Moll have probed the proper boundaries of
117
the legal protections, as well as their application.
Others have
113. See Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 193 (“Professor O’Neal’s
1975 treatise, Oppression of Minority Shareholders, urged the reasonable expectations of
shareholders as the most reliable guide to a just resolution of disputes among
shareholders.”); O’NEAL, supra note 77, at § 9.08, 609-10 (advocating the adoption of
dissenters’ rights statutes covering all types of combinations of mergers and sales of
assets); Afterman, supra note 4, at 1043-46 (discussing the usefulness of section 210 of
the English Companies Act in granting redress to “any member of a company who
complains that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner
oppressive to some part of its members”); see also Hetherington, supra note 4, at 946
(“Each shareholder is entitled to assume that the other shareholders will not
intentionally exercise their rights as owners for the purpose of damaging or
destroying the common venture.”).
114. See, e.g., O’NEAL, supra note 77, § 9.03, at 582 (“A person taking a minority
position in a close corporation often leaves himself vulnerable to squeeze-out or
oppression by failing to insist upon a shareholders’ agreement.”).
115. See id. §§ 9.02, 9.08, at 579, 609-10 (suggesting that restrictive statutes should
be amended to enforce bylaw provisions and shareholders’ agreements, while at the
same time minimizing the disadvantages and complexities facing minority
shareholders in asserting dissenters’ rights).
116. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 6 (“Accordingly, we offer a model
statutory provision requiring the majority to repurchase the minority’s interest at the
request of the latter.”).
117. See, e.g., Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 200-05, 210-16, 22836 (discussing alternative remedies to court-ordered involuntary dissolution such as
voluntary dissolution, dissolution due to deadlock, dissolution based on misconduct,
shareholders’ reasonable expectations, buyouts and custodial arrangements);
Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 699 (discussing the response
of legislatures in broadening the grounds for judicial dissolution of a corporation
and providing additional remedies in addition to the courts expanding the ability of
shareholders to bring a direct and individual cause of action against the
corporation); Moll, supra note 4, at 989 (comparing contract law and the remedy of
oppression); Moll, supra note 7, at 765-78 (discussing the availability of remedies
based on the perspective of the trier of fact); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression
& Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation
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118

followed suit.
The goal of their research has been to explore and
outline a legal structure that would ameliorate the vulnerability
inherent in minority ownership, thereby minimizing the associated
119
agency costs.
In doing so, however, each has made objective
arguments based not on the parties’ individually chosen allocation of
power, but on public policy concerns equally applicable to all
minority investors (or at least all unsophisticated minority investors).
Interestingly, even opponents of a broad remedy have approached
the problem as one impacting all minority investors in a uniform
manner. Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, cautioned against
assuming that close corporation investors really desire an allocation
120
of control other than the statutory norm.
In doing so, they
appeared to open the door to a more subjective analysis that would
seek to uncover the boundaries of proper conduct actually elected by
121
the parties. They failed to seize this opportunity, however. Instead,
their recommendations were not to replace a mandatory standard
with a case-by-case approach, but to change the default assumption

Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717 (2001-2002) (examining the “time of investment” focus
of most published oppression decisions); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression &
Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60 WASH & LEE L. REV. 841 (2003) (considering
whether judicial intervention is warranted in close corporation dividend policy).
118. See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 68, at 1101, 1136 (discussing the extent to which
Delaware corporation law prevents oppression of minority investors given the ruling
in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), where the court declined to create
any special rules for close corporations but applied the “entire fairness” test which
requires the majority “to proceed in a manner that is both procedurally and
substantively fair”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 4, at 947-48 (taking the approach
that the close corporation structure should first be limited in its use, then that the
law should take a passive approach to avoid undermining the self-enforcing structure
already in place).
119. See Moll, supra note 7, at 775, 826 (advocating the use of a “modified minority
perspective” where the court will consider the minority shareholder’s reasonable
expectations in light of the particular circumstances before the court at the time);
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 237 (“The change in law of
involuntary dissolution . . . is a necessary complement to the broad flexibility now
provided to participants structuring their relationship in a corporation.”). For a
further discussion of the interplay between oppression and agency costs, see infra
Part II.D.
120. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 250 (arguing that “the
assumption that participants in closely held corporations want to be governed by
partnership law is questionable. The participants incorporated for a reason.”);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 285 (“In light of the potential cost of these
protections [right of dissolution at will and imposition of strict fiduciary duties], it is
conceivable, indeed certain, that there will be situations where all parties decide that
they are better off without them.”).
121. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 301 (“There is no basis for treating
one form or one group of investors as favorites of the law, and there is every reason
to treat both groups of investors as intelligent adults who’s contracts should be
enforced.”).
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from one that is protective of minority investors to one that is not.
123
In this way, like the Delaware courts, they continued to treat all
minority investors as similarly situated and advocated a fixed, uniform
124
scheme. Rather than seek to uncover the parties’ true bargain, they
simply argued for a different underlying assumption regarding the
implications of the minority’s inherent vulnerability.
There appears to be broad agreement among scholars, then, that
the range of permissible conduct in a close corporation should be
determined in a uniform manner, treating all minority investors as
similarly situated equally vulnerable. The choices and intentions of
the parties, as reflected in their particular bargain, are generally
ignored by scholars as well as by courts and legislatures.
D. The Defects in the Response
Wherever possible, the parties to a business corporation should be
granted the freedom to bargain among themselves over the proper
125
range of discretion to be allocated to the controlling shareholders.
In this way, they can select the balance between discretion and
accountability that is optimal given the particular circumstances of
126
their unique transaction.
Only when it is not possible to give
deference to the parties’ intentions should the legal system impose
an objective standard for what constitutes proper commercial
behavior.
The reluctance of scholars and other policymakers to permit
investors to bargain privately for their own preferred standard of
acceptable commercial behavior appears to be rooted in some
combination of four assumptions. The following sections describe
these assumptions and challenge their application to close
corporations.
122. See id. at 273 (“No a priori case can be made for greater legal intervention in
closely or publicly held corporations.”). O’Kelley also advocated an approach that
would tend to enforce “the level of majority discretion normally afforded by the
corporate form.”
O’Kelly, supra note 6, at 246.
However, he based his
recommendation on the assumption that “the parties are presumed to have chosen
corporate form rationally and for governance reasons.” Id.
123. See supra notes 7 and 68.
124. In this respect, interestingly, Easterbrook and Fischel’s hypothetical bargain
approach differs from a strict contractarian analysis, which would seek to provide a
default rule applicable when the parties are silent, rather than imposing a mandatory
rule. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 17 (“It is, therefore, a mistake to identify
the hypothetical bargain approach with the contract theory of the corporation.”).
125. See id. at 32 (arguing that “the fundamentally contractual nature of fiduciary
duties means that they should be subject to the same presumption in favor of private
ordering that applies to other contracts”).
126. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 636 (characterizing risk management as a
commodity that can, and should, be priced by the parties to a business transaction).
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1.

A false analogy
As Americans, we profess to value equality and to abhor injustice.
On both a philosophical and emotional level, we reject the disparate
treatment of others, even if we sometimes disagree in practice over
127
what conduct constitutes improper discrimination. The reluctance
of policymakers to permit minority investors to waive protections
therefore appears to be predicated in part on a belief in the similarity
between their vulnerable status and that of other aggrieved
128
minorities, such as racial and ethnic minorities.
In fact, the law’s
very language and use of metaphor—the term “oppression,” for
example—appears to be borrowed from the realm of equal
129
protection law.
As with a “protected class,” to borrow a term
directly from constitutional law, it is the mere fact of the minority’s
130
vulnerable status that triggers the application of special protections.
The remedies for oppression therefore seem based as much on an
intuitive sense of equity arising out of concern for vulnerable
131
minorities as on traditional notions of contract law.
Being a minority investor is quite different from being a racial or
ethnic minority, however. Presumably, one is born with certain
largely immutable physical characteristics that determine one’s race
or ethnicity. Whether or not the concepts of race and ethnicity are in
part constructed, minority status is for the most part beyond the
control of the typical citizen, at least insofar as she cannot easily take
action to permanently alter her race or ethnicity. Accordingly, the
127. For a general discussion of the status of, and the challenges facing, racial and
ethnic minorities in the United States, see generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 26-50 (1987).
128. See Chander, supra note 1, at 153-58 (comparing the history and motivation of
corporation law’s treatment of minority investors to constitutional law and critical
race theory in terms of power of the majority and fairness to the minority).
129. The Supreme Court’s early view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that its
“one pervading purpose” was “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion
over him.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872) (emphasis added).
130. Under modern constitutional jurisprudence, individuals are deemed
members of a protected class if they constitute “discrete and insular minorities.”
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The
designation as a protected class means that the courts will apply “strict scrutiny” when
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation that disparately impacts such individuals.
See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 687 (7th
ed. 2004).
131. Traditional notions of contract law are based on the concept of a free
exchange of consideration. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 2.2, at 47-48. The
remedies for oppression, on the other hand, provide minority investors with
protections for which they neither bargained nor paid. But see Moll, supra note 4, at
989 (distinguishing the remedy of oppression from the contract law doctrine of an
implied-in-fact contract).
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laws of a multi-ethnic nation are often crafted with a view toward
ameliorating the vulnerabilities that are associated with inherent
132
minority status.
Conversely, minority investors freely elect their vulnerable status.
Their decisions to purchase shares in a close corporation are made
133
deliberately and without coercion.
Unlike racial and ethnic
minorities, they are free to participate (or not) in a given enterprise
depending upon the investment’s perceived merits and risk. To the
extent a particular term or set of terms in a deal offends them, they
can refrain from investing. In fact, not only do minority investors
freely submit to the fact of their vulnerability, but they are complicit
in shaping its bounds. Often, they can use the threat of withholding
their investment dollars as leverage to negotiate ex ante for a more
favorable allocation of risk. Thus, unlike race or ethnicity, minority
vulnerability is both highly mutable and largely determined by the
minority itself. The decision as to whether to become a minority is
134
therefore wholly and entirely within their control. Though there is
no costless means of exit, a minority investor has control over the
choice of entry.
What is or is not fair and equitable with respect to racial and ethnic
minorities, therefore, is not the same as what is or is not fair and
equitable with respect to minority investors. It is also not the same
for all minority investors. In other words, although the comparison
to other aggrieved minorities has a certain emotional appeal, the
metaphor misleads, and the assumption that minority investors
represent a homogeneous and victimized category does violence to
135
their individually negotiated investment contracts.
Treating all
minority investors the same—as if they all negotiated, or tried to
negotiate, the identical deal and thus are all equally vulnerable—robs
them of the ability to select an allocation of control that is best suited
132. See Chander, supra note 1, at 167 (“The ideology of governmental
colorblindness does not deny the persistence of difference within the polity. Rather
it proposes that law must ignore such difference, lest it become complicit in its
perpetuation.”).
133. In the event an investment decision is made under the influence of coercion
or subject to some other defect in the bargaining process, such as if the investor were
a minor or the victim of fraud or duress, the law of oppression would not be
implicated as the parties’ initial investment contract would be a nullity under
traditional principles of contract law (or at least voidable at the election of the
investor). FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 4.16, at 255-57.
134. Id.
135. For examples of circumstances that might lead a minority investor to agree to
cede a greater degree of control than might seem reasonably prudent, thereby
subjecting herself to a high level of risk of oppression, see supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
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for their own specific needs and those of their particular corporate
enterprise.
2.

A false resemblance
The law’s concern for the vulnerable position of minority investors
may also arise partly from the resemblance between close
corporations and partnerships. This point was made most forcefully
by Hetherington and Dooley, who believed that the parallels were
significant enough to warrant the extension of partnership-like
136
As is the case with a
protections to minority shareholders.
partnership, they argued, investors in a close corporation serve
simultaneously as owners and managers and also are involved in a
137
close relationship of mutual trust and confidence. Unlike partners,
however, minority shareholders have no costless means of exit, and so
138
are therefore uniquely vulnerable to abuse. For Hetherington and
Dooley, a close corporation is simply a partnership with limited
139
liability.
They therefore advocated extending partnership-like
dissolution rights to close corporations, thereby providing minority
140
investors with an exit right at the expense of their co-investors.
136. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 6 (offering “a model statutory
provision requiring the majority to repurchase the minority’s interest at the request
of the latter and subject to appropriate safeguards”).
137. Id. at 2-3 (“Typically, such firms are founded by individuals who have a
virtually complete identity of interests and strong feelings of trust and confidence for
one another.”) .
138. Id. at 3 (“The consequences of a breakdown in consensus are quite different
depending on whether the parties have been operating in the partnership or
corporate form, and the difference lies in the ease with which the participants’
interests can be liquidated.”). See also Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra
note 4, at 701 (“Free transferability, if there is a public market for the corporation’s
shares, provides liquidity that can provide the minority shareholder with an escape
from the majority’s possible misuse of centralized power.”).
139. Their assumption seems to have been that investors in close corporations
actually desire the attributes of a partnership but elect to incorporate instead in
order to obtain the benefits of limited liability. See infra Part II.D; see also Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975)
(noting the “fundamental resemblance” that a close corporation bears to a
partnership). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 286 (providing reasons
investors might prefer restrictive rules regarding involuntary dissolution, including
the possibility that a rule of easy exit would increase the number of deadlocks and
other conflicts and concern that the loss of a key entrepreneur-manager could
reduce the value of the corporation).
140. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 6. Under traditional norms of
partnership law, a partner generally has the right to dissolve the partnership and
retain her proportional value of the firm’s assets upon liquidation. U.P.A. § 38(1)
(1914); R.U.P.A. § 807 (1997). Alternatively, the remaining partners can elect to
continue the partnership and pay the departing partner the amount she would have
received had the firm been liquidated. U.P.A. § 41; R.U.P.A. § 701. Under either
scenario, the amount to be paid to the departing partner depletes the firm’s value
and so comes at the expense of the remaining partners. If partnership-like exit
rights were to be extended to close corporation shareholders, as Hetherington and
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The shortcomings of this approach are several, and some have
been described before. First, as Easterbrook and Fischel responded,
it is not clear that investors are as ignorant or passive as the foregoing
141
analysis would suggest. There is a danger, in fact, in assuming that
investors who are savvy enough to choose the corporate form for its
limited liability—and perhaps even to elect partnership tax treatment
142
through a subchapter S election —are nonetheless unaware of the
143
other attributes of a corporation. Easterbrook and Fischel posited,
for example, that some investors cognizant of their inability to
foresee all contingencies may have selected the corporate form in
144
order to lock one another into the investment.
It is at least
plausible, then, that the investors may have chosen the corporate
form not solely or even primarily for its limited liability, but in order
to make exit more difficult.
Any assumptions that investors

Dooley advocated, then the ability to exit would likewise either cause the dissolution
of the corporation or require the corporation to pay the departing shareholder a
liquidation value, thereby reducing the corporation’s value in the hands of the
remaining shareholders. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 27-28. Where the
corporation retained value as an ongoing enterprise, the ability of the parties’ to
bargain makes it likely that they would in most cases negotiate a buyout of the
departing shareholder rather than acquiesce passively in a dissolution procedure. Id.
141. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 298 (arguing that “the assumption
that participants in closely held corporations want to be governed by partnership law
is questionable. The participants incorporated for a reason. . . . Corporate law is
different from partnership law in many ways, and the venturers may desire to
preserve these differences.”).
142. A common planning technique for close corporations is to elect to be taxed
under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 1361 (2006)
(outlining the procedures for making such an election). So-called “S corporations”
are taxed much like partnerships and so avoid the impact of a double tax. However,
they may not have more than 100 shareholders (or any corporate or non-resident
alien shareholders) or more than a single class of stock, making them unsuitable for
many close corporations. See DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD
ENTERPRISES 30-32 (2006). For a more thorough discussion of other tax planning
techniques available to close corporation shareholders, see supra note 48.
143. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 299 (“Even if the parties did not
consciously decide to opt out of the partnership rule, all this means is that they were
asleep. What reason have we to think that if they were awake they would have
selected the partnership rule?”).
144. Id. at 287; see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 4, at 918-20 (arguing that
investors may prefer to limit exit in order to avoid the loss of match-specific assets
that “have great value to insiders and little value to outsiders”). This inability to
anticipate the long-term consequences of their agreement is referred to as “bounded
rationality.” See O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 221 (“While individuals may intend to act
rationally, there are cognitive limits, or bounds, on their ability to do so.”);
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 25 (“Decisionmakers inherently have limited memories,
computational skills, and other mental tools, which in turn limit their ability to
gather and process information.”). Agreeing to be locked into an investment—
thereby increasing the incentives toward good behavior—is one method for dealing
contractually with the problem of bounded rationality. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 4, at 287.
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ignorantly select the corporate form are therefore suspect and likely
145
to result in at least occasional injustice.
A second drawback to the Hetherington and Dooley approach
results from the subsequent development of the limited liability
company. Though not available as a planning tool at the time they
were writing, limited liability companies combine partnership-like
management structures (and, potentially, exit opportunities) with the
146
benefits of corporation-style limited liability.
As a result, it is now
far more difficult to assume that an investor group views the decision
to incorporate as a straight-forward compromise between the benefits
provided by a corporation and those provided by a partnership.
Rather, if those were their concerns, such a group would presumably
147
opt to form an LLC instead.
At least to the extent they
incorporated after 1996, then, it would seem more likely that the
investors actually desired what the corporate form has to offer,
148
including perhaps a prohibition against easy exit.
A third reason for questioning an approach that is based on an
analogy between close corporations and partnerships is that they are
dissimilar in important ways.
Most significantly, partners are
generally liable for the debts of the partnership to the fullest extent

145. Certainly, investor expectations will in many cases overlap with such
assumptions. The overlap will not, however, be complete. See id.
146. For an overview of the basic features and early history of the limited liability
company, see generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability
Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1, 2-6 (1995). Interestingly, in order to ensure that LLCs were
taxed as flow-through entities under applicable IRS rules, early state LLC statutes
generally applied the partnership law norm of easy exit as the default rule. Douglas
K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company: Learning (Or Not) From
Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 926-31 (2005). After the IRS
promulgated its “check-the-box” regulations in 1996, however, many states amended
their LLC statutes to adopt the corporation law norm of limited exit as the default
rule. Id. at 932-35. This appears to have been done in part to reduce the value of
close corporation stock for estate and gift tax purposes by making it subject to a
discount for lack of marketability. Id. at 936-40.
147. If, as Hetherington and Dooley appear to believe, most close corporation
investors would have formed a partnership but for the unlimited liability they would
incur, then the presence of a new form of entity that combines the attributes of a
partnership with the limited liability of a corporation should attract such investors in
the future. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 6. Thus, investors who
nonetheless choose to incorporate might appear to prefer the attributes of a close
corporation, as predicted by Easterbrook and Fischel, rather than the attributes of a
partnership. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 299.
148. Prior to the adoption of new Treasury Department regulations in 1996, the
federal income tax treatment of limited liability companies was both complex and
uncertain, making LLCs initially less attractive than they otherwise might have been.
See generally Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, The Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 422-50 (2005)
(comparing the federal income tax treatment of entities before and after the “checkthe-box” regulations).
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149

of their individual wealth. Thus, because each partner can bind the
150
partnership, and hence effectively pledge the assets of the other
partners, it is critical that they be able to exit where there is
151
disagreement over fundamental policy matters.
The same is not
true of corporations, however, where the doctrine of limited liability
generally shields investors from losing more than the value of their
152
investment. A rule that protects the capital of a business enterprise
from withdrawal by restricting easy exit is therefore much more
consistent with the lesser risks associated with a corporate investment
as well as with the concept that a corporation constitutes a distinct (if
153
artificial) person.
A final reason for doubting the notion that close corporation
investors would actually prefer the attributes of a partnership (other
than with respect to liability) is that many partnerships actually
contract for corporate-style limitations on exit. In sophisticated
partnership agreements, for example, it is often the norm to
154
contractually prohibit the withdrawal of a partner’s capital.
The
155
same is true, in fact, of sophisticated limited liability companies.
Thus, at least some evidence suggests that the proper conclusion to
draw from the parallels between close corporations and partnerships
is not that exit rights should be expanded in the corporate context,
149. U.P.A. § 15 (1914); R.U.P.A. § 306(a) (1997). See generally GEVURTZ, supra
note 57, § 1.1.1, at 3 (“Individual partners have unlimited personal liability for debts
incurred in the business.”).
150. U.P.A. § 303 (1914); R.U.P.A. § 301 (1997) (“Acts of a partner in the ordinary
course of business bind the partnership”). See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 57,
§ 1.1.2, at 14.
151. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that the “problem of
exploitation” of minority investors in close corporations can be traced primarily to
the illiquidity of their shares).
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 162 (2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2005)
(“[A] shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the
corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or
conduct”). See generally GEVURTZ, supra note 57, § 1.1, at 7 (explaining that
“stockholders have no liability for the corporation’s debts simply by virtue of being
stockholders”).
153. Chief Justice Marshall famously described a corporation as “an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,” thus
confirming and solidifying the principle that a corporation exists at law separate and
apart from its shareholders. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518, 636 (1819).
154. See, e.g., JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND
OPERATIONS, § 9.03, 9-17 (2004).
155. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 1 RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 11.01, at 11-2 (2002) (arguing against a dissolution-atwill doctrine for limited liability companies). Although early LLC statutes generally
provided for partnership-style dissolution-at-will, the modern trend is to eliminate
such rights. Id. One of the reasons for this is that the limitation on transfer can be
used by investors to argue that their holdings are relatively illiquid and so less
valuable for estate and gift tax purposes. Moll, supra note 146, at 936-40.
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but that they should be eliminated as the default position in the
partnership context.
For a variety of reasons, then, the superficial resemblance between
close corporations and partnerships does not support an expansion
of the rights of minority shareholders. Such an unjustified shift in
the allocation of control would come at the expense of controlling
shareholders, and hence would constitute an injustice without
furthering any significant policy goal or theoretical concern.
3.

A false equivalency
The law’s focus on the relative power and status of controlling and
minority shareholders is also partly the result of a third assumption—
that each share of a corporation’s stock represents the same bargain.
The assumption appears to be that, because the specific rights set
forth in the corporation’s charter documents and in the applicable
statute are the same for all shares of a particular class, the individual
shares somehow serve to symbolize the same bargain as to risk and
156
Each such share, for example, has the same right to
reward.
participate in dividends. Accordingly, it is assumed that the only
distinction represented by different blocks of shares is that a
controlling shareholder owns more, thus providing her with a larger
aggregate portion of any dividends declared by the board. The
controlling shareholder is not, however, entitled to a greater portion
of the per share profits as a result of her status. According to this
logic, the risks associated with minority vulnerability must be
allocated evenly among the shares in order to maintain the
equivalency of the shares’ rights and privileges.
Focusing on the shares themselves, however, misses the point. The
shares merely represent the language in which corporation law
speaks. They do not provide their holder with a direct claim on any
of the corporation’s assets, nor do they guarantee any specific
156. Corporation statutes generally permit companies to issue multiple classes and
series of stock with different rights and privileges. CLARK, supra note 49, §§ 18.3.3,
18.3.4, at 779-80. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (“Every corporation may
issue 1 or more classes of stock or 1 or more series of stock within any class
thereof.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (“If more than one class of chares is
authorized, the articles of incorporation must prescribe a distinguishing designation
for each class or series.”). However, all of the shares of a particular class or series
must, on their face, have identical rights and privileges. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 151(f); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (“Except to the extent varied as
permitted by this section, all shares of a class or series must have terms, including
preferences, rights and limitations, that are identical with those of other shares of the
same class or series.”). Therefore, for convenience, references throughout the text
to “all shares” or similar terms are intended to refer only to shares of the same class
and series of stock and not to all shares issued by the corporation.
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157

management or employment rights.
Rather than representing
some fixed, unalterable and equivalent bundle of rights, they simply
serve as a proxy for the parties’ business deal, which may or may not
158
contemplate an equal or proportionate division of power. In other
words, different shares of stock, though in all respects equivalent on
their face, can represent different bargains and hence different value
propositions.
Shares of stock in fact represent both more and less than the
bundle of rights and privileges expressly granted by the applicable
159
statute. Thus, depending on the risks and benefits associated with
its ownership, a particular share may be significantly more or less
valuable than the others of its class. If that share provides its owner
with control over the corporation’s future conduct, for example, it
would represent more than a mere pro rata claim against the
160
The bundle of rights of such a share would
corporation’s assets.
include the discretion to guide corporate policy—a valuable right
161
indeed. If the share is part of a minority block, on the other hand,
the holder’s inability to influence or control the actions of the
company could mean that she might never actually enjoy the rights
162
that are technically granted her by the statute. In fact, when viewed
157. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 8-10 (explaining that
although a person may hold stock in a brewery, that person cannot go to the brewery
and trade the value, or even a discounted value, for an amount of beer).
158. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 466-67 (noting that the value of control over a
corporation’s affairs derives from the relative, as opposed to absolute, degree of
power exerted).
159. In fact, the rights granted by statute to shareholders are surprisingly narrow
in scope. Typically, they include the right to receive a pro rata share of any dividends
or other distributions—but only to the extent they are declared by the board—the
right to vote on fundamental corporate changes and in the election directors, and
the right to sue on behalf of the corporation in a derivative action. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 212, 327 (2006) (declaring shareholder dividend, voting,
and derivative action rights under Delaware corporation law). They also include the
right to receive a pro rata share of the corporate assets in the event of dissolution.
See id. § 281 (mandating the priority and procedure for payment to claimants and
stockholders of a dissolved corporation).
160. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 18 (noting that “control
owners have rights that minority owners do not”). See also BRUNER, supra note 3, at
465 (characterizing control as an option that can be valued, purchased and sold
separately from the underlying stock).
161. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 18.
162. Although the corporation statutes put the power to elect directors in the
hands of shareholders, for example, this power is severely limited by a variety of
factors. See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 57, §§ 13.12, 13.19, at 739, 759 (noting that
before a shareholder can vote, the corporation must call a meeting at which a
quorum must be present, and determine through the corporate books who has legal
ownership of the voting shares and thus who is entitled to vote, “mere possession” of
the share certificate being insufficient). Moreover, in large public corporations,
nominations are typically controlled by the existing board, meaning that there is
generally only one candidate per open seat. See id. § 13.33, at 803 (noting that one of
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in this light, control can be understood as an economic right that is
163
It can be valued,
distinguishable from the underlying shares.
purchased and sold separate and apart from the block of shares to
164
which it adheres.
In financial terms, then, control might be
considered to be a call option that gives its holder the ability to
165
choose between alternative corporate strategies and policies.
The bundle of rights that is associated with minority shares
therefore differs from that associated with controlling shares, much
like shares of different classes or series differ in the extent of their
166
rights and privileges.
Certainly, no court would find conduct
oppressive where the right to engage in such conduct was tied to a
particular class of shares and denied to another class, even if such
disparate rights made the secondary class of shares less valuable.
Such is almost uniformly the case with preferred stock, which often
has superior dividend and dissolution rights but inferior voting and
control rights. Why not, then, acknowledge that this division of
control is often achieved through the simple process of divvying up
the shares? Indeed, for unsophisticated investors who are less likely
to engage in careful planning (and who are therefore less likely to
use a dual-class capital structure), many of the rights and risks the
parties intended to affix to the shares may not be set forth in the legal
documents that purport to govern them. Rather, it is frequently the
context in which the shares are held that determines the actual
extent of the holders’ rights.
Because the shares held by close corporation investors vary in their
rights, the law should not attempt to impose a false equivalency.
Rather, the law regarding close corporations should seek to
determine which rights the parties themselves believe that they
purchased. An investor who paid full consideration for shares she
believed would enjoy equal status with all other shareholders deserves
to reap the benefits of her bargain. On the other hand, an investor
who paid a discounted price for a lesser set of rights should not then
many control devices can be the classification of directors, with staggered elections of
only some of the directors each year). The shareholders vote, but their vote does not
matter. Id. Likewise, in close corporations, the result of a norm of majority rule is to
give the power to the controlling shareholders to elect, not merely a proportional
number of directors, but all of the directors. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text. Thus, the allocation of power resulting from the relative size of the parties’
share holdings may determine the extent to which the legal rights afforded a share of
stock in the statute is meaningful.
163. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 465-66.
164. See infra Parts II.B.2 (discussing how control is valued) and II.C (discussing
techniques for privately allocating control).
165. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 465-66.
166. See supra note 156.
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be granted them by law. Such an outcome would be at the expense
of the controlling shareholders and would constitute an
uncompensated transfer of wealth. In the first instance, then, the law
should look past the apparent equivalency of the shares themselves
and instead attempt to interpret the bargain that the shares
symbolize.
4.

An ambiguous silence
The most important basis for the reluctance of policymakers to
consider a larger role for private ordering in the context of close
corporations appears to arise from the ambiguity inherent in the
decision to opt out. In fact, minority investor vulnerability poses an
especially acute problem in that it confronts policymakers with the
limits of the law’s power.
In the first place, no legal scheme, whether based on statute or
operating through the more flexible means of fiduciary duties, is
capable of protecting minority investors from the full panoply of risks
167
they face at the hands of their fellow shareholders. In fact, most of
the indignities likely to be suffered by minority investors will be
isolated or transient enough that they fail to rise to the level of
168
oppression.
Thus, it is highly unlikely that minority investors will
seek redress from the judicial system except under the most
egregious of circumstances.
Shareholders in close corporations are also involved in an intimate,
ongoing relationship, which in many cases overlaps with significant
169
familial and other bonds. Certainly, all lawsuits are expensive, timeconsuming, and uncertain—burdens that are likely to weigh
especially heavily on unsophisticated or resource-poor investors. In
the context of a close corporation, however, bringing a lawsuit has
the added disadvantage of destroying the parties’ other

167. Butler and Ribstein refer to the assumption that legal rules will in all cases of
market failure operate to provide a perfect (or even preferable) remedy as the
“nirvana fallacy.” Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 53.
168. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 288-89 (“The restrictive rule of
involuntary dissolution based on fault does not leave the minority shareholder
without any remedy but rather limits its use to egregious cases.”).
169. See generally Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 749-52 (2000) (building on Ian Macneil’s theory
that long-term contracts are relational because events in the long term cannot be
accurately predicted so as to include all events within the contract). Posner argues
that courts must find a way to resolve such relational disputes by drawing on social
norms or the norms of the relationship, by filling in gaps with terms that maximize
the value of the contract, or by reading the long-term contract literally. Id.
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170

relationships.
Thus, for example, if a minority investor also is
involved with the controlling shareholders in one or more nonbusiness relationships, such as if they are relatives or close friends, the
prospect of a lawsuit can seem even more unpleasant than the norm
and could even rise to the level of seeming shameful.
Resort to the legal system, then, at least in the context of close
corporations, is likely to be infrequent. Instead, other influences—
including market forces, societal norms of good behavior, and, most
importantly, private ordering by means of agreements among the
parties—appear to play a much larger role than legal rules in policing
171
opportunistic behavior in close corporations.
Because the law of
oppression plays a relatively small role in the enforcement of good
behavior in most close corporations, it is of critical importance that
172
minority investors negotiate for private contractual protections.
If

170. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 274 (noting that “[p]articipants in
closely held corporations frequently have familial or other personal relations” that
make it less comfortable to engage in conflict).
171. It is also possible to argue, from an economic standpoint, that in many cases
legal rules result in less efficient outcomes than markets. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein,
supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that “serious questions remain concerning the efficiency
of the alternative to private ordering—mandatory terms”). Unfortunately, however,
market forces are unlikely in most cases to play a significant role in protecting
minority investors in close corporations. Laws of supply and demand only work
where there is an active market for the good, such as with respect to the markets for
managerial talent or the markets for investment dollars. See, e.g., id. In a typical
close corporation, where the shareholders also double as managers, the parties are
not likely to be frequent repeat players. The controlling shareholders’ opportunistic
behavior is therefore unlikely to significantly damage their chances to enlist future
business partners or bring in future investment dollars, as there it is unlikely that
there will be a future. Moreover, if there is a future, it will most likely arise based on
some type of personal interaction rather than a market-style competition with others
for the same resources. Thus, market forces are unlikely to serve as a significant
check on the controlling shareholders’ conduct. As a result, societal norms of
behavior and other systems of private ordering are likely to factor more heavily in
protecting minority investors. See id. at 34 n.139 (arguing that, although there is no
active trading market for close corporation shares, “the participants in closely held
firms contract with each other directly, and so do not need the protection of the
securities markets as a constraint on the development of efficient arrangements”).
172. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS 230 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that “the Stock
Purchase Agreement is usually accompanied by a Stockholders Agreement, an
agreement by and among the founder in his capacity as a stockholder and the
investors.”); MARVIN HYMAN, CORPORATION FORMS 42-7 (1994) (explaining that
shareholders’ agreements can provide for the rules governing the management and
control of a close corporation, including specific situations such as the death,
disablement or retirement of one or more of the shareholders). Even publications
aimed at popular audiences—who are less likely to hire legal counsel—acknowledge
the ubiquity and importance of shareholders’ agreements. See, e.g., ANTHONY
MANCUSO, INCORPORATE YOUR BUSINESS: A 50-STATE LEGAL GUIDE TO FORMING A
CORPORATION 5/5 to /8 (2d ed. 2004) (recommending that entrepreneurs who are
otherwise “tired of incorporation paperwork” nonetheless consider adopting a
shareholders’ agreement).
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the parties fail to do so, the corporation law norms of centralized
control and majority rule will allocate wide discretion over corporate
173
In fact, the need for
policy to the controlling shareholders.
expressly negotiated guarantees is so obvious and fundamental that
many commentators seem to assume that the mere fact of their
absence justifies legal intervention in an otherwise private
174
relationship.
This concept is often expressed by means of a
generalization along the lines of “only a fool would purchase a
175
minority interest in a close corporation.” Although such statements
are generally used to highlight the minority’s inability to exit, they
also evidence a fundamental belief that the existence of a minority
interest unprotected by appropriate contractual guarantees is
indicative of the sort of unjust surprise that the law should
176
remediate.
Ideally, in a realm where private agreements dominate, the law’s
highest priority should be the interpretation and enforcement of
177
those agreements. Only where it is not possible to interpret those
agreements should the law consider substituting its judgment for that

Although one might argue that many small investors are too unsophisticated or
lack the resources to protect themselves, a detailed understanding of the operation
of corporation law is not necessary. Rather, an investor need only recognize the
threat of opportunistic behavior to negotiate an adjustment to the price. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 272-73 (cautioning against assuming that
shareholders are unable to make their own choices). But see O’Neal, supra note 4, at
884 (noting that even a minority investor’s lawyer, “if he has one, may not have the
knowledge, experience and skill necessary to draft effective protective
arrangements”); Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 199 (“Investors
often fail to anticipate the failure of their enterprise, or they demonstrate an overly
optimistic trust in those with whom they are undertaking the venture.”); Bebchuk,
supra note 4, at 1836 (“The main problem with the shareholder voting mechanism is
the lack of information.”); Brudney, supra note 4, at 1420 (noting that “investors’
knowledge and volition are a quantum jump from the kind of knowledge and
volition that are the premises for operation and enforcement of the classic law of
contract and its claimed attendant economic efficiency”).
173. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 4, at 989 (“The law of shareholder oppression
protects the close corporation minority investor from the improper exercise of
majority control.”); Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 199-201, 231
(supporting judicial remedies such as voluntary dissolution, dissolution for
misconduct, dissolution on deadlock and court-ordered buyout arrangements).
175. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d
505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (“No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the
disadvantaged minority. The outsider would have the same difficulties.”).
176. See id.
177. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 64 (arguing that “the approach
throughout the law of contract is to presume in favor of private ordering until some
type of market failure can be shown”).
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178

of the parties.
In other words, efficiency in contracting should be
the goal, not efficiency of outcome.
The problem posed by close corporations, however, is that the
structure of corporation law and the content of the deal documents
often make it difficult for observers to uncover the parties’ true
179
bargain. This interpretive problem arises because of the effect that
silence has on statutory default rules. When investors acquire shares
in a close corporation, they typically execute several documents,
including in most cases some type of purchase agreement, a set of
charter documents governing the corporation and, especially when
180
the parties are more sophisticated, a shareholders’ agreement. The
documents that the parties negotiate and sign do not encapsulate
their entire bargain, however, because the applicable corporation
181
statute is deemed to be incorporated into the company’s charter.
178. In particular, currently available remedies for minority oppression require
the court to substitute its own business judgment for that of the parties. See supra
notes 83-88 and accompanying text. This requires the judge to determine whether
to insert into the parties’ agreement a set of contractual provisions that the parties
omitted. The judge, in other words, in ruling for the minority, is expressing her
judgment that the parties should have—but did not—negotiate for minority
protections. See id. This aspect of the remedy runs counter to the general thrust of
corporation law as evidenced by the business judgment rule, which holds that courts
are not generally deemed competent to challenged or overturn the decisions of the
corporation. See supra note 93. Under normal circumstances, the law provides
parties to a business deal, or managers of a corporation, with a degree of latitude in
arranging their affairs. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000)
(explaining that “directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors
are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith,
act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach
their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all
material facts reasonably available”). It is only when there is a breakdown in the
normal functioning of the bargaining process that the judge is deemed competent to
impose her own judgment. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 280-81 (giving
examples of where courts today enforce various types of voluntary agreements among
investors in close corporations unless there is injury to a third party).
179. See, e.g., id. at 284 (noting that the rule of law plays an important role in close
corporations because it is difficult to tell whether the parties did not include a term
in the shareholders’ agreement because they were ignorant of a statutory rule or
because they purposefully chose to leave it out); see also HYMAN, supra note 172, at 421 to -17 (illustrating a typical form of shareholders’ agreement).
180. See, e.g., 1 BARTLETT, supra note 172, at 54, 211-35 (describing the types of
information that should be included in the corporation’s charter documents, stock
purchase agreement, stockholders’ agreement, and employment agreements);
HYMAN, supra note 172, at 42-8 to -17 (providing a detailed template of a
shareholders’ agreement to organize a close corporation); MANCUSO, supra note 172,
at 2/10 to /12, 2/28 to /34, 5/5 to /8 (introducing the reader to the primary
corporate documents of Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, Stock Certificates, and
Minutes of the First Directors Meeting, suggesting ways to raise capital through sales
of stock, and instructing the reader to create a shareholders’ agreement with
suggestions on information to include).
181. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(b) (2006) (“Every corporation shall be
governed by the provisions and be subject to the restrictions and liabilities contained
in this chapter.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.02 (2005) (stating that all corporations
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Where documents are silent regarding an issue, therefore, the
parties’ bargain will include all of the default rules contained in the
182
statute, as well as an often extensive and detailed body of caselaw.
The presence of silence can therefore indicate one of two
possibilities: either (1) the parties were aware of the default rules
and deliberately left the investment documents silent so as to select
them, or (2) one or both of the parties were unaware of the default
183
rules and left the investment documents silent out of ignorance.
Silence in the investment documents, in other words, could be
consistent with either agreement or lack of agreement. In both cases,
the documents would appear the same but the parties’ intentions
184
would be different.
Observers who look for express contractual
language protecting the minority will therefore be unsure of how to
interpret the omission of such language. In fact, most of the
governing provisions that serve to allocate power among the investors
will appear in a document that they are unlikely even to have read—
185
namely, the corporation statute.
In the absence of clear information regarding the parties’
intentions, corporation statutes and legal decisions have erred on the
side of protecting all minority investors by equating omission with
186
oversight.
As a result, current protections for minority investors
impose a mandatory rule rather than a default one that the parties
187
can waive or renegotiate.
Indeed, a rule that protects those
investors who are most likely to lack the legal sophistication or
resources to protect themselves seems like a sensible notion. A single
standard that applies to all close corporations also offers the benefit
of providing a bright-line rule, although the inherently uneven
organized pursuant to the Model Act “are governed by the amendment or repeal” of
any provision thereof); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 283
(“Corporate law, both statutory and judicial, is best understood as a set of standard
[contract] terms that lowers the costs of contracting.”).
182. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 7 (“The terms of the agency
contract include the provisions of state law.”); O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 216.
183. See O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 216 (explaining that “the close corporation
contract—the standard form rules provided by state corporation law as
supplemented by a particular corporation’s articles, by-laws, and shareholders’
agreements—usually does not specify how an incorporated, closely held firm and its
investors will substantively adapt to most future contingencies”).
184. See O’Neal, supra note 4, at 886 (“In a close corporation, the corporation’s
charter and bylaws almost never reflect the full business bargain of the
participants.”).
185. Brudney, supra note 4, at 1414-20 (arguing that most investors are unaware
of the constantly shifting statutory and case law regarding fiduciary duties).
186. See O’Neal, supra note 4, at 883-84 (arguing that statutory protections are
needed for minority investors because minority investors often do not put all of the
necessary terms in their shareholders’ agreements).
187. See supra Part I.B.
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application of fiduciary rules is likely to undercut this advantage
188
somewhat.
A flaw in the existing objective approaches to minority
vulnerability, however, arises because policymakers focus unduly on
express contractual provisions. When interpreting the parties’ initial
investment agreement, a natural tendency is to look for express
189
guarantees and interpret their absence as oversight.
What is
overlooked by such an approach, however, is a concept familiar to
dealmakers—that price adjustments can substitute for express
190
protections in a contract.
When the parties to a business
transaction identify a particular risk, they can chose to allocate it
either by bargaining for specific language to that effect or by
191
adjusting the price to be paid. If goods are to be shipped overseas,
for example, a purchaser can either negotiate for an express contract
provision requiring the seller to assume the risk of delivery, or merely
pay a lower purchase price and use the money saved to acquire
192
insurance.
In this way, adjustments to the purchase price and the
negotiating and drafting of contract language are effectively
193
interchangeable and serve the same purpose.
Just as a future
188. See Moll, supra note 7, at 749 (arguing that courts apply legal protections for
minority investors unevenly, with the result in any given case being determined
largely on the basis of the judge’s preconceptions regarding the causes of the
minority’s vulnerability). But see Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 1675
(arguing against a rigid application of fiduciary rules).
189. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 285 (acknowledging that “the
failure of the parties to include a particular contracting term is ambiguous. It may
mean that the parties did not want the term, but it could mean that they were
ignorant.”).
190. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 21 (arguing that all
issues in a negotiation, regardless of how sacred, can be reduced to dollars). See also
BRUNER, supra note 3, at 779, 781 (describing business negotiations as a “system” that
involves monetizing or otherwise quantifying different possible trade-offs in order to
assess their relative value).
191. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 21.
192. The purchaser could also self-insure. In either case, the purchaser would
assume the risk because she believes that her cost of bearing the risk would be lower
than the seller’s cost. As a result, this would allow her to create value in the deal. See
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR
COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 99-100 (1986) (explaining that parties with
different levels of risk aversion can use the differences to negotiate mutually
beneficial trade-offs).
193. In order for parties to a multi-issue negotiation to make concessions and
trade-offs, they must have at least a rough sense of the value they place on each issue.
See RAIFFA, supra note 31, at 148-65 (describing a multi-issue negotiation as a process
whereby each party attempts to “sort out its own preferences, by approximating a
monetary or other value for each issue, and then engages in appropriate trade-offs
and concessions with the other party based on their differing evaluations); LAX &
SEBENIUS, supra note 192, at 74-84 (describing methods that negotiating parties can
use to assess the economic value they place on intangible interests in order to make
trade-offs). To the extent issues can be monetized or otherwise valued, a party
making a particular concession should find it irrelevant whether she is “paid” in the
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stream of income can be reduced to its present value, a particular
business risk can be reduced to a dollar amount that represents a
194
party’s best estimate of its potential cost. Therefore, a contract that
appears silent because of its omission of express language might not
be silent at all. Rather, the observer might simply be looking in the
wrong place and the key element of oversight may in fact be absent.
An observer who interprets the lack of express contractual
guarantees as evidence that the parties did not consider the risks
associated with minority status may therefore be overlooking
evidence that the parties did in fact consider, and allocate, such risks.
Without analyzing the purchase price, it is not possible to know
whether the parties intended a specific allocation of power. Thus,
the law’s retreat to uniform standards in the face of a perceived lack
of subjective information about a particular deal may be premature.
The information may in fact exist and may be waiting to be
uncovered on a case-by-case basis.
E. Investor Protections as Default Norms
Mandatory legal protections for minority investors in close
corporations appear both overly rigid and likely to misconstrue the
relative equities of many cases. They appear overly rigid to the extent
they impose on the parties a fixed, uniform allocation of control, and
limit the parties’ ability to freely determine among themselves the
form of a concession on another issue or by means of a purchase price adjustment.
The two, in other words, are interchangeable. See, e.g., id. at 86 (“To assess tradeoffs
among intangible interests, it is sometimes helpful to imagine services one could buy
otherwise to satisfy the same interests.”). Freund, in fact, counsels that “it is often
prudent to counsel your client not to agree on the purchase price, even if the
negotiations have reached that point, until the other material terms of the deal have
been settled.” FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 59.
Indeed, adjusting the purchase price is in many instances superior to negotiating
specific contractual language in that it does not require as careful a parsing of the
risks. See id. at 74 (“Thinking about tradeoffs is often excruciatingly difficult and
done badly.”). In the shipping hypothetical described in the text, for example, a
purchaser who elects to pay a lower purchase price need not identify with precision,
and then spend the time and money to negotiate, each of the many causes for losing
cargo at sea. Rather, for unsophisticated investors who lack the knowledge, time or
resources to carefully analyze and negotiate every possible risk—a universe that is
limited only by the imagination, including anything from adverse weather conditions
to piracy—adjustments to the purchase price may be preferable to lengthy contract
negotiations. Where transaction costs cannot easily be engineered, in other words,
price adjustments may often be utilized by less sophisticated investors almost as a
form of poor man’s corporate attorney. See generally Gilson, supra note 11, at 253-55
(discussing the value that business lawyers bring to a transaction).
194. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 21 (“I am a firm believer
in the ultimate solubility of most issues negotiated in an acquisition—by reducing
down to dollars what appear to be sacred principles. When an adversary states that
an issue is non-negotiable, I take that to mean that the price is very high, or at least
that he would like it to be.”).
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distribution of power that is optimal for their own unique
195
circumstances. Moreover, by focusing exclusively on the fact of the
parties’ unequal status and ignoring the question of whether they
chose—and were compensated for—their vulnerability, current
doctrine may in some cases find injustice where there is none. The
result in such cases is an uncompensated wealth transfer from one of
196
the parties to the other.
A minority investor who was already
compensated for the risks associated with her vulnerable status
through a reduced purchase price should not be able to claim redress
197
to the legal system upon the later occurrence of those risks.
Whether or not the minority fully understood the precise risks, such a
result would require controlling shareholders to pay twice.
In fact, given that minority investors are in a position to influence
the corporation’s particular allocation of control, it seems that
injustice will occur in the close corporation context only when a
minority investor is both justifiably unaware of the risks associated
with her vulnerable status and, more importantly, uncompensated for
bearing those risks. Thus, if a minority investor foresaw a particular
risk and agreed to bear it in exchange for some other benefit, such as
a lower purchase price, there is no injury in the event the risk
becomes reality. The law has never intervened in private contracts by
reallocating risk merely because of differences in bargaining power
198
or business acumen.
Likewise, even if she does not fully
comprehend the nature of the risks she assumed, a minority investor
is not injured in a legal sense upon the occurrence of a negative
outcome for which she was previously compensated. Where a risk is
identified and allocated, as in an investment contract, injustice occurs

195. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 71 (arguing that “corporate rules,
ultimately are and, from an efficiency perspective, should be the product of private
ordering”).
196. For an example of such a case, see infra Part III.B. Note also that the
uncompensated transfer could occur in either direction. For example, if a minority
investor had previously been compensated for bearing the risks associated with a lack
of control, then a rule that protects her from such risks would be the legal equivalent
of permitting the minority to “have her cake and eat it too.” On the other hand, if
such consideration were not present, then the absence of a protective rule would
allow the controlling shareholders to pay less while still reaping the rewards of
control.
197. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 12.3, at 735-38 (discussing what happens
when one party to a contract “err[s] in calculating the net benefit to be anticipated
from performance of the agreement”).
198. See, e.g., Protech Indus, Inc. v. URS Corp., 377 F.3d 868, 873 (2004) (“The
purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is not to disturb the allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power, but to prevent oppression and unfair
surprise.”).
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only in the presence of unfair and uncompensated surprise.
The
legal protection of minority investors, then, should be focused on
providing a remedy for specific instances of surprise, not on
eliminating the vulnerability of minority investors as a class.
Current doctrine ultimately fails because it ignores the subjective
particulars of the parties’ deal, particulars that are often hidden in
200
plain sight. In fact, the general confusion present in current law, as
201
well as its reliance on mandatory standards, may in part be the
result of an underlying dissatisfaction with the tools currently
available for uncovering the subjective equities of a particular case.
A better, more nuanced approach to the problem of minority
investor vulnerability would in the first instance compare the
controlling shareholders’ alleged misconduct with the parties’ initial
bargain, paying particular attention to matters of price. To the
extent the parties purposefully elected an allocation of power within
the corporate enterprise, and to the extent that allocation was
reflected in an appropriate adjustment to the purchase price, their
private allocation should be preferred over the law’s. However,
where there is a mismatch between the parties’ deal and their
subsequent conduct, or when an analysis of price does not yield
additional information as to the nature of their bargain, an objective
analysis based on the reasonable expectations standard would appear
202
to be appropriate.
In other words, the cause of action for
oppression should be treated as a default gap-filler that the parties
may opt out of, and the law’s objective approach to minority
vulnerability should continue to be applied, but only after a thorough
investigation of the parties’ intentions has been concluded.
This approach is superior to prevailing standards in several
respects. First, it is more firmly rooted in norms of contract law than
are current standards, and thus does justice to the parties’ deal by
199. In this respect, the remedy of oppression mirrors the contract law doctrine of
unconscionability, which is often described in a short-hand manner as involving the
presence of an “unfair surprise.” See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1053
(2004) (“The Iowa Supreme Court has established that we should analyze the
following factors of unconscionability: (1) assent; (2) unfair surprise. . .”); W.L. May
Co., Inc. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 543 P.2d 283, 286 (Or. 1975) (holding that, in order
to determine the unconscionability of a particular contract provision, the court must
consider whether invalidation of the provision would prevent “oppression and unfair
surprise”). The presence of unconscionability makes the contract voidable at the
option of the injured party. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 4.28, at 301.
200. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Part I.B.
202. See, e.g., Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 237-38 (advocating
the use of the reasonable expectations standard as “an effective response to the
problems of minority shareholders”).
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seeking to give them the benefit of their respective bargains. In this
way, it would serve to bolster and support, rather than undercut, the
primary mechanism for protecting minority investors in close
204
corporations—privately negotiated contractual guarantees.
Second, treating minority protections as default norms would make
it less likely for courts to mistake the equities of a given case. An
examination of the price brings into the analysis the important
question of the minority’s complicity in their vulnerability. Courts
that consider not only express contractual guarantees but also the
ways in which price can serve to allocate risk are less likely to
overcompensate minority investors who already received adequate
205
consideration for assuming the risk of their vulnerability.
At the
same time, because it utilizes an objective standard as a second step in
the event an investigation of the price does not illuminate the
underlying bargain, a price-based approach to contract interpretation
continues to err on the side of protecting unsophisticated minority
investors.
Third, by providing a limited space for parties to privately
negotiate their preferred allocation of control, a price-based
approach offers a compromise between those who believe that
fiduciary duties constitute mandatory rules and those for whom they
206
are subordinate to private ordering.
One of the most important
critiques of the contractarian view that fiduciary duties should be
waivable, at least in the context of public corporations where market
207
forces are deemed powerful, has been that investors are often
ignorant of the true nature and content of their investment

203. See Moll, supra note 4, at 989 (discussing the relationship between contract
law and the remedy of oppression). In fact, for contractarians, fiduciary duties are
deemed to be part of the parties’ investment contract and are therefore subject to
waiver or negotiation the same as any other provision. Butler & Ribstein, supra note
4, at 19. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 592 (1819)
(“A grant of corporate powers and privileges is as much a contract as a grant of
land.”). But see Coffee, supra note 4, at 939 (“Historically, American corporate law
has never regarded the corporation as simply a private contract.”).
204. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 34 n.139 (arguing that a court’s refusal
to enforce the parties’ waiver of fiduciary duties makes planning more difficult). See
also infra Part II.C.
205. For examples of investors who might have been paid to bear such risks, see
supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
206. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 4 (“An important recent battleground
of the debate over freedom of contract in the corporation is the question of whether
the fiduciary duties of corporate managers should be subject to private ordering
through contract or should be to some extent law-imposed and non-waivable.”).
207. Id. at 6.
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208

bargain.
The approach advocated in this Article, however, solves
that problem by recognizing a waiver as legitimate only where there is
clear evidence that the investor was previously compensated for the
additional risk. The test, in other words, is not whether the investor
was aware of the risk of controlling shareholder opportunism, but
whether she was paid for bearing it. Even if the investor were in fact
ignorant, the waiver could cause no legally cognizable injury. By
focusing on compensation rather than knowledge, this approach
causes the concern regarding investor knowledge and sophistication
to recede. Thus, conceiving of minority protections as default norms
makes it possible to permit investors the freedom of waiver, as is
209
generally advocated by the contractarians,
while retaining a
concern for the adequacy of the status and sophistication of the
investor.
Finally, by encouraging a case-by-case analysis of each deal, default
norms suggest a middle ground between the extensive legal
protections provided by states such as Massachusetts and the near
complete lack of protections afforded investors in states such as
210
Delaware.
Thus, it appears to satisfy the concerns of both
jurisdictions, neither over- nor under-compensating the parties.
Under this approach, only investors who are not otherwise
compensated for bearing the risks associated with their minority
status—rather than all or none—would receive compensation.
II. A SOLUTION: USING PRICE AS A DIAGNOSTIC TOOL
The existing scholarship regarding close corporations has focused
its attention on creating a mandatory standard in large part because
of the difficulties associated with interpreting silence in an
211
investment contract. Because silence as to the allocation of power
can indicate either agreement or lack of agreement, policymakers
have largely given up on efforts to interpret each individual contract

208. See id. at 42 (“Some anti-contractarian writers argue that corporate contracts
should not necessarily be enforced because individual investors are ignorant
concerning the corporate governance arrangements they vote on or invest in.”).
209. See id. at 71.
210. See supra note 7 (comparing the refusal of the Supreme Court of Delaware to
extend special relief for minority investors in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 138081 (Del. 1993), with the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975), and
subsequently in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass.
1976), which held that shareholders owe a duty to each other of “utmost good faith
and loyalty”).
211. See supra Part I.D.4 (discussing the default rule of protecting all minority
investors by equating omission with oversight).
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to determine the bounds of fair conduct as negotiated by the
212
They have instead substituted an objective standard for
parties.
measuring in all cases what constitutes appropriate behavior by
213
controlling shareholders. In so doing they have substituted a blunt
instrument—a uniform rule—for a precise one—a case-by-case
analysis. Under this standardized approach, however, courts are
214
likely to misperceive the equities of many situations.
In the first
instance, then, courts should instead attempt to engage in a
subjective analysis, applying the objective “reasonable expectations”
standard only when efforts to interpret the parties’ chosen allocation
fail.
In order to engage in a subjective analysis, however, a different set
of analytical tools is needed. It is the claim of this Article that a
careful examination of the price initially paid by shareholders for
their interests can serve as just such an analytical tool. Price offers a
window into the structure of the parties’ deal because it reflects their
215
allocation of risk.
Because a party who bears a greater portion of
the risks associated with a venture would expect to be compensated
accordingly, changes in risk are typically associated with changes in
216
price.
When the allocation of risk is express, one obviously does
not need to examine the price in order to observe the allocation.
Both will point in the same direction. But when a default allocation
is imposed as a result of contractual silence, an assessment of the
price may uncover whether the parties intended the default term or
217
whether its presence was the result of oversight. If all investors paid
the same price, for example, it might suggest that the omission was
212. But see Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 32 (arguing that “the fundamentally
contractual nature of fiduciary duties means that they should be subject to the same
presumption in favor of private ordering that applies to other contracts”).
213. See supra Part I.B.
214. For example, if an entrepreneur were to purposefully and consciously cede
control of her corporation to a venture capital fund in order to attract seed capital
that was not otherwise available, it would seem unjust to limit the control rights of
the venture fund simply because most other investors would not agree to such a
lopsided allocation of control. See BARTLETT, supra note 29, at 96 (noting that
venture capital investors wield significant power over a corporation’s affairs because
they are often the only source of funds available to early-stage entrepreneurs);
BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 29, at 191 (explaining that one downside of raising
money from venture capital investors is that they are likely to require the ability to
take over control “if the entrepreneur stumbles”).
215. See infra Part II.A (discussing the risks associated with investment and how, if
those risks are identifiable, investors can attempt to eliminate or minimize those risks
through private ordering).
216. See BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 51, at 13 (“Naturally, if all else could be
held equal, investors would prefer investments with the highest expected return.”);
PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 2.
217. See supra Part I.E.
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uninformed or unintentional. Alternatively, if the investors paid
different prices, with some contributing more to the corporate
enterprise than others, then it might be reasonable to assume that
the parties did not intend to bear the risks of the enterprise
218
proportionately.
In such a case, the allocation may have been
deliberate.
The following sections explore the nature of share prices in close
corporations to determine whether pricing can shed light on the
problem of minority investor vulnerability.
A. Price as a Proxy for Risk
As a general principle, investors expect to be compensated for the
219
level of risk they incur in any given investment. The more risky the
investment, the higher the return that is required to offset the
possibility that their investment dollars will be lost or that a positive
220
return will prove elusive.
This represents the fundamental
relationship between risk and return: to entice investors to make a
more risky investment, there must be the promise of a
221
commensurately large return.
Moreover, as a corollary to this
equation, where there is a risk that is not to be borne equally by all
investors, those who will bear the risk most heavily must receive
222
appropriate compensation for their extra burden. In other words,
an investor would expect to pay less for shares that have a higher level
of risk associated with them, whether or not those risks are shared
proportionately by other investors.
Certainly, where a particular risk can be identified, the parties to a
contract can attempt to eliminate or minimize the risk, so that it does

218. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 462-67 (characterizing liquidity and control as
options for purposes of corporation finance).
219. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
181 (1996) ( “Wise investors don’t take risks just for fun. They are playing with real
money. Therefore, they require a . . . risk premium”); SLEE, supra note 18, at xxi, 19.
See also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40-41 (explaining that increased risks of
opportunistic behavior by managers can be expected to result in lower returns,
thereby leading to lower share prices).
220. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 2; BODIE, KANE &
MARCUS, supra note 51, at 133 (“The degree to which investors are willing to commit
funds to stocks depends on risk aversion.”).
221. SLEE, supra note 18, at xxi, 19; BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 51, at 7. See
generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 219, at 173-203 (discussing the relationship
between risk and return).
222. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 457-58 (“Whenever liquidity and/or control
change, value changes. . . . as you move from the base case of no control asymmetries
to the world where control asymmetries exist, two things happen: The control group
gains a premium value to their shares, while the minority shareholders experience a
discount.”).
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223

not need to be allocated. For example, if there were uncertainty in
the historical records as to whether an underground storage tank
containing hazardous substances remained buried beneath a factory,
a potential buyer of the factory would run the risk that she would
224
unwittingly acquire a significant environmental clean-up cost. The
parties could eliminate this risk by hiring an environmental scientist
to dig a hole under the factory and, if necessary, remove the tank. All
that would remain would be to bargain over which party should bear
225
the costs of hiring the scientist.
If, on the other hand, a risk cannot be eliminated, the parties must
226
bargain over who will bear it. Thus, to continue the example above,
if the location of the factory made digging an exploratory hole
impractical, the buyer and seller could simply agree on which of
them will bear the costs in the event they discover some years later
that remediation was indeed necessary. In fact, one of the basic
functions of a contract is to allocate the risks associated with
227
cooperative activities. In most cases, this will be the party who can
228
most cheaply bear the risk.
Allocations of risk can be made either explicitly through express
contractual language or implicitly through silently acquiescing to the
229
status quo ante.
Thus, to complete the factory example, the
purchase contract could be drafted to expressly state that the seller
will bear the cost of investigating and, if necessary, remedying the

223. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 112 (discussing ways that
parties to a negotiated transaction can seek to avoid the assumption of unwanted
liabilities).
224. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. (2006), requires polluters to shoulder the
financial burden of cleaning up certain contaminated sites. “Potentially responsible
parties,” including owners and operators of contaminated sites, are brought into a
lawsuit and have the opportunity to establish among them who and to what degree
each party will be liable for the clean-up costs. Commonly known as “CERCLA,” the
statute was enacted by Congress to enable the federal government to have the tools
necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems of national magnitude
resulting from hazardous waste disposal, and to make those responsible for creating
the harmful conditions bear the costs and responsibility for remedying them. See
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D.C. Minn. 1982).
225. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 21.
226. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 192, at 99-100 (explaining that parties with
different levels of risk aversion can use the differences to negotiate mutually
beneficial trade-offs).
227. See generally FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 18-21.
228. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 192, at 90-92 (noting that value is created most
readily when negotiating parties are able to make trade-offs based on differences in,
among other things, their preferences and capacity to bear risk).
229. See supra Part I.D.4.
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230

environmental concern.
In this way, the risk may be expressly
allocated by contract and a subsequent observer would have no
difficulty recognizing who had agreed to bear it. This is, in fact, the
231
more common understanding of how contracts allocate risks.
Alternatively, however, if the buyer chose to bear the environmental
risk herself, the contract could indicate this by simply remaining
232
silent, thereby engaging the status quo as a default norm.
This
would not be the omission that it first appears to be, however,
because the buyer would most likely require some type of price
adjustment to compensate her for bearing the additional risk. The
factory, as it were, would be less valuable.
Instead of an
environmentally safe investment, the buyer would be acquiring a
233
property subject to a cloud. Indeed, all risks that can be identified
can at some level be quantified, with more or less certainty, thereby
enabling the parties to bargain over their allocation, either by means
of express language or through silence coupled with a change in the
234
price.
An observer who overlooks the role that price often plays

230. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY xiii (2001)
(explaining that a purchase agreement typically deals expressly with “the allocation
of risk among the parties from such contingencies as environmental, pension and
tort liability”); COMMITTEE ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 111 (1995) (characterizing
sample environmental language as “in part a risk-shifting mechanism”).
231. See, e.g., RAIFFA, supra note 31, at 148-65 (describing multi-issue negotiations
as a series of trade-offs and concessions over different issues); LAX & SEBENIUS, supra
note 192, at 75-76 (giving the example of a tort plaintiff who is willing to accept a
decreased settlement award in exchange for less anxiety over the judgment).
232. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 112 (explaining how
liabilities, both known and unknown, may in some cases be assumed to be
undertaken unless specifically excluded in the agreement).
233. CERCLA liability attaches to any “owner or operator” of certain
contaminated property. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2006). Thus, a purchaser of a
contaminated facility would inherit the liability associated with its clean-up costs. See
supra note 224.
234. FREUND, MATING DANCE, supra note 12, at 130 (arguing that all “sacred
principles” can be reduced to “mundane dollars”). Risks that investors cannot
identify can also be allocated, through price adjustments and/or an express
agreement as to which party will bear the cost of any unknown or contingent
liabilities. They cannot, however, be quantified as their exact nature and extent
remain unknown. For an excellent—albeit bizarre—explication of this concept as
applied to national security issues, consider Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
comments of February 12, 2002:
Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know
there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown
unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks
throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the
latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.
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may therefore believe she is witness to an omission when in fact she is
in the presence of an express allocation.
In the close corporation setting, two of the most significant risks
faced by an investor involve control over the corporation’s affairs and
235
the marketability of its shares. By accepting a minority position, an
investor subjects herself to the risk that the controlling shareholders
236
will prove incompetent, lazy and/or untrustworthy.
Without the
ability to influence the operations and affairs of the corporate
enterprise, the minority investor must passively accept that the value
237
of her investment will be determined by the behavior of others.
Similarly, because of the lack of a market for minority interests in
close corporations, the inability to exit her position, either at the time
she prefers or at all, could destroy the value of an otherwise successful
238
investment.
Both of these risks, like any other risk, can be expressly allocated
among the parties. By giving the minority a seat on the board or a
position in management, for example, the parties may give the
minority some degree of influence over the corporation’s affairs,
thereby re-allocating the default rules as to the risks associated with a
239
lack of control. Likewise, by entering into a buy-sell arrangement,
the risks associated with a lack of marketability may similarly be
240
shifted.
In other words, the parties can adjust, contractually, the
degree of risk each assumes with respect to their respective
investments in the close corporation.
Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Department of Defense News Briefing
(Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02122002_t212sdv2.
html.
235. See infra Part II.B (stating that the context in which non-public stock is held
determines whether a discount should be applied to appropriately represent its
value).
236. See supra notes 39-40; see also BRUNER, supra note 3, at 468 (“One reason that
control might be valuable is that it presents the opportunity for the majority to
expropriate wealth of the minority.”).
237. See supra note 40 (explaining that the concept of reliance on the efforts of
others is essential to being considered a security under federal law, citing as an
example the definition of an investment contract found in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)).
238. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 78 (“Lack of
marketability, more often than not, is the largest dollar discount factor in the
valuation of a business interest, particularly a minority interest.”); BRUNER, supra note
3, at 462 (“Illiquidity, or lack of marketability of an asset, commands a discount
sufficient to induce investors to buy the nonmarketable asset rather than an identical
marketable asset.”).
239. See infra Part II.C; see also 1 BARTLETT, supra note 172, at 230 (discussing ways
in which the shareholders can structure the board so as to allocate control in
accordance with their understandings).
240. See HYMAN, supra note 172, at 42-13 to -23 (providing an example of a buy-sell
agreement).
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To the extent a party assumes a greater portion of these risks,
241
however, she would expect to receive appropriate compensation. A
minority investor who is subject to the full panoply of risks associated
with a lack of control, for example, would presumably pay a lower
price for her shares than one whose investment is protected by one or
242
more express contractual guarantees.
The price of the shares will
243
fluctuate with the degree of risk assumed.
Price, in other words,
244
serves as a proxy for risk. By determining the relative value of the
shares, an observer can therefore make certain inferences as to the
manner in which the parties allocated the risks associated with their
joint endeavor. Where the contract is silent regarding a particular
risk, price can provide a window into whether such omission
represents regrettable oversight or deliberate choice.
B. The Valuation of Private Firms
Attempts to use price as a window into the parties’ intentions are
complicated by the lack of an active market for shares of private
245
companies. The existence of a market for a commodity or financial
instrument, for example, enables one to estimate with confidence the
246
value investors place on the item in question. So long as the market
is sufficiently deep and transparent, the collective interactions of
large numbers of willing buyers and sellers will shed light on how
247
investors perceive the item and its particular components.
Where
no such market exists, however, as is the case with respect to close
corporations, no such consensus opinion is readily available. Thus, it
is impossible to measure with precision the relative value investors

241. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 2; BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 219, at 180; BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 51, at 149 (discussing the
trade-off between risk and return in portfolio management).
242. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 219, at 180 (explaining that investors require
a higher return for a given investment in order to compensate for greater risk).
243. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 457 (“Whenever liquidity and/or control change,
value changes.”).
244. See FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 12, at 21 (stating that most
issues negotiated during an acquisition can be solved by “reducing down to dollars
what appears to be sacred principles”).
245. See supra note 41.
246. According to proponents of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, for
example, “[p]rices of actively traded securities quickly reflect at least all public
information about a company.” Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 34 (citations
omitted). For a fuller explanation of the hypothesis as it relates to securities issued
by public corporations, see generally Eugene Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market
Prices, 21 FIN. ANAL. J. 55 (1965).
247. See supra Part II.A (discussing the relationship between a share’s price and
the risks associated with owning it).
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place on different allocations of power and risk in the context of
248
close corporations.
One way around this impasse may be to consider the growing body
of literature produced by and for the business valuation industry.
Beginning in the early 1980s, a previously disparate collection of
business valuation practitioners generally began to coalesce into
249
today’s more unified body of experts.
As a result, the once
haphazard practice of providing ad hoc valuation opinions has
evolved into an organized profession with its own standards, metrics,
250
and academic literature.
Presumably, then, one can consider the
techniques developed by valuation professionals to gain insight into
how investors perceive non-marketable securities. To the extent the
procedures developed in the valuation marketplace constitute more
or less accurate measures of the relative value of controlling and
minority stakes in a close corporation—which is indeed their claim—
the industry’s views can be understood to be generally representative
of the views of investors.
When calculating the value of a block of shares in a close
corporation, professional appraisers generally begin by attempting to
251
place a value on the enterprise as a whole.
Depending on such
factors as the purpose of the valuation and its premise of value, the
appraiser selects one or more techniques from a catalog of available

248. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 34 n.139 (noting that the price
efficiency of securities markets does not extend to close corporations).
249. See SLEE, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that “private business valuation has
become a career path” with thousands of practicing appraisers in the United States).
The professionalization of the industry was catalyzed in large part by the publication
of Shannon Pratt’s seminal work, “Valuing a Business.” See PRATT, VALUING A
BUSINESS, supra note 18 (presenting a comprehensive overview of the theory and
practice of valuing a business or an interest in business).
250. See SLEE, supra note 18, at 1.
251. The value of a close corporation depends on the “value world” that the
appraiser is applying. SLEE, supra note 18, at 23 (“Every private company, therefore,
has a large number of different values at the same time, depending on the purpose
and function of the valuation.”). Possible value worlds include fair market value, fair
value, investment value, early equity value, collateral value, market value, intangible
asset value, insurable value, impaired goodwill value, economic value, and owner
value. Id. at 26. For purposes of this Article, fair market value is the most relevant
value world as it is the closest approximation to the value investors place on
corporate participation. Id. at 88-89. Fair market value is defined by the IRS to
mean:
[T]he price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to
buy and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. . . . [T]he hypothetical buyer and
seller are assumed to be able, as well as willing, to trade and to be well
informed about the property and concerning the market for such property.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
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252

metrics and applies them to the corporation.
The selection of
techniques is usually based on one of three broad approaches to
253
value—income value, cost of capital, and comparative market value.
In this way, the appraiser attempts to recreate the value an investor
would place on the enterprise by estimating the present value of its
future income stream, the investor’s relative cost of capital, and/or
the value the market places on a more or less similar public
254
company.
Regardless of the method used, however, the goal
initially is to approximate the value that a willing buyer would pay for
255
the corporation as a whole.
Once the appraiser places an estimate on the value of the entire
enterprise, prorating that value so as to make it proportional to the
size of the minority’s share is a simple matter of arithmetic. If the
enterprise is estimated to be worth $10 million, for example, a thirty
percent interest in the whole would presumably be worth $3 million.
This is not the end of the investigation, however, as there is a second
step to the analysis: an analysis of the risks associated with owning
the particular block of shares.
After estimating the proportional enterprise value of a block of
non-public stock, an appraiser must consider whether to apply one or
more discounts (or premiums) to the stock as a measure of the value
256
imparted to the shares by the context in which they are held. For a
minority investor, the most important discounts arise from the risks
associated with a lack of control and a lack of marketability, which are
257
discussed below in Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3.
Before exploring the
operation of these discounts, however, it is necessary to examine in
the following section the extent to which such discounts apply to
close corporations.

252. A valuation’s premise refers to whether the company is to be valued as a
going concern or for liquidation. JAMES R. HITCHNER, FINANCIAL VALUATION:
APPLICATIONS AND MODELS 6 (2003).
253. See id. at 7-8 (highlighting the three approaches, termed by Hitchner simply
as the income, asset, and market approaches, and discussing examples of the
numerous methods within each that can be considered when performing a
valuation).
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
256. SLEE, supra note 18, at 91, 96.
257. Other common discounts include key person discounts, discounts for
trapped-in capital gains taxes, portfolio discounts, and discounts for contingent
liabilities. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at xxiii. These do not
relate disproportionately to a minority’s stake, however, and so are beyond the scope
of this Article.
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1.

Firm-specific risk
Mainstream corporate finance theory generally assigns a zero value
258
to firm-specific risks.
This is because it assumes that a rational
investor will seek to diversify her portfolio in such a way as to negate
259
the impact of any risks unique to individual firms.
Thus, when
determining the level of return that is required to induce investors to
purchase a given financial instrument, risks specific to the issuer of
the instrument (such as the particular competitive pressures
260
impacting the firm) are not generally included in the calculation.
In this respect, internal allocations of control would appear to be
irrelevant to the stock’s value to a well-diversified investor, and so the
risks associated with a particular minority position would appear to be
irrelevant to the shares’ price.
Investors in close corporations, however, are generally unable to
261
diversify away firm-specific risks.
Often, for example, their capital
investment in the enterprise represents a substantial portion of their
individual net worth, making it impossible for them to acquire other
262
significant positions.
Moreover, in the typical close corporation,
263
To the extent they work
the investors often double as employees.
full-time, minority investors are therefore similarly unable to diversify

258. STANLEY J. FELDMAN, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE FIRM VALUATION 80 (2005); Butler
& Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40 (“The Capital Assets Pricing Model, the dominant
theory of financial valuation, states that the market price of securities will reflect
‘systematic,’ or market-wide, risk . . . which cannot be eliminated by diversification,
but not ‘firm-specific’ risk, which can be eliminated by holding diversified portfolios
of assets”) (citations omitted). The focus, instead, is on market risk, or beta. See, e.g.,
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 219, at 194-95.
259. BREALY & MYERS, supra note 219, at 173 (“Investors can eliminate the unique
risk [that is particular to a stock] by holding a well-diversified portfolio.”); FELDMAN,
supra note 258, at 80. For a small or retail investor, this may mean concentrating her
investments in diversified mutual funds or index funds. For a large or institutional
investor, this means spreading its investment dollars over a wide variety of financial
instruments, each with varying levels of risk and time horizons.
260. In other words, the required return will typically ignore firm-specific
attributes such as reliance on key personnel, customer concentration, and
transparency. Id. at 80-81.
261. FELDMAN, supra note 258, at 80 (“In estimating the cost of capital for a private
firm, it is generally assumed that the owners cannot diversify away from the unique
risk that the firm represents, and thus anybody desiring to purchase the firm would
incorporate a premium to reflect this fact.”).
262. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 274 (explaining that “investors in
closely held corporations have large percentages of their wealth tied up in one firm
and lack access to capital markets”).
263. See id. at 273-74 (noting that in a close corporation, the firm’s principal
investors are also its managers and that this is both a detriment, in that the firm loses
specialization, but also an advantage, because each individual is more likely to work
harder and realize that what is good for the firm is also good for the individual).
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away their firm-specific investment of human capital.
For an
investor in a close corporation, firm-specific risks, including the
negotiated allocation of control, pose real challenges and comprise
significant factors in their expected level of return. In fact, many
principles of corporate finance theory, not only the principle that
firm-specific risks are ignored, are inapplicable to smaller, non-public
265
entities such as close corporations. The value of close corporation
stock, therefore, will vary depending upon the firm-specific risks
associated with holding any particular block of shares.
2.

The discount for lack of control
In the close corporation context, professional business appraisers
generally apply a large discount to blocks of shares that do not
provide the owner with the ability to influence the direction and
266
activities of the corporate enterprise.
This is referred to as the
267
After estimating the value of the
discount for lack of control.
enterprise as a whole (and adjusting for the size of the interest in
question), appraisers generally reduce the amount by as much as
twenty-five to thirty percent or more, depending upon the degree of
268
control represented by the interest.
The opposite of a discount for lack of control, of course, is a
269
control premium. Investors will typically pay a premium price for a
controlling block of shares because of the discretion over the
corporation’s direction and activities that such shares impart on their
270
owners. Assuming all else is equal, the discount and the premium
should be mirror images of each other: a controlling shareholder’s

264. See id. at 273-74 (observing that in most instances a close corporation’s
“principal investors are also its managers”).
265. SLEE, supra note 18, at xix, 6 (noting that, while corporate finance theories
explain and organize public capital markets, they were never meant to explain
nonpublic capital markets).
266. See HITCHNER, supra note 252, at 272 (explaining that discounts for lack of
control, also referred to as minority interest discounts, “quantify the level of risk
assumed by a non-controlling shareholder”).
267. Id.
268. See SLEE, supra note 18, at 97 (noting that “the average control premium paid
in the past 10 years has typically been in the 35% to 45% range”) (citing studies
published by Mergerstat Review). In fact, appraisers frequently apply the formula of 1(1/(1 + control premium) to the Mergerstat data to derive minority interest discounts.
Id. For examples of ways in which control can be divided, see supra text
accompanying note 46.
269. HITCHNER, supra note 252, at 272.
270. Id.; see also BRUNER, supra note 3, at 468 (“One reason control might be
valuable is that it presents the opportunity for the majority to expropriate wealth of
the minority.”).
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control premium should be proportional to the discounted price
271
paid by a minority investor.
The size of the appropriate discount (or premium) is dependent
272
on the level of control to be exercised. Obviously, a share position
that provides its owner with complete control over the corporation is
more valuable than one with rather limited influence, just as a share
position with rather limited control is more valuable than one
273
exercising no control.
Therefore, in determining the size of the
appropriate discount for lack of control (or control premium), one
must consider the corporation’s capital structure and other factors
274
impacting the internal allocation of risk.
In the close corporation context, the prerogatives of control are
many. Because the board of directors is directly responsible for
managing the corporation’s affairs, for example, a shareholder with a
large enough stake to elect a majority of the board will be able to
establish corporate strategy and to select, evaluate, and (if necessary)
275
change management.
Perhaps more importantly, such a
shareholder would also control the corporation’s policy toward
dividends and distributions and toward the payment of salaries and
276
other employee compensation.
As these are the most significant
tools a corporation has for dispensing its profits on an ongoing basis,
the level of a shareholder’s discretion over such policies may
277
significantly impact the value of her investment in the company.
271. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 19 (demonstrating the
math whereby a thirty-five percent control premium translates into a proportional
twenty-six percent minority discount).
272. See supra text accompanying note 46; see also BRUNER, supra note 3, at 467-68
(noting that control is relative).
273. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 18; BRUNER, supra note 3,
at 466-67 (demonstrating mathematically how the value of control derives from its
relative power).
274. See infra Part II.C (describing the private allocation of risks associated with a
lack of control, through methods such as determining the relative number of shares
that each investor purchases, determining the presence or absence of the various
attributes of the shares themselves, and using different tools to alter the degree of
marketability of a given block of shares); see also FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra
note 12, at 112; 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:2, at 5-5.
275. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 465-66 (describing control as a “call option on
alternative strategies and policies”); see also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2006) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or
under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by
or under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in
the articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under section 7.32.”).
276. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 20.
277. See HITCHNER, supra note 252, at 277 (stating that from the viewpoint of the
minority shareholder, the majority shareholder’s control can reduce or eliminate the
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Given the many opportunities a controlling shareholder has to
influence the affairs of the corporation, it is not at all surprising that
investors would pay a premium price in order to acquire the greatest
degree of control possible. The success or failure of the corporate
policies and strategies undertaken by the controlling shareholders
will, to a significant degree, determine the value of each investor’s
278
stake.
Similarly, the degree to which the controlling shareholders
use their control to restrict dividends or pay themselves preferential
salaries will to a significant degree determine how much minority
279
investors share in the corporation’s profits.
Although the size of
the discount will be affected by the corporation’s particular capital
structure and allocation of control, there can be no doubt that buyers
would value minority shares less highly than they would a block of
shares that exercises a greater degree of discretion.
3.

The discount for lack of marketability
The ability to exit an investment is another key determinant of its
280
For this reason, investors will pay extra for shares that may
value.
281
The value
be quickly and efficiently sold on an active market.
appraisers place on the lack of an efficient exit is known as the
282
discount for lack of marketability.
In the close corporation context, the discount for lack of
marketability and the discount for lack of control are closely
283
related. Shares that lack control are obviously less marketable than

return on the minority’s investment, specifically in regards to paying excess
compensation, which “reduces the earnings of the corporation by distributing those
funds to the majority shareholder or his or her designee”).
278. See supra notes 39-40.
279. For a general discussion of the causes of minority investor vulnerability to
oppression, see supra Part I.A.
280. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 79.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 78-79. The term “discount for lack of marketability” appears to be
preferred in the literature over the more traditional term “liquidity discount.” See,
e.g., id. at 79 (using the term consistently when explaining this type of minority
discount); SLEE, supra note 18, at 97-98 (“The lack of marketability discount (LOMD)
is the amount or percentage deducted from the value of a marketable ownership
interest to reflect the relative absence of marketability for private company.”). See
also BRUNER, supra note 3, at 462 (“’Liquidity’ and ‘marketability’ are often used
interchangeably. However, the terms differ in subtle ways.”). But see FELDMAN, supra
note 258, at 170 n.1 (“We use the terms liquidity discount and marketability discount
interchangeably in this paper, as is customary in this literature.”). The marketability
of shares is defined as “the ability to quickly convert property to cash at minimal
cost.” HITCHNER, supra note 252, at 285 (using the definition provided by the
International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms).
283. BRUNER, supra note 3, at 471-72 (discussing the interaction between liquidity
and control).
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284

shares that comprise a controlling stake. Where a buyer might be
willing to purchase (thereby making a market for) a controlling
interest, she would be less willing to purchase an interest that bears
285
the risks associated with minority status.
In this respect, although
the two discounts are distinct in theory, it is not clear that they can be
differentiated in practice, at least with respect to minority interests in
close corporations.
Marketability is important to investors for a variety of reasons. For
one, the value of an investment invariably changes over time. Thus as
the price of a stock increases and decreases, the ability to exit at
exactly the right moment can mean the difference between a loss and
286
a gain (or a small loss or gain and a large one).
Consider, for
example, the plight of the Enron employees who were prohibited
from selling their stock even as the corporation slid toward
bankruptcy, and compare the value of their investments to those of
the Enron executives who were able to bail out before the slide
287
turned into a rout.
A second reason investors value liquidity is that their own personal
circumstances may evolve rapidly such that the flexibility to cash out
of a particular investment may prove critical. Any number of
factors—margin calls, for example, or the need to cover losses in
other investments—could place an investor in a cash squeeze.
Similarly, opportunities to invest ahead of the market in promising
new technologies or business ideas may be lost if the investor cannot
quickly liquidate her existing positions and move her investment

284. See HITCHNER, supra note 252, at 78-79.
285. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(Mass. 1975) (“No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the
disadvantaged minority. The outsider would have the same difficulties.”).
286. This is, in essence, the basis for the Black-Scholes model of option pricing.
See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (presenting a model of option pricing that can
be applied to common stock, corporate bonds, and warrants). The longer an option
remains exercisable, the more valuable it is because it is more likely that the price of
the underlying stock will rise above the strike price at some point within the period.
See id. at 641 (noting that, after making certain assumptions, “the value of the option
will depend only on the price of the stock and time and on variables that are taken to
be known constants”).
287. See generally Michael Ash, Enron: Where to Start?, in FIELD GUIDE TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY: A COMPACT AND IRREVERENT GUIDE TO ECONOMIC LIFE IN AMERICA
(Jonathan Teller-Elsberg, Nancy Folbre & James Heintz eds., 2000) (lambasting top
Enron management for cajoling Enron employees to hold Enron stock to maintain
its share price, while the chairman of Enron sold his shares after hearing reports that
Enron was in trouble); Lorraine Schmall, Defined Contribution Plans After Enron, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 891, 894 (2003) (“Management also had the legal right to sell their
stock whenever they wanted, which their rank-and-file plan participants did not
have.”).
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dollars into a potentially more lucrative new venture. Liquidity, then,
can be invaluable and is one of the most highly sought after of
288
investment characteristics.
A significant number of empirical studies have attempted to
quantify the level of discount investors impose for a lack of
289
marketability.
Such studies typically fall within two categories. In
the first, researchers compared the price of securities pre- and postIPO and attributed the bulk of any increase to a marketability
290
premium.
Such studies suggested average discounts of around
291
forty-five to fifty percent for lack of marketability. In the second set
of studies, researchers compared prices paid for publicly traded
shares of a corporation’s stock with identical shares of the same
292
corporation that were subject to restrictions on trading. Here, the
293
Although both sets
discounts averaged around thirty-five percent.
294
of studies suffer from a variety of well understood shortcomings,
they provide powerful evidence that investors differentiate
investments—even investments in the same corporation—based on
their relative marketability.

288. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 79 (“Investors love
liquidity and are willing to pay a high premium for it.”).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 83.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 80-81. Shares of a public corporation can be restricted for any number
of reasons, the most common of which may be the failure of the corporation to
register the shares with the SEC at the time it registered its other shares. See id. at 80
(noting that “underwriters of initial public offerings often are not willing to have all
of the outstanding stock registered for public trading at the time of the offering.
They are concerned about the risk that insiders may bail out and depress the
market.”).
293. Id. at 81. In 1990, the SEC loosened the restrictions on resale of restricted
securities by adopting Rule 144A. Id. The SEC further loosened the restrictions on
resale in 1997 by reducing the required holding period for Rule 144 from two years
to one. Id. Rules 144 and 144A establish a safe harbor for certain private resales of
restricted securities by providing that the seller in a transaction qualified under
either of the rules will be deemed not to be an underwriter pursuant to Section
2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 230.144A. As a result,
qualified participants can take advantage of Section 4(1) of the Securities Act of
1933, which exempts from registration “transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer.” 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2005). As a result of the
increased marketability of such shares, studies of restricted securities after 1990 have
shown markedly lower discounts (generally in the “low 20s”). PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND
PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 81-82.
294. For a detailed description of the various studies, including their drawbacks,
see HITCHNER, supra note 252, at 287-311 (discussing and critiquing various studies,
including the Emory IPO studies, the Willamette Management Associates IPO
studies, two IPO studies by James R. Hitchner, the author of the text, and multiple
restricted stock studies). Despite any faults pertaining to particular studies, however,
their sheer number and the consistency of the results suggests the accuracy of their
basic insight.
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Just as there are different levels of control, however, there are also
different levels of marketability. Marketability discounts are affected
by both the investor’s opportunity to exit and her ability to withdraw
295
profits on an ongoing basis. Thus, where the amount of dividends
or other distributions is fixed, the discount for lack of marketability is
likely to be smaller than when the board maintains discretion over
296
dividend policy. Similarly, though dividends on common stock are
generally discretionary, a history of generous or consistent dividends
297
will also serve to reduce the impact of the discount.
The prospect of future liquidity may also affect marketability.
Where there is soon to be a liquidity event, such as an upcoming IPO
or a lifting of transfer restrictions, for example, the discount for lack
of marketability is generally smaller than when such future liquidity is
298
more uncertain. Similarly, the existence of registration rights may
tend to make securities trade at prices closer to marketable
299
securities.
Other factors may also tend to minimize the impact of
300
the absence of an active market for the security.
The discount for lack of marketability, then, represents a second
major factor that distinguishes the value of different shares of the
same securities. Where the market for such securities is limited or
nonexistent, investors will demand a discounted price to compensate
them for the additional risks associated with an illiquid investment.
Alternatively, where there is a market, investors will pay a significant
premium for shares that are liquid over otherwise identical shares
that are subject to restrictions on transfer.
C. The Private Allocation of Risk
Although corporation statutes and caselaw provide default rules,
the allocation of the risks associated with minority ownership is not

295. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 153 (noting that the
“primary drivers” of the reduced marketability discounts include the size and
frequency of historic distributions, prospects for future liquidity, and the pool of
potential buyers).
296. Id. at 153-57.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 157.
299. See id. at 79, 157 (noting that registration of the interest in an IPO
contributes to achieving liquidity, and the greater the prospect of the liquidity, the
smaller the discount, therefore making the prices closer to those of marketable
securities).
300. Id. at 153. For example, the size of the pool of potential buyers for the
security may affect its marketability (and thus the discount). Id. at 153, 158. The size
of the pool of potential buyers may in turn be affected by factors such as the strength
of the ultimate trading market and the size of the block to be sold. Id. at 159-60.
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301

outside the control of investors.
A company is not formed by
happenstance. Rather, the investors themselves determine the
degree of control to be exercised by each party and also influence the
302
market for the corporation’s shares.
The primary way in which investors elect their particular allocation
of control is by determining the relative number of shares they and
303
the other shareholders purchase.
Venture capital funds, for
example, commonly invest only in companies where they are
304
permitted to purchase at least fifty-one percent of the shares. Thus,
when negotiating the corporation’s capital structure, both the
venture capital investor and the entrepreneurs are involved in an
affirmative allocation of control. By agreeing to give up a controlling
block of shares in exchange for an influx of risk capital, the
entrepreneurs are electing their minority status and, hence, their
vulnerability. Since there is no general duty to buy or sell securities,
the choice to invest is made freely and either party can back out if
they view the proffered terms, including the risk of oppression, as
305
unreasonable.
Embedded in the corporation’s capital structure,
then, are the parties’ choices.
Investors also allocate control by determining the nature of the
306
shares to be issued. For example, a corporation may issue multiple

301. For a discussion of the default allocation of control, see supra Part I.A.
302. It should be noted, in fact, that controlling shareholders often have
incentives to offer protections to minority investors even if they are not requested.
To the extent the minority investors are aware of the risks associated with minority
participation, offering protections will permit the corporation to demand a higher
purchase price for the minority’s investment. Likewise, to the extent the minority
investors are unaware, the possibility that they will later discover the risks may
incentivize the controlling shareholders to offer protections up front so as to ensure
the long-term continuation and success of a relationship based primarily on mutual
trust and respect. Indeed, to the extent the shares are offered as part of an
employee-incentive scheme, it is critical that the shares be protected or they may over
time lose their ability to incentivize the minority. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 24, § 5:2, at 5-5 (“Holders of the controlling interests in a corporation may be
willing to share their control in order to bring into the enterprise persons who
otherwise would not buy a minority interest.”); Johnston, supra note 4, at 309 (noting
that a well-informed controlling shareholder may find it in her interest to offer a
minority investor/employee some protection against oppression so as to encourage
the investor/employee to make a greater level of “relationship-specific investments”).
303. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 18 (“The value of
control depends not only on legal power and rights, but also on economic
potential.”).
304. See supra note 29.
305. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §§ 4.1-4.20, at 217-67; see also FREUND, ANATOMY
OF A MERGER, supra note 12, 5-7.
306. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 1:2, at 1-3 (“As a general
proposition, a corporation operates under the principle of majority rule: the holders
of a majority of the shares with voting power control the corporation.”).
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classes or series of stock, each with different voting rights.
Preemptive rights, supermajority voting requirements, cumulative
voting provisions and other rights are also options that can impact
both the relative allocations of control and the ease with which a
308
shareholder may exit her investment.
Shareholders can, for
example, impose supermajority voting requirements either in the
corporation’s charter or in a separately negotiated shareholders’
309
agreement to which they are all party. A typical requirement might
be that approval of eighty percent of the outstanding shares, rather
than a simple majority, is necessary before the corporation may enter
310
into a merger or other similar corporate reorganization.
Under
such circumstances, the holder of a twenty-one percent block of
311
shares could veto any such proposal. The effect of adopting such a
307. See supra note 156.
308. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining preemptive rights and
cumulative voting provisions). With respect to supermajority voting requirements,
investors are always free to negotiate for a higher vote requirement than is provided
by the applicable statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (2006)
(permitting the certificate of incorporation to include “[p]rovisions requiring for
any corporate action, the vote of a larger portion of the stock or of any class or series
thereof, or of any other securities having voting power, or a larger number of the
directors, than is required by this chapter”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.27(a) (2005)
(“The articles of incorporation may provide for a greater quorum or voting
requirement for shareholders (or voting groups of shareholders) than is provided
for by this Act”). This may be put into effect either in the corporate charter itself or
in a separate agreement among the shareholders.
309. Courts historically have frowned on shareholders’ agreements that limited
the parties’ discretion. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting the judicial
hostility toward private attempts to change the default allocation of control by
contract. The modern view, however, is that shareholders’ agreements should
generally be respected to the extent they do not cause harm to third parties. 1
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:6, at 5-25 to -26 (“Since at least 1960 courts
and legislators have shown an increased sensitivity to the need of close corporations
to depart from the traditional statutory norms. Court decisions reflect a definite
trend toward greater judicial readiness to uphold shareholder control agreements, at
least in close corporation settings.”). In fact, in modern legal practice, the adoption
of a shareholders’ agreement appears to be standard practice when organizing a new
entity. See, e.g., 1 BARTLETT, supra note 172, at 230 (“the Stock Purchase Agreement is
usually accompanied by a Stockholders Agreement, an agreement by and among the
founder in his capacity as a stockholder and the investors”); 2 HYMAN, supra note 172,
at 42-7 (“The shareholders of a close corporation, by agreement, may provide for the
rules governing the management of the corporation.”); MANCUSO, supra note 172, at
5/5 to /8 (recommending that entrepreneurs who are otherwise “tired of
incorporation paperwork” nonetheless consider adopting a shareholders’
agreement).
310. See, e.g., SLEE, supra note 18, at 348-49 (highlighting sample provisions for a
shareholders’ agreement, including one to the effect that for decisions on certain
issues of corporate governance, such as selling the business, acquiring another
business, or optional buyouts, supermajority approval of the shareholder interests is
required).
311. Interestingly, it has been pointed out that minority shareholders can be guilty
of oppression by using veto and other similar blocking rights in an opportunistic
manner. See generally supra note 35; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at
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provision, then, is to adjust the degree of discretion afforded to a
controlling shareholder and thus reduce (or increase) the risks
312
associated with a lack of control.
Investors can apply a similarly wide variety of tools to alter the
degree of marketability applicable to a given block of shares. By
entering into some form of buy-sell agreement, for example, the
parties can ensure that they will have an exit if they ever decide to
313
liquidate their investment.
Similarly, granting registration rights
may increase the shares’ marketability somewhat in that the grant
314
may signal the anticipation of an active public market.
By altering the default rules, then, investors can increase or
decrease the levels of control and liquidity represented by their
investments and so alter the level of risk associated with a minority
position. A shareholder who wishes to exercise wide latitude over the
corporation’s affairs can therefore purchase such influence by
receiving less consideration per share from the minority investors and
structuring the corporation accordingly. Absent a breakdown in the
bargaining process—a breakdown for which contract law would

296 (explaining that certain minority conduct, such as refusing to attend meetings so
that a quorum does not exist, can constitute tools that allow the minority to extract a
disproportionate benefit). The arguments made in this Article therefore apply
equally to oppressive minority conduct as to oppressive controlling shareholder
conduct.
312. Another typical set of private agreements deals with the composition of the
board of directors. Frequently, founding shareholders will enter into an agreement
to nominate and vote for each other (or for each other’s designee) at each election
of directors. 2 HYMAN, supra note 172, at 42-7; 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24,
§ 5:9, at 5-45. This would ensure that each shareholder has a seat on the board.
Likewise, by adopting a cumulative voting scheme in the corporate charter, a
corporation’s investors can ensure that even minority investors have representation
on the board. 2 HYMAN, supra note 172, at 42-7. Such a provision, much like a
supermajority voting provision, would serve to limit somewhat the scope of the
majority’s discretion. It is unlikely, however, to be crafted so as to transfer real
control to the minority. See generally 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 24, § 5:9, at 545 to -54 (discussing state statutes that limit the duration of certain shareholders’
agreements).
313. Pursuant to such an agreement, the parties can outline a set of circumstances
that would cause the corporation to be obligated or entitled to repurchase an
investor’s shares. See 2 HYMAN, supra note 172, at 42-13, 42-18 (providing draft buysell agreements). Generally, a formula for determining the price for such shares is
set forth in the agreement, as well as a description of the event or events that would
trigger the buyout right. Id. at 42-15, 42-20.
314. Registration rights agreements generally provide investors with the right to
have their shares registered with the SEC, and hence qualified for immediate resale,
in the event or soon after the corporation files an IPO. See Royce de R. Barondes, An
Alternative Paradigm for Valuing Breach of Registration Rights and Loss of Liquidity, 39 U.
RICH. L. REV. 627, 641-42 (2005). Thus, by increasing the likelihood that the shares
will become tradable in an active public market, the presence of a registration rights
agreement will tend to increase the marketability of the shares prior to their
registration. PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 157.
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presumably supply a remedy —such minority investors will have
been compensated for the additional level of risk in the form of a
lower purchase price. In other words, if a corporation’s internal
allocation of control makes the minority’s interest riskier than the
interests of the other shareholders, she would expect to pay a lower
purchase price, just as she would expect to pay a lower purchase price
for shares in an unproven venture than for shares in an established
316
one.
The investors themselves—not some passive circumstances
into which they are born—often privately determine their level of
317
control and, hence, their level of block-specific risk.
Risk and
reward are united.
To the extent control is purchased for consideration (and the risks
associated with a lack of control are sold), an injustice occurs only
318
when that control is circumscribed by court action.
In such a
circumstance, the controlling shareholder will have paid for some
level of discretion over the direction of corporate policy but not
received the benefit of her bargain. Likewise, if for some reason a
minority investor were prohibited from exercising a veto right for
which she had negotiated and paid, she would have been unjustly
denied a level of influence for which she had paid. Risk and reward,
in both cases, would have been separated.
Existing remedies for minority investors increase the likelihood of
such injustices by approaching each investor as if she had negotiated
315. It is a basic premise of contract law that each party entered into the
agreement freely. Where there is evidence of fraud, duress, lack of capacity to form
the intent to contract, or other defect in the bargaining process, the law generally
holds such agreements null and void (or at least voidable at the option of the injured
party). FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §§ 4.1-4.20, at 217-67. Thus, where an
investment contract—an agreement to purchase shares for a given consideration—is
not entered into freely, contract law provides a remedy and the remedies for
oppression are not needed. See id. (discussing grounds to nullify a contract and
grounds for contractual remedies). But see Moll, supra note 4, at 989 (arguing that,
despite the existence of contract law, the remedy of oppression “serves a critical
protective function that justifies its independent existence”).
316. See PRATT, DISCOUNTS AND PREMIUMS, supra note 18, at 2-3.
317. See supra Part I.D.1.
318. To illustrate this point, imagine two corporations, each having one seventyfive percent owner and one twenty-five percent owner. Corporation A’s charter
requires an eighty percent vote to approve mergers, whereas Corporation B’s charter
is silent and so adopts the default norm of majority rule. All else being equal, the
minority shareholder in Corporation B will pay less than the minority shareholder in
Corporation A because the A minority is purchasing not only the shares but also the
additional right of a veto over mergers. See BRUNER, supra note 3, at 465
(characterizing control as a financial commodity that can be isolated from the
underlying stock). If, however, a court were to intervene and prohibit a merger
involving Corporation B on the grounds that it is unfair that the minority be left out
of the decision, the B minority will have obtained the benefit of a veto without paying
for it. The B majority will thus have been the victim of an uncompensated wealth
transfer.
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319

the same allocation of control.
An objective standard is a blunt
instrument that is likely to overcompensate those minority investors
320
Such investors, to use a
who forgo contractual guarantees.
colloquial phrase, are likely to “have their cake and eat it too.” An
objective standard is also likely to undercompensate a minority
investor who expends the resources necessary to negotiate—and
pay—for express contractual guarantees. In other words, to the
extent the law will provide such protections anyway, she may have
overpaid for her shares.
An examination of negotiated prices, however, may allow
subsequent observers to determine whether a minority investor was
already compensated for bearing the risks associated with her lack of
control. Because the parties may elect—and pay for—the degree of
discretion they exercise, the legal system’s intervention in the
allocation of corporate control risks doing injustice to both minority
and controlling shareholders. If the court misinterprets the parties’
agreement, it can cause an uncompensated wealth transfer and alter
their bargain in fundamentally unjust ways. Thus, only by inquiring
into the parties’ actual bargain, through an examination of price, can
one assure a just outcome in all cases.
D. Pricing and Efficiency
In some respects, the central claim of this Article, that price can
sometimes be used to illuminate the parties’ intentions, may appear
at odds with current theory. Price is generally assumed to be
synonymous with cost, and one of the primary goals of corporation
321
law is to minimize agency and other transaction costs.
Thus the
premium price an investor might pay for control actually represents a
322
form of agency cost. If the parties could trust each other to always
act in their mutual best interests, then there would be no need to
allocate the risk of minority vulnerability because the risk would not
323
be present, thus yielding a more efficient result. Rather than using
price to identify private allocations of risk, it would therefore seem
319. See supra Part I.B.
320. See supra notes 28-34.
321. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 283 (“Corporate law, both
statutory and judicial, is best understood as a set of standard terms that lowers the
costs of contracting.”); Gilson, supra note 11, at 253-55 (arguing that business lawyers
create value as “transaction cost engineers”).
322. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 283 (discussing
contractual ways to “minimize agency problems in close corporations,” as well as a
cost benefit analysis of various legal rules “designed to assist minority shareholders”).
323. See id. at 272 (“[I]f family owned ventures reduce the agency costs of
management, there will be gains for all to share.”).
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more prudent for the law to attempt to eliminate the agency costs
324
inherent in the risk of shareholder opportunism.
This critique would probably be correct were the law a more
formidable force in the context of close corporations. As was
discussed previously, however, investors in a close corporation are
generally involved in a series of overlapping relationships, often
325
including bonds of family and friendship. The reality is that close
corporation shareholders are far more likely to be protected by extralegal constraints on behavior, such as market forces and societal
norms of good behavior, than they are to resort to the legal system as
326
a dispute resolution mechanism.
As a result, legal remedies in the close corporation context are
unlikely to be capable of significantly reducing the agency costs
associated with shareholder opportunism regardless of how they are
327
crafted.
However, because of the law’s general impotence vis-à-vis
the protection of minority investors, expansive legal rules risk
disrupting private ordering without providing any concomitant
benefits. Thus, although it might be aspirational to attempt to craft a
set of rules that minimize or even eliminate the agency costs
associated with the management of close corporations, the effort is
probably doomed. Thus it might instead be more productive to
attempt to maximize the impact of existing non-legal constraints on
328
behavior, in particular private contracting. In other words, the goal
with respect to close corporations should be, whenever possible, to
enforce the actual agreement of the parties, thereby reinforcing their
private arrangements and also minimizing the likelihood that a fixed
legal standard will result in unexpected consequences. In other
words, where the upside is illusory and the downside genuine, the law
should take a back seat. The law of close corporations, then, should
be crafted to prefer efficiency in contracting over efficiency in
outcome.
A uniform approach to the problem of minority
324. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 1, at 121 (“Corporate law . . . routinely intrudes
into the corporation to secure the protection of minority shareholders against
controlling persons within corporations.”).
325. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 274 (“Participants in closely held
corporations frequently have familial or other personal relations in addition to their
business dealings.”).
326. See id. at 272 (noting that agency costs are generally lower in close
corporations as a result of such relationships).
327. But see Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 1675 (arguing that
“the law of corporations historically has attempted to provide a principled and
coherent set of regulations to ensure that those who hold power are accountable to
those who are dependent upon its fair exercise”).
328. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 32 (arguing in favor of a “presumption
in favor of private ordering”).
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vulnerability should be used only when it appears that there truly was
329
no private agreement as to the allocation of risk.
III. A TEST: REVISITING THE EARLY CASELAW
This Article has argued that the law regarding minority investor
vulnerability is at odds with the reality of the typical minority
investors’ decision-making process. Rather than assuming that all
shares are equivalent, such investors generally recognize, if only
330
intuitively, that minority stakes in close corporations suffer from the
331
risks associated with a lack of control. Recognizing such risks, they
often negotiate for a different allocation of control or accept the risks
332
and pay a lower purchase price. Especially for the unsophisticated
investor, price can serve a similar protective function as do
333
contractual guarantees.
To observe that current doctrine over-emphasizes the status of
minority investors as minorities is not, however, to reject current
doctrine. Rather, what is needed is a more nuanced, two-step
approach. In the first instance, a court should investigate the
particular equities of the case before it by measuring the controlling
shareholders’ conduct against the allocation of control actually
334
contemplated by the parties.
In the event an examination of the
parties’ bargain fails to uncover their intentions or demonstrates that
329. But see Moll, supra note 4, at 993-94 (arguing that the doctrine of minority
oppression is more than a mere replacement for contract law).
330. An overriding concern of policymakers who are uncomfortable with
converting minority investor protections into default norms appears to be an
intuition that most investors are ignorant of the rules of corporation law. See, e.g.,
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 36 (arguing that the approach taken by this
Article “credits close corporation shareholders with too much foresight and fails to
give sufficient weight to the difficulties of contracting for adequate protection”).
However, investors do not need to have a deep understanding of all of the various
rules and norms of corporation law in order to negotiate to protect themselves.
Rather, they need merely to understand that their business co-venturers might not be
trusted, especially over the long-run, and that ceding them control exacerbates the
risks associated with the investment. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 284
(“The extent to which minority shareholders are ignorant of problems they might
face and thus fail to protect themselves is impossible to tell. . . . Certainly
participants in close corporations are better informed about their legal rights and
obligations than participants in either partnerships or public corporations.”); id. at
298 (“Proponents of the partnership analogy assume that participants in closely held
corporations are knowledgeable enough to incorporate to obtain the benefits of
favorable tax treatment or limited liability but ignorant of all other differences
between corporate and partnership law. There is no support for this assumption
once you realize that people have to jump through a lot of formal hoops (assisted by
counsel) to incorporate but could become partners by accident.”).
331. Id. at 274-75.
332. See id. at 285.
333. See supra Part I.D.4.
334. See supra Part I.E.
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silence did in fact equate with oversight, the court should engage in a
335
The ultimate test
second-step reasonable expectations analysis.
would therefore remain one of the fairness of the controlling
336
shareholders’ particular course of action.
The claim of this Article, then, is not that existing doctrine in all
cases leads to the wrong result. Rather, it is that existing doctrine is a
sometimes useful but unnecessarily blunt instrument given the clues
that may be afforded by an examination of the price. Before
resorting to such a blunt instrument, courts should first attempt to
resolve disputes using a more precise interpretive tool. This Article
suggests that price is such a tool.
This supposition can be tested by revisiting two of the leading
judicial opinions that were influential in the early development of the
protections afforded to minority investors. In some cases, one would
expect an examination of price to uncover no new useful
information. This would be the case if, for example, the parties’
337
preferred allocation of control mirrors the default rule, or if the
presence of silence is in fact indicative of the kind of oversight that a
reasonable expectations analysis would remedy. In both situations,
the application of a blunt, category-based remedy would yield the
same result as a more precise, subjective analysis—a victory for the
minority plaintiff.
A price-based approach and a reasonable
expectations test, in other words, often yield overlapping results. In
other situations, however, one would expect an examination of price
to uncover instances where the court misperceived the equities and
338
overcompensated one of the parties.
Using price as a diagnostic
tool, then, should account for the existing, correct body of caselaw
while also identifying errors in the caselaw. This is, in fact, exactly

335. See Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 237-38 (advocating the
use of the reasonable expectations standard as “an effective response to the problems
of minority shareholders”).
336. See Chander, supra note 1, at 124 (arguing that, “[a]s crafted over the
centuries by judges and legislators, corporate law is . . . a device to ensure that
minorities will be treated fairly”).
337. In situations where omissions result in a dispute, courts typically supply rules
through “gap-fillers” that attempt to approximate what the parties would have
bargained for had they considered the issue themselves. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15,
§ 7.15, at 480-83; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 291 (“Properly interpreted,
fiduciary duties should approximate the bargain the parties themselves would have
reached had they been able to negotiate at low cost.”).
338. For example, it would seem unjust for a court to award a remedy against a
venture capital fund investor for exercising a control right that the corporation’s
founders ceded to it as a condition of receiving early stage risk capital. See, e.g.,
BARTLETT, supra note 29, at 124-26 (noting that venture capital investors frequently
retain the ability to terminate the corporations’ founders).
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what one finds when one revisits the early precedents that led to the
development of the modern doctrine of oppression.
The following sections apply a pricing analysis to two of the leading
cases in the development of the doctrine of minority shareholder
oppression as a test of the usefulness of such an approach.
A. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Perhaps the most famous and broadest statement of the doctrine of
minority investor oppression is contained in Donahue v. Rodd
339
Electrotype.
A staple of casebooks, Donahue’s influence has been
wide—in one recent count, it had been cited by courts no less than
340
239 times.
Its facts are therefore well-known and perhaps not
unusual, though they are somewhat complicated.
At the time of the events at issue, the plaintiff, Euphemia Donahue,
341
found herself a minority investor and a widow.
Harry Rodd, the
original controlling shareholder, had retired as a director and as the
president and general manager of Rodd Electrotype, and been
342
replaced by his two sons. He had further limited his involvement in
the company by embarking upon a systematic, eight-year program of
gifting to his three children his majority interest in the company,
343
presumably as part of an estate planning process.
At the
completion of his gift program, each of Harry’s three children owned
344
fifty-one shares, while Euphemia Donahue controlled fifty shares.
This gave each of them approximately equal interests in the
company.
At issue in the case was the disposition of forty-five of Harry Rodd’s
shares which, unlike the others, were never transferred to his
339. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
340. A Westlaw “Citing References” search performed at the time of this Article’s
publication yielded 1,026 documents. Many of these citing documents were United
States cases. Of these, 16 gave it negative treatment, 17 offered positive treatment, 48
discussed it, 134 cited it, and 24 mentioned it. Further, a staggering 556 secondary
sources have cited to Donahue.
341. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 508-09.
342. Id. at 509-10.
343. Id. at 510 (“From 1959 to 1967, Harry Rodd pursued what may fairly be
termed a gift program by which he distributed the majority of his shares equally
among his two sons and his daughter.”). Harry Rodd began with 200 shares, made
gifts to his three children totaling forty-nine shares each, sold each of his children
two additional shares, and returned two shares to the corporate treasury. Id. This
left him with the 45 shares at issue in the case.
344. See id. (regarding the Rodd family holdings). Euphemia Donahue owned
forty-five shares and her son, Robert, owned the other five. Id. at 510 & n.8. For
simplicity of explanation, this Article treats the interests held by Euphemia and
Robert as if they were held by a single person, as did the court. See id. at 520
(combining the forty-five shares held by Euphemia and the shares held by her son as
a single block of fifty shares).
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345

children as part of his estate plan.
Rather, in order that Harry
should take some money out of the company upon the occasion of
his retirement, the board authorized Rodd Electrotype to redeem his
remaining forty-five shares for cash in the amount of $800 per
346
share. As a result, the Rodd family’s combined interest was diluted
347
from eighty percent to just over seventy-five percent.
The gist of Euphemia’s complaint was that the company and its
controlling shareholders, the Rodds, had breached the fiduciary
duties they owed to her because they “failed to accord her an equal
348
opportunity to sell her shares.”
Stated in financial terms, her
complaint was really that the Rodd family, acting collectively as a
block of controlling shareholders, had given up nothing of
substance—no real voting power—in exchange for $36,000 of the
349
company’s cash.
In holding for the Donahues, Chief Justice Tauro famously noted
the “fundamental resemblance” that a close corporation bears to a
partnership and established the rule in Massachusetts that
shareholders in close corporations owe one another substantially the
same fiduciary duty that partners owe to one another—namely, “the
345. Id. at 510.
346. Id.
347. See id. (stating the Charles Rodd, Frederick Rodd and his daughter, Phyllis
Mason, held a total of 153 shares to the Donahue’s 50 shares—roughly seventy-five
percent of the issued and outstanding shares of the corporation’s stock).
Euphemia’s late husband, Joseph Donahue, had originally held 50 shares (or 20%)
to Harry Rodd’s 200 shares (80%). Id. at 509. Thus, the result of the transactions
was to increase the Donahue family holdings from 20% to 24.6%.
To understand the extent of Euphemia’s vulnerability, it is worth noting that,
following the redemption of Harry’s 45 shares, the three Rodd children’s combined
153 shares represented 75.4% of the voting power. As a result, where the three
children voted together, they controlled every corporate decision by a wide margin.
Moreover, even if they split their votes, with one of the children siding with
Euphemia, the remaining two children were nonetheless guaranteed to win—102 to
101. Thus, unless two of the three Rodd children sided with her, Euphemia’s shares
would never be counted with the majority. Furthermore, if two children did vote
with her, Euphemia’s 50 votes would still remain superfluous—the two children
would win the contest over the third even if Euphemia abstained. Euphemia’s 24.6%
interest in the company, in other words, had exactly zero impact on the outcome of
any vote where all the shares were voted.
348. Id. at 511.
349. Although the forty-five shares were returned to the corporate treasury, the
Rodd family holdings only fell 4.6% (from 80% to 75.4%), thereby enabling them to
retain complete control over the future and direction of the company. See infra note
347. It is also worth noting as well that each of Harry Rodd’s two sons, as well as his
daughter’s husband, were employed by the company. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
Thus, each was presumably taking money out of Rodd Electrotype in a form not
available to Euphemia—salary and benefits. For a discussion of the use of
compensation as a device to misappropriate the value of minority investments, see
supra note 2. For a discussion of the use of employee compensation as a tax-planning
device, see supra note 48.
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350

utmost good faith and loyalty.”
The ruling stressed the need for
“trust, confidence and absolute loyalty” among close corporation
shareholders, implying that such relational values could somehow be
351
inculcated, or at least enforced, by the legal system.
What seemed to offend the court the most, however, was not so
much a lack of cooperative spirit as the mere fact of disproportionate
treatment. In stating its specific rule as to redemptions—that, in
order to show good faith, a corporation that redeems shares from a
controlling shareholder must also offer an equal opportunity to any
352
interested minority investors —the court seemed to find injustice in
the fact that the Rodd family enjoyed the benefits of their control.
For example, the court placed particular emphasis on the fact that
the offer of redemption transformed Harry Rodd’s previously illiquid
investment into a liquid one, while leaving Euphemia’s minority
353
interest to remain forever illiquid.
It is not clear, however, how creating increased liquidity for some
shareholders injures others, given that liquidity is not a zero-sum
game. In fact, corporation statutes do not generally require that
354
redemptions be offered to all shareholders or none,
and
Euphemia’s late husband, when making his original investment, must
have known that he might never have the opportunity for an exit.
Thus, it was not in the subjective injury per se that the court found
affront. Rather, the court believed that apples should be compared
to apples—that one share of the company’s stock should be treated,
355
and valued, exactly the same as any other. Contrary to the court’s
assumption, however, each share of stock is not the same; shares that
356
comprise a controlling interest are more valuable.
The question that should have been asked was not whether the
redemption at issue in Donahue was somehow inherently unfair
because it treated the shares held by the minority and the majority
differently, but whether such shares were indeed different. It was a
leap to assume that the parties bargained for equal conduct without
350. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. The court’s language is itself reminiscent of
Judge Cardozo’s famous opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y.
1928) (“Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”).
351. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512. See also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at
2 (emphasizing that the adoption of “special contractual arrangements is much less
important than [the] ability to sustain a close, harmonious relationship”).
352. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
353. Id. at 512.
354. See CLARK, supra note 49, § 14.4, at 625-31 (describing the operation and
function of redemptions and repurchases).
355. For a critique of such an approach, see supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the
equivalency of rights associated with shares of stock).
356. See supra Part II.B.2.
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examining the price. The court’s objective approach therefore
ignored the particular intentions of the parties and so undermined
their deal. It should have begun with an analysis of the parties’
intentions in order to reinforce their private bargain.
In order to uncover the subjective particulars of the parties’ deal, a
court would typically begin with a close reading of the express
357
provisions of the contract.
Rodd Electrotype’s corporate charter,
however, omitted any mention of supermajority voting procedures or
other provisions that would have served to allocate a degree of
358
influence to the Donahues. Their agreement, therefore, presented
front and center the interpretive problem of how to construe silence:
did the omission of express guarantees signify regrettable oversight
or a deliberate choice to adopt the default norm of majority rule?
Certainly, the investment agreement itself could not shed any light
on the parties’ intentions.
Faced with this uncertainty, a traditional analysis of the equities
would probably look next at the particular facts and circumstances of
359
the case for evidence of the parties’ intentions. Rodd Electrotype,
it turns out, existed as a corporation before any involvement by either
the Rodds or the Donahues. Originally known as Royal Electrotype
Company of New England, Inc., it had been a wholly owned
subsidiary of Royal Electrotype Company before Harry Rodd and
Euphemia Donahue’s late husband, Joseph, purchased it for $20 per
360
share in 1955. Presumably, if Harry and Joseph were sophisticated
enough to structure a fairly complicated buyout of Royal of New
England, they were also aware of the rather simple fact that the end
361
result would be eighty percent control by Harry.

357. It is widely accepted that contract interpretation begins with the document’s
plain language. See, e.g., Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 860 F.2d 409,
413 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that contract provisions are determined under a plain
language analysis); Arizona v. United States, 575 F.2d 855, 863 (Cl. Ct. 1978)
(“[P]rovisions of a contract must be so construed as to effectuate its spirit and
purpose . . . and . . . an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all of its
parts will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of it useless . . . or achieves a
weird and whimsical result.”).
358. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519 (noting that while the Rodds owned stock
separately, they voted as a block, essentially providing no protection to the
Donahues).
359. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 7.10, at 453 (explaining that, in attempting
to interpret the “plain and ordinary meaning” of a contract, “the court is free to look
to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction”).
360. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
361. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 284 (noting that investors in close
corporations are “better informed about their legal rights and obligations” than is
often assumed).
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Why, then, if Joseph knew he was acquiring unequal rights, would
he have agreed to pay an equivalent (or, more properly, a
proportional) consideration? One answer that suggests itself is that
perhaps they did not believe they were contributing proportionately.
Each, for example, had expertise to contribute. Perhaps they
believed that the management expertise that Harry was contributing
was more valuable than Joseph’s operational expertise, thus
362
suggesting that Harry did indeed pay a premium price for control.
On the other hand, given that Harry would be spreading his expertise
over more shares, it is just as likely that they believed the eightytwenty percent split accurately represented their contributions of
both money and skill.
Certainly, their actions were not so
inconsistent with such an interpretation as to require a different
result in the case.
A more rewarding factual inquiry might be to instead inquire why
Harry included Joseph in the deal in the first place. The fact that
Harry was liquid enough to finance the entire deal himself suggests
363
that he did not need Joseph’s money.
Rather, Harry more likely
included Joseph so as to incentivize him to continue working as an
employee after Harry took control and changed the company’s name
364
to Rodd Electrotype.
Giving Joseph a twenty percent stake may
have amounted to a 1950s version of a modern stock incentive
program, such as the grant of phantom stock or stock appreciation
365
rights. Although such shares would provide him neither a real say
362. Harry Rodd and Joseph Donahue joined Royal of New England as employees
in the mid-1930s, thereafter working their way up to being general manager and
treasurer, and plant superintendent and corporate vice president, respectively.
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519. For an example of a partnership case where one party
was allegedly compensated for his superior management expertise, see Richert v.
Handly, 330 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Wash. 1958).
363. According to the facts, Harry loaned the company most of the $75,000 that it
paid at closing. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 509. Given that Joseph’s investment
amounted to only $1,000, it is not a leap to imagine that Harry could have increased
the loan to $76,000 had he needed to.
364. See id. (noting that Joseph, at Harry’s sugestion, decided to purchase shares
in the corporation even though a majority of the financial backing would be coming
from Harry).
365. See O’Kelley, supra note 6, at 220-21 (considering the possibility that “Rodd
merely allowed Donahue to continue as a shareholder as an incentive-compensation
device”). Stock appreciation rights, or SARs, grant the employee cash “equal to the
excess of the fair market value of a share of the corporation’s common stock on the
date of exercise over the fair market value of a share on the date the right is
granted.” Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2 C.B. 166. SARs are granted without cost to the
employee and an employee does not have to own the corporation’s stock to obtain a
SAR. Id. “Phantom stock is ‘[a] right . . . to receive . . . an award with a value equal
to the appreciation of a share of stock from the date the Phantom Stock is cashed
out.’” Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Coopers & Lybrand, Executive Summary of Nonqualified Long-term Incentive Plans, CV01
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in management nor the guaranty of continued employment, they
would serve as an important symbol. Joseph would gain the
important emotional feeling of having a stake in the enterprise. The
shares also would provide an easy way to compensate Joseph for his
efforts toward the success of the business—a direct share of any
corporate dividends.
The problem with such a scheme, and perhaps one reason for the
modern preference for stock incentive programs, is that in a private
corporation the value of a minority stake is based almost entirely on
367
the goodwill of the controlling shareholders.
Unless the board of
directors, acting at the direction of the controlling shareholders,
agreed to redeem the shares or declare a dividend, there would be no
368
way for the employee to realize any value from her shares. In this
sense, such shares are more akin to a promise to be considered for a
discretionary cash bonus plan. Under either structure, the minority
holder would receive a payout only to the extent the controlling
369
shareholders caused the company to declare a payment. Because a
company is always free to pay a bonus to any employee in any
reasonable amount, minority share ownership, such as that held by
Joseph Donahue, is generally redundant and, hence, largely
ineffective as an employee incentive (other than as a morale
370
booster).
ALI-ABA 619, 632 (1996)). Like SARs, phantom stock constitutes a form of
employee compensation awarded to incentivize executives.
Chamison v.
HealthTrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 915 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 748 A.2d 407 (Del. 2000).
The purpose of equity incentive plans like phantom stock and SARs is to align the
interests of management and stockholders. See Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube
Co., 197 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the purpose of a phantom stock
plan is to “promote the interests of the [c]orporation . . . by aligning the interests of
senior management . . . with those of the stockholder”). For income tax purposes,
both phantom stock and SARs are characterized as rights to receive future
compensation and not as stock of the issuing corporation. Rev. Rul. 80-300, 1980-2
C.B. 166.
366. For a discussion of the relationship between minority oppression and
employment law, see Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment at Will in
the Close Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517 (1999)
(describing the deficiencies in contesting termination of employment under the atwill doctrine in contrast with the advantages of making the claim under the
oppression doctrine where the employee is also a shareholder).
367. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (noting that minority stockholders are at the
mercy of majority stockholders in close corporations in terms of both monetary
benefits and a role in corporate management).
368. See Thompson, Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 732 (noting that
even if the minority shareholder is able to bring a derivative action “any recovery . . .
remains under the control of the . . . defendants in the litigation”).
369. See id. at 702-03 (describing the use of dividend withholding as a form of
squeeze-out technique).
370. They may, however, appear to have tax advantages by providing a means for
distributing cash at lower rates. On the other hand, given that the payment of
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If Joseph’s investment represented little other than the privilege of
371
participating in a discretionary cash bonus plan, he could have had
little expectation that his investment would be valuable beyond the
372
life of Harry’s goodwill toward him.
Thus, when the Rodd family
finally did cut off the payments, there would seem to be little about
their conduct that would constitute an unfair surprise. Joseph
apparently took the job with the new company, and invested $1,000,
on the gamble that he would be repaid. Like any other business or
investment risk, there is nothing inherently unjust about entering
373
into a losing deal.
On the other hand, it is equally possible that
Joseph expected to be able to sell his shares back to the company
upon his retirement (or death) and that they represented not only
participation in a discretionary cash bonus plan but also a sort of
informal pension arrangement. In fact, the further one delves into
the facts in search of evidence of the parties’ intentions, the more
complicated the analysis becomes and the more supposition that is
necessary.
It is at this point, then, that a focus on the price offers a potential
path out of the confusion. Where the facts and circumstances
surrounding a dispute, as well as the express language of the
agreement in question, fail to illuminate the parties’ deal, an
exploration of the price may provide the clues necessary to interpret
their intent. In this way, the use of price may make possible a
subjective analysis where traditional tools yield only confusion. If
Joseph had paid a discounted price, for example, it might serve as
evidence that he had already been compensated for bearing the risks

dividends is not deductible to the company, their tax treatment may actually be less
favorable than the payment of salary because of the resulting double tax. Moreover,
because any dividends paid on such shares must also be paid to the majority in a
proportionate amount, they are significantly less flexible than a discretionary cash
bonus plan. See supra note 365 (discussing how the value paid on shares is
determined).
371. The $1,000 invested by Donahue may also represent bonding costs. At the
time of the transition of the company from corporate subsidiary to Rodd-controlled
private entity, Joseph may have believed it necessary to pledge his fidelity to Harry
Rodd in order that Harry continue to partner with, and invest in, Donahue as a
valued and trusted employee. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 509 (noting that Joseph
had served as an employee and had never served in management and at Harry’s
request, Joseph purchased fifty shares in the corporation knowing that Harry would
have the majority of the shares).
372. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing the risks associated
with a falling out among shareholders and a loss of a mutually trusting relationship).
373. See, e.g., Protech Indus., Inc. v. URS Corp., 377 F.3d 868, 873 (2004) (“The
purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is not to disturb the allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power, but to prevent oppression and unfair
surprise.”).
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374

associated with his minority status.
A more productive line of
inquiry would therefore be to ask how Euphemia (through Joseph)
came to become a shareholder of Rodd Electrotype in the first place.
It is the initial investment transaction, then, that must be explored to
determine the price that Joseph paid for the shares.
The acquisition of Royal of New England was structured as a twostep process. In the first step, Harry Rodd purchased 200 shares and
375
Joseph Donahue 50 shares. Each paid twenty dollars per share and
acquired their shares directly from the parent company, leaving the
376
parent with 725 of the 1000 outstanding shares. In the second step,
Royal of New England redeemed the parent corporation’s 725 shares
377
for $135,000. Of this amount, $75,000 was paid in cash at closing,
378
most of which appears to have been financed by a loan from Harry.
379
The remainder was payable in installments over five years.
Thus, Harry and Joseph each paid identical amounts per share for
their interests in the company. Moreover, the consideration for the
725 shares to be retired was paid out of the company’s future
revenues—revenues that otherwise would have benefited Harry and
Joseph proportionately, in accordance with their relative share
380
ownership.
The proportional structure of their initial investment
transaction therefore seems to suggest that Harry and Joseph
intended their interests to represent equal claims. Omission, in this
case, appears to have resulted from oversight, and the later
redemption of Harry Rodd’s shares appears to have constituted an
unfair surprise.
An analysis of the price, then, suggests an alternative basis for the
court to have found in favor of the Donahues. Joseph paid full and
374. See supra Part II.C.
375. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 509.
376. Id. The remaining twenty-five shares appear to have been owned by an
individual identified only as Lawrence W. Kelley. Id. As they were redeemed by
Royal of New England for $1,000 as part of step two—for a tidy profit of $500—their
exact disposition is unimportant, as is the identity of Kelley. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. Although Harry Rodd appears to have contributed most of the $75,000
that was used to redeem the parent corporation’s shares, he was acting as a lender,
not an equity investor. Id. This amount was presumably repaid with interest and so
does not represent a disproportionate investment in the company and so does not
impact an analysis of price. Id. at 509-10.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 509. Interestingly, the acquisition of Royal of New England by Harry
and Joseph appears to have been structured as a sort of crude management-led LBO.
Id. at 509. The two financed their acquisition of the company with $5,000 of their
own cash as equity, together with two loans against the corporation’s assets—one
payable to the parent corporation and one to the bank of Harry Rodd—for the
remaining $135,000. Id. Over 96% of the purchase price, in other words, would be
paid from the future revenues of the company. Id.
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equal value for his shares, without minority discount.
Their
subsequent treatment as minority shares by the Rodd family was
therefore inequitable and represented a misappropriation of the
value of Joseph’s investment. Joseph was never compensated for the
additional risks he bore by agreeing to be a vulnerable minority
investor, and so the Rodd family exceeded their discretion by treating
their shares as superior in right. The blunt instrument of the court’s
objective approach thus yielded the same result in this case as would
a subjective analysis of the parties’ bargain through the lens of price.
Though the result was the same, a focus on the price yielded a
more nuanced and more solid understanding of the parties’
intentions than did a traditional exploration of the facts and
circumstances. Price, then, served its purpose as a diagnostic tool,
and would have allowed the court to uncover the true extent of the
parties’ bargain with a higher degree of certainty. Joseph Donahue
paid the same price per share as did Harry Rodd. One can therefore
deduce that he either was ignorant of the risks he was assuming or
believed that his investment had equal (or, more accurately,
proportional) value. To the extent he was ignorant, the omission
from their bargain of language protecting him from abuse was an
oversight that led to an unfair surprise. Alternatively, to the extent
he believed his shares and those purchased by Harry were equivalent
in right, the Rodd family’s redemption unfairly subordinated his
investment to that of Harry and constituted oppression. Either way,
the similar pricing of the shares suggests that the parties intended
equal treatment. Joseph, however, was denied the benefit of his
bargain.
B. Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries
381

Though an English case, Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries served as
an important influence on the early development of the American
382
response to minority vulnerability. Preceding Donahue by about two
years, it was hailed at the time as “the most significant decision on
minority shareholder remedies delivered during the past two

381. [1972] 2 All E.R. 492.
382. See Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 212 (tracing the impetus
for the development of the reasonable expectations standard in the United States to
the scholarly work of Afterman and O’Neal and to the House of Lords’ decision in
Ebrahimi); O’Neal, supra note 4, at 885 (“Perhaps the decision that has propounded
[the concept that the law should protect the reasonable expectations of minority
investors] most forcefully is a 1972 decision of the House of Lords, Ebrahimi v.
Westbourne Galleries Ltd.”).
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383

decades.”
It addressed another common expression of
opportunistic behavior—the dismissal of an employee who was also a
384
minority shareholder—and serves as a useful contrast to Donahue.
Plaintiff Ebrahimi and the defendant, Nazar, had organized a
385
private company in 1958 as equal shareholders.
Each paid £500
386
“Soon after the company’s formation,”
and received 500 shares.
however, Ebrahimi and Nazar each sold an equal portion of their
shares to Nazar’s son, making the ownership structure forty percent
387
for each of Ebrahimi and Nazar, and twenty percent for the son.
Assuming that Nazar and his son would pool their votes, and because
the contract omitted any special protections for Ebrahimi, the Nazars
therefore exercised near complete discretion over the corporation’s
388
affairs.
The court found in favor of the employee Ebrahimi, holding that
his dismissal did not satisfy the English “just and equitable”
389
standard. As in Donahue, the court seemed offended not so much
by the particular conduct at issue but rather by the inherent
390
inequality present in the arrangement. The court emphasized in its
opinion that the Nazars treated—and indeed seemed to regard—
Ebrahimi as a subservient employee rather than as a co-equal
391
partner.
He was, as the court noted, “at the mercy” of the
392
controlling shareholders. The Nazars, for example, had the power
to pay out the profits to themselves in the form of salaries, thereby
393
depriving Ebrahimi of the value of his investment.
383. F. Hodge O’Neal, Introduction, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1987) (quoting L.
H. Leigh, Just and Equitable Winding Up, 88 LAW Q. REV. 468 (1972)).
384. Id.
385. Ebrahimi, 2 All E.R. at 492. Although the form of entity at issue in Ebrahimi—a
private company governed by the English Companies Act—is not the same as an
American close corporation, the two forms are close enough as to make the English
precedent relevant for US legal decision-making. See Lutter, supra note 24, at 7-8
(describing a private company as one “whose shares were held by a few members,
were not offered for public subscription, were not traded on the stock exchange, and
whose transferability was restricted by the articles of association”).
386. Ebrahimi, 2 All E.R. at 492.
387. Id.
388. See id. (stating that Nazar and his son abused their power by excluding
Ebrahimi from exercising any control and from participating in the management of
the business).
389. Id. at 500-01.
390. See id. (stating that removing directors from the board is a normal course of
business for companies but that does not mean the removal is always justified,
especially where one partner is excluded from the management of the company).
391. Id. at 501 (“Mr. Nazar made it perfectly clear that he did not regard the
appellant as a partner; but did regard him as an employee.”).
392. Id.
393. Running counter to this concern, however, was the fact that Nazar had
apparently made assurances to the court that the company’s prior policy of not
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Ebrahimi, then, would appear quite similar to the decision in
Donahue, and in fact both served to further the protection of minority
394
In both cases, the courts took
investors in their own jurisdictions.
an objective approach to the problem by ignoring the possibility that
the controlling shareholders had bargained for the discretion to
engage in the conduct at issue. The Nazars, for example, made
395
assurances to the court that they would pay dividends to Ebrahimi.
In other words, their conduct was not intended to make his
investment unprofitable, but merely to remove him as an officer and
396
director.
Is it not possible, however, that the Nazars had paid ex
ante for the right to control management? Share ownership is not
usually co-extensive with guaranteed employment, so this does not
397
appear to be an unreasonable assumption.
The court, however,
ignored the question of the parties’ unique bargain and instead
imposed its own view of proper commercial behavior. The English
“just and equitable” standard, according to the court’s approach, was
398
to be interpreted by the judge, not bargained over by the parties.
Using price to approach the case from a subjective viewpoint,
however, one quickly uncovers evidence regarding the parties’
intentions as to how much discretion would be allocated to the
Nazars. As was the case in Donahue, the parties appear to have paid
equal consideration for their shares, thus suggesting that they
399
believed they were purchasing equivalent rights.
Had Ebrahimi
paid less than Nazar for his shares, it might have been possible to
infer that the parties deemed his shares less valuable, presumably
because of a mutual understanding that Nazar’s shares possessed the
400
additional attributes of control and discretion.
This, however,

paying dividends would be reversed, such that Ebrahimi would receive distributions
of corporate profit. Id.
394. See Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 4, at 212 (discussing the
importance of the decision of the House of Lords in Ebrahimi to extend the English
“just and equitable” standard to the realm of minority oppression).
395. Ebrahimi, 2 All E.R. at 501.
396. See id. (explaining that while Ebrahimi would not have retained his position
as a director, he would have retained dividends from his shares).
397. But see Moll, supra note 366, at 523 (“In the traditional public corporation,
the typical shareholder is an investor who neither contributes labor to the
corporation takes part in the responsibilities of management. In contrast. . . . Close
corporation shareholders usually expect employment.”) (citations omitted).
398. See Ebrahimi, 2 All E.R. at 500-01 (stating that it was unjust for the Nazars to
exclude Ebrahimi from the management of the business even though it was evident
that Nazar thought of Ebrahimi as an employee rather than a business partner).
399. Id. at 492.
400. See supra Part I.D.3.
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appears not to have been the case. Rather, they each invested an
401
identical one pound per share.
Taking a closer look at the structure of the consideration, however,
one uncovers a more nuanced, and perhaps unexpected, story—
certainly one overlooked by the court. Though the facts are
somewhat vague on this point, it appears from the opinion that Nazar
had been engaged in the business of dealing in carpets before
402
forming a new company with Ebrahimi.
In other words, the
business was not commenced at the time Nazar and Ebrahimi joined
forces; the business was a continuation of the prior one. Thus,
Ebrahimi did indeed pay a discounted price for his shares in that he
contributed only £500 cash, whereas Nazar apparently contributed
403
£500 cash plus the assets and goodwill of the prior business.
Depending on the value of the prior business, it is even possible that
the two £500 payments represented only a small portion of the
business’s actual value. In this way, the money itself could even have
been essentially symbolic, much like the clods of dirt once exchanged
404
to signify the sale of real property. In fact, although the case does
not provide the facts necessary to be sure, Nazar’s insistence that he
regarded Ebrahimi as his employee rather than his partner suggests
that Ebrahimi’s investment—unlike Joseph Donahue’s—may indeed
have represented an employee incentive scheme rather than a true
405
partnership stake.
Why else would Ebrahimi have been willing to
sell twenty percent of his shares back to Nazar and his son for little or

401. Ebrahimi, 2 All E.R. at 492.
402. Id. at 492-93.
403. Id. at 492. Ebrahimi and Nazar had run the business for many years as a
partnership, with each taking an equal share of the profits. Id. It was only after
incorporating the business that they reconfigured the ownership to reflect the fortyforty-twenty percent split that existed at the time of the trial. Id. While this
additional wrinkle seems to suggest that the two both contributed equally to the
private company, in that both contributed the assets and goodwill of the partnership,
it does not so much change the story as move it back in time. Rather than contribute
unequally to the private company, the two seem to have contributed unequally to the
partnership. Given that the case is based in equity, however, it seems appropriate to
carry this inequality forward through the different structures in order to discover
whether the parties’ investments were intended to be treated as equally valuable, or
whether the parties’ actions implied that they believed a fundamental inequality
existed—one for which a price adjustment was made.
404. The ancient English custom of exchanging “a twig, a clod of dirt, or a piece
of turf” to symbolize the sale of real property was known as the “livery of seisin.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (8th ed. 2004). See also Tennant v. John Tennant
Mem’l Home, 140 P. 242, 244 (Cal. 1914) (explaining that a transfer accomplished
by means of the manual delivery, in front of witnesses, of a clod or piece of turf
served to make such transfer irrevocable).
405. See supra notes 369-70 and accompanying text (discussing SARs, phantom
stock, other employee incentive plans generally).
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no gain, thereby entrenching his minority status in the company’s
capital structure?
Unlike in Donahue, then, an analysis of price in Ebrahimi suggests a
different outcome than does an objective approach. If Nazar did
indeed contribute valuable assets and goodwill from a prior business
in addition to the £500 cash amount, then he paid a premium price
for his interest, presumably because the parties never contemplated
equal treatment. Rather, they allocated to the Nazars a large degree
of discretion over the company’s operation.
To the extent the Nazars made oral or implicit promises to induce
Ebrahimi to remain employed with the business, such an injustice
could have been remedied by principles of either contract law or
406
employment law.
With respect to corporation law, however, it
would appear that Ebrahimi was previously compensated for
assuming the risk that his employment could be terminated. He was
admittedly at the mercy of the Nazars, but the fact of his lowly status
407
was not itself an injustice but rather the nature of their bargain.
Certainly, there would have been no sense of injustice had Ebrahimi
received shares of a non-voting class of stock. The court’s decision in
favor of Ebrahimi therefore gave him a dual benefit at the expense of
the Nazars. Having contributed a disproportionately small amount of
the consideration, Ebrahimi was erroneously treated by the court as if
his interest was equivalent to that of the Nazars.
Again, as was the case in Donahue, the court in Ebrahimi failed to
measure the controlling shareholders’ conduct against the allocation
of power adopted by the parties. Rather than seek to apply the
allocation of power elected by the parties, the court applied its own
opinion as to the proper scope of permissible commercial behavior.
The court’s mistake was in reading the omission of special
408
protections as oversight, when in fact there was no omission.
The
parties’ preferred allocation of the risk of control was embedded in
409
the structure of the consideration.
To judge the equity of Ebrahimi’s termination, it is necessary to
consider whether the parties’ bargain gave the Nazars discretion over
406. See Moll, supra note 4, at 989 (discussing the relationship between the
governance of close corporations and the principles of contract law); Moll, supra
note 366, at 517 (discussing the relationship between the governance of close
corporations and the principles of employment law).
407. See supra notes 28-34.
408. See Ebrahimi, 2 All E.R. at 500–01 (discussing the relationship between Nazar
and Ebrahimi). Although Nazar believed the relationship to be one of employer and
employee, the court believed the relationship to be one of equal partners. Id.
409. See id. at 492 (describing the beginning of the corporation and what assets
each partner brought to the corporation).
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such matters. Here, then, in contrast to Donahue, the blunt
instrument of an objective approach to the problem of minority
vulnerability resulted in a different outcome than would have a more
precise, price-based analysis. By focusing on the deal’s negotiation of
price, then, it is possible in some cases to avoid injustice by granting
the parties the benefits of their bargain. Rather than comparing
allegedly opportunistic behavior to an idealized norm, an analysis of
price frequently provides a mechanism for enforcing the parties’
actual deal.
CONCLUSION
A flexible norm is generally superior to a uniform and mandatory
410
rule. By giving the parties the benefits of their bargain, rather than
imposing an allocation of risk that the court prefers, the legal system
411
encourages and reinforces private contracting. This enables parties
to negotiate the allocation of risk that is optimal for their own
circumstances and for the circumstances of their particular corporate
412
enterprise.
Moreover, by attempting to recreate and enforce the
parties’ preferences, a subjective approach also serves a broad liberty
interest. All else being equal, there is a good to be achieved by
allowing investors the freedom to bargain over and structure their
own affairs.
When a default approach is not possible, however, it may
admittedly be necessary to apply a mandatory one. Many minority
investors are certainly the victims of oppression, although its precise
413
frequency cannot be known.
When it is unclear whether the
omission of contractual protections represents oversight or intention,
414
legal intervention may be necessary to avoid an injustice. By erring
on the side of protecting minority investors, the use of an objective
standard is likely to provide a just result in most cases, as it did in
415
Donahue. The lack of sophistication of many small investors makes
410. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 32 (arguing for the establishment of a
presumption in favor of private ordering). Skepticism regarding the competence of
policymakers to second-guess the judgment of investors and businesspeople lies at
the heart of the business judgment rule. See supra notes 93 and 178.
411. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 64 (arguing that “the dominant trend
in corporate law over the last 200 years has been to free corporate law from its state
concession origins and treat it as a contractual relationship”).
412. See id. at 46 (arguing that “legal regulation of the right of contract should be
based on particularized circumstances”).
413. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 284 (“The extent to which minority
shareholders are ignorant of problems they might face and thus fail to protect
themselves is impossible to tell.”).
414. See Chander, supra note 1, at 121, 124.
415. See supra Part III.A.
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it likely that omission is often indicative of oversight rather than of
416
An objective standard of permissible commercial
intention.
417
Its use should
conduct also serves an important educational role.
therefore not be casually discarded. Rather, an objective standard
should be used to evaluate potentially opportunistic behavior when a
subjective approach proves impossible.
Price, because it serves as a proxy for risk, can illuminate the
parties’ deal. In this manner, it can be used as a tool for uncovering
and interpreting the range of behavior that the parties themselves
418
had contemplated.
Where traditional methods of interpreting
contracts fail to shed light on the meaning of contractual silence,
exploring the relative prices the parties paid may often yield an
insight. A price-based approach to contract interpretation—at least
in the context of close corporations—makes it possible to protect
deserving minority investors while still treating the courts’ objective
419
standards as default norms that the parties may waive.

416. See O’Neal, supra note 4, at 883 (“A person taking a minority position in a
close corporation often leaves himself vulnerable to squeeze-out or oppression by
failing to insist upon a shareholders’ agreement or appropriate charter or bylaw
provisions.”).
417. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation:
An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX L. REV. 477, 527 (1995)
(arguing that within traditional moral discourse there is room for law to create moral
accountability by reinvigorating the autonomy of corporate actors).
418. See supra Part II.C.
419. For a discussion of the advantages of a price-based approach to minority
oppression over traditional oppression doctrines, see supra text accompanying notes
203-10.

